THE

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW

FOR

OCTOBER—DECEMBER, 1950

JANUARY—MARCH, 1951

VOLUME CLI



THE CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW

39, WELBECK STREET,
LONDON, W.1.
1951.

v.151-
152
1950-
51

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A NOTTINGHAMSHIRE PARSON IN THE 17th CENTURY

By F. H. WEST

"A REGISTER," wrote William Sampson, rector of the Nottinghamshire village of Clayworth from 1672 to 1703, "is one of the best preservatives against the evils which our mortality, and the world's volubility makes us liable unto". His own register, or "Rector's Book" as he liked to call it, was compiled for the benefit of posterity and for the correction of those who "thought that there is nothing (or very little) worth noting in a country parish". It is more of a log book than a diary and therefore lacks the lively personal touch of Parson Woodforde's Journal: but it gives a vivid picture of the life of a country clergyman and his parish at the end of the seventeenth century.

William Sampson came of yeoman stock and was born at South Leverton in Nottinghamshire in 1632. He graduated at Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, and was elected to a fellowship under the Commonwealth. In these early days he was probably a good Puritan like other members of his family, and to the end of his life he remained a Whig in politics. In his short *History of Pembroke College* (1936), Aubrey Attwater pays tribute to Sampson's ability as an administrator and to his successful setting of the college finances in order after the Restoration. The system of keeping accounts which he introduced in the reign of Charles II was not superseded until the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria.

In 1672 the Dean of Lincoln presented the capable young don to the comfortable but somewhat remote benefice of Clayworth, vacant by the preferment of Dr. Mapletoft to the Mastership of Pembroke and Deanery of Ely. For several generations the rectors of Clayworth had been men of some distinction. Anthony Topham (d. 1655) became Dean of Lincoln, and the

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Puritan Cromwell who was ejected in 1661 to make way for Dr. Mapletoft was chaplain to his illustrious namesake the Lord Protector.

On receiving letters of institution from the Archbishop of York in July 1672,[1] Mr. Sampson went into residence and preached his first sermon. Letters of induction from the Archdeacon of Nottingham followed, the induction itself being performed without ceremony by the curate. The next Sunday the new rector read and subscribed to the XXXIX Articles. After these preliminaries the people of Clayworth did not see him for nearly three years, for in October he was recalled to Pembroke as President, "which occasioned my residence in ye University and non-residence at Clayworth". A curate was found to look after the parish, and the spacious rectory with its revenues was let to a layman for £150 p.a.

In November 1675 Sampson retired from Cambridge for good and returned to his rectory. A long standing feud with one of his colleagues, Dr. Coga, who later succeeded Mapletoft as Master, may have been responsible for bringing his academic career to an end. He still kept in close touch with the College and made a generous contribution towards the building of the library; but when in 1693, he was offered the Mastership, rather to everyone's surprise he refused it. By then he had come to prefer the rural life. This episode is tersely recorded in the book.

> "Mr Anthony & Mr Tyrwhit two of ye Fell[ow]s of Pemb[roke] Hall in Cambr[idge] (upon ye death of Dr. Coga) brought me Letters of my being Elected to ye Mastership of ye College. But I excused myself to ym".

In the twenty-eight years that he resided at Clayworth he appears to have had only one holiday, apart from his visits to Lincoln of which he became a prebendary, and to York as a Proctor in Convocation; this holiday was spent in London and Cambridge and lasted five weeks.

Once he had returned to his cure in 1675 it seems that the rector attended conscientiously to his parochial duties. He made

[1] Nottinghamshire was then an archdeaconry in the Diocese of York.

a complete list of all his parishioners together with their occupations. This list, which is preserved in the book, provides very valuable information about the size and make-up of a village community three centuries ago. Within a short time he was catechising the children on Sunday afternoons, and the following year he resolved always to have public prayers on Wednesdays and Fridays in Lent. Sometimes when a brief had been read on a Sunday he compelled the churchwardens to undertake a house to house collection with him during the following week.

Holy Communion was then celebrated at Clayworth only at Christmas, Easter and Whitsun. But the rector was careful that everyone who desired to communicate should have an opportunity of doing so. Palm Sunday and Good Friday were added to the Easter celebrations, and the two Sundays following Christmas and Whitsun to the celebration on those days. At Easter 1680, from a population of 400 (of which about 170 were children), there were 209 communicants. At Christmas and Whitsun he never had above 50. One entry in the book suggests that if the rector had been prepared to have Communion more frequently he would not have been without communicants. The Test Act of 1673 required every person who took office under the Crown to receive Communion at the hands of a priest of the Church of England. "July 8 1677 Mr. Wawen (being Commissioner for land tax) received ye Sacrament with 8 more communicants.... July 11th I subscribed Mr. Wawen and Mr. Dickonson a certificate of their receiving ye Sacrament according to ye use of the Church of England". Now Mr. Wawen was not a regular communicant, and his reasons for receiving the Sacrament on this occasion are obvious enough. But the other eight who communicated with him were probably people who were glad of this rare chance of attending Communion between Whitsun and Christmas.

By the end of the century numbers at Communion had dropped considerably. In 1701 there were only 126 Easter communicants, nearly a hundred less than 25 years before. The enthusiasm which greeted the restoration of the Church of England in 1660 was beginning to wear off. Almost on the last page

of his book the rector speaks of "the hot fit" of enthusiasm with which the reintroduction of the Rogationtide procession was received in 1661. The yeoman farmers had opened their doors to the party and so delayed the procession by their lavish hospitality that the perambulation took three days to complete. But by 1700 it was taken for granted. Only one farmer had offered hospitality in recent years, and the rector was expected to bear the cost of entertainment. In 1660 the Restoration of the King meant to country folk the revival of the long forbidden village feasts, frolicks and sports. For a time the Anglican clergy basked in the spring sunshine which appeared in the general reaction from the grim winter of the Puritan regime. But all this was forgotten forty years later.

However, even in the early days of his ministry at Clayworth there were problems to be solved. One of them, according to Overton, was general throughout the country and a legacy of the Puritan regime. In the seventeenth century parents did not delay the baptism of infants even until the mother had risen from childbed. A glance at any church register of the period will show that a very high proportion of infants died within a few days of birth. So the custom of baptizing infants on the second or third day prevailed everywhere and not a few were baptized at home. The Prayer-Book rubric requires that privately baptized children shall be brought to church for official reception at the earliest opportunity, and Anglican clergy of the Laudian school had always been strict on this point. The Puritans who had broken up medieval fonts and were generally contemptuous of ceremonies, not only tolerated private baptism but encouraged it; and lazy parents often took advantage of this state of affairs and called the minister to their house, when they could quite easily have brought the baby to church. An abuse once accepted is difficult to correct, and many of the Anglican clergy, Mr. Sampson among them, met with considerable opposition after the Restoration when they tried to enforce the rubric.

> "1677 Mr. Thomas Dickonson having had a child baptized privately in his house (ye child not sick) about Xtmas '76, sent a note to me . . . to know whether I had entered it into ye Church

Register and I returned him word, No, and yt I was of opinion it ought not to be done; it not being baptized publickly, nor yet publickly certified yt it was baptized privately."

Mr. Dickonson refused to bring the baby to church and appealed to the archbishop. Correspondence from all the parties concerned flowed between Clayworth and the Chancellor's court at York, and the dispute was still continuing when "ye child dyed at Retford and put an end to this difference".

There are only three references to confirmations in the neighbourhood during the whole time Mr. Sampson was at Clayworth. All of them took place at Retford. In 1685 33 candidates were presented. In 1690 the easy-going Archbishop Lamplugh confirmed after his primary visitation. The scandalously haphazard way that confirmations were conducted in the seventeenth century is reflected in an entry in the book: "There was a confirmation but so confused a thing that I could not see who of my own parish was there".

We shall see later that there was very little enthusiasm for education at Clayworth. No school building existed during Mr. Sampson's incumbency, but in 1676 the rector gave leave to John Wyersdale to "teach school in ye church", and in 1700 "ye place in ye church called ye lumberhouse was separated by deal bonds from ye church and made use of for a school". This improvised school room was not more than 15 feet square, so there could not have been many scholars.

There are many references to the stirring events in Church and State before and after "The Glorious Revolution" of 1689. When James II ascended the throne in 1685, the Whig rector, with a greater foresight than many of his Tory brethren, sensed troubled times ahead for Church and State, for he remarks that the collect for the day (Epiphany V) is "observable" which indeed it was.[2] In 1687 one churchwarden, claiming that King James had dispensed with the ecclesiastical laws of the realm, refused to take the oath administered by the archdeacon at his visitation. On June 3 and 10, 1688, Mr. Sampson refused to

[2] "O Lord, we beseech thee to keep thy Church and household continually in thy true religion . . . "

read the King's Declaration of Liberty of Conscience. On the second of the two days the Queen gave birth to the future "Old Pretender". Mr. Sampson obviously accepted the Whig legend of the warming pan for he notes: "On ye latter of these two days ye Prince of Wales *was said* to be born". His mind and, no doubt, his sermons were full of thoughts upon contemporary events. The psalm for the day (52nd) suggested a vivid description of the King: "Why boasteth thou thyself, thou Tyrant that thou canst do mischief?"

Meanwhile the seven bishops had been cast into the Tower for protesting against the Declaration. Three weeks later news came to Clayworth that they had been discharged. It was St. Peter's Day, the patronal festival of the church: "June 29 being St. Peter's day (and ye feast or rather frolick at Clayworth) by ye intercesion of whome [St. Peter] it was perhaps hoped his pretended successor [the Pope] might obtain a Victory over ye 7 Angels [the seven Bishops] of ye English-Protestant-Church; ye Bps were brought to ye Bar and tryed, but found not guilty".

On July 16 the archdeacons were summoned to make a return to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners of all the clergy who had refused to read the Declaration. "But they generally not appearing had by some means longer time given." Then the old Whig adds with the utmost relief: "Before that came, the snare was broken and we were delivered; I mean ye Ecclesiastical Commission itself was taken away by ye News of ye Prince of O's preparations to invade ye Kingdom".

> "Dec. 17th. The Prince of O. sent a kind of Order to ye King to have him remove himself from Whitehall. On which day at ye evening Service was read in course Ps. 89: which see vv. 32-37 etc"[3].

These entries in the book are interesting chiefly because of the information they give of the kind of texts which a Whig clergyman would choose for his sermons, and the commentary he would make upon them during the troubled years of James II's reign.

[3] Verse 32: "If they break my statutes and keep not my commandments: I will visit their offences with the rod and their sin with scourges."

The rector hints in one or two places that the hold of the Church on the people towards the end of his ministry at Clayworth was not what it had been thirty years earlier. The register of services bears out this view. With all the enthusiasm for the Church which had marked the first years after the Restoration, there had been little inclination to reconstitute the ecclesiastical courts through which Archbishop Laud had hoped to control the manners and the morals of the people. From 1672 to 1701 the Wardens of Clayworth presented only two or three offenders at the archidiaconal visitation, and there was only one excommunication. Nonconformity was on the decline throughout the rural areas of Nottinghamshire; Mr. Sampson reported to the archbishop that there was not a Dissenter of any sort in the parish. Yet the Church was undoubtedly losing its grip.

Elsewhere, and more particularly in the towns, the indifference of the people to religion and the consequent increase of immorality were causing public concern. In 1684 James II caused the statute of 1624 against profane swearing to be read in all churches. Eleven years later William III, chastened by the death of Queen Mary, issued injunctions to the bishops which he hoped might spur the Church to action.

Meanwhile many devout Churchpeople and Nonconformists joined together to combat the vices of the time. The purpose of the Society for the Reformation of Manners was to detect moral irregularities and to discipline offenders in the appropriate courts. Many bishops supported it and spoke enthusiastically of the number of lewd houses and taverns which the society had succeeded in closing in their dioceses. But Archbishop Sharpe of York did not approve of its methods, especially of the encouragement it gave to busybodies and informers. In 1699, according to Mr. Sampson, the clergy of the archdeaconry of Nottingham were invited to join the society. They immediately consulted the archbishop and called a meeting at Mansfield, which a dozen of them attended. They "concluded it not agreeable to ye canons to form societies and to have set and formal meetings. But this we did. We subscribed a paper to give encouragement to school masters to teach poor children to read and write and in-

struct them in the church catechism and also to buy some small books (as ye Xtian Monitor . . .) to be given to poor families". This looks like a typical example of Anglican caution. But it is probable that the country clergy did not regard the moral state of their parishes as requiring the drastic action which others would have employed in the cities. Parson Sampson's many references to his parishioners do not suggest that they were in any way out of hand. The squire once broke his gun barrel over the head of a servant: now and again a drunken rustic fell from a horse and broke a few bones; one or two burglaries were committed, and there were, of course, some violent quarrels. But the Clayworth folk seem to have been generally a well behaved crowd.

Mr. Sampson was fortunate in the possession of a moderately wealthy benefice. Unlike many of his clerical neighbours he was able to live spaciously, to entertain his parishioners liberally, and to play a benevolent part in the life of the village. In September it was his custom to provide a harvest supper. Like Parson Woodforde, a century later, he entertained some of the poorer folk at Christmas. In January he gave two treats for "the husbandry," presumably his own tenants and labourers, at the rectory. At Rogationtide he accompanied the party which perambulated the boundaries of the parish, and those who had been to church beforehand were entertained at the expense of the rector afterwards. His house was always open for informal meetings and gatherings. In 1681, at a meeting in the rectory, Mr. Sampson promised to give a fifth part of what was required for endowing a free school in the village. Mr. Johnson, a substantial farmer, came forward with the offer of a house for the master. But the people "proved generally cold" and the scheme came to nothing.

The rector's book gives a detailed account of the sources from which a seventeenth century country benefice drew its revenue; fees taken at church for ministerial duties, the produce of the glebe, and tithe. Of these the first was by far the smallest. In 1674 the rector derived £6 2s. 10s. from weddings, burials, churchings, mortuaries and funeral sermons; that is only

3 per cent. of his total income. A mortuary was a death duty of 10s. payable to the incumbent by the executors of a deceased parishioner. Funeral sermons were very popular with the people and the parson always charged a fee for them.

Before the enclosures, the parson's glebe was scattered, like the land of his parishioners, over the open fields and meadows. Like the others, he had common rights for his cattle in the parish pastures. But a good deal of enclosing went on throughout the seventeenth century, and along with many yeoman of his day Mr. Sampson enclosed land whenever he could. The open field system of agriculture was already proving a handicap to progressive farmers, amongst whom Mr. Sampson could be numbered.

Many incumbents who were ignorant of farming let their glebe land on a yearly lease. Sampson, a native of South Leverton, came of yeoman stock, and rather naturally kept the glebe in his own hands and managed it himself. He was a model farmer, and his experience at Pembroke had given him a good business training. When he came to the benefice in 1674 the annual value was £150. In 1679 it had risen to £246. Once in a bad year (1685) it dropped to below the original figure; but in 1697, for the first and only time, it topped £300. The steady rise in the value of the benefice may partly be attributed to the rapid increase in the price of corn during this period, but some of the credit must be given to the rector's skill as a farmer. A slack or inefficient parson might through his carelessness permanently lower the value of his benefice to his own disadvantage and that of his successors.

Every year Mr. Sampson records the state of the weather, unusual phenomena of nature, and the agricultural experiments which he introduced on his glebe. 1684 "The year I made Tryall of keeping wheat in ye chaffe (having first skreened ye dust out) and find it keeps bright and from shrinking and it saves turning in a great degree." He gives a graphic description of the dreadful year 1692 to which Macaulay refers in his *History of England*: In April, storms, wind and snow: In May, "storms hindered the processioning" (Rogationtide) ,"Ye winds blasting and cut off a great deal of young fruit... From midsummer to

ye end of June rains put out ye waters so that I missed my course at Lincoln [i.e. his residence as prebendary] ye ways not passable." In July there was more rain. In August there was thunder and lightning, "The meadows so sopped that it cost 15s. to make a way for hay to be led out of them." In September there was a mild earthquake! In October there was more rain, and in November snow. On and off it lasted till the middle of March. Truly an unpleasant year! As a result, the harvest rotted on the ground and " corn was gott at an higher price than it had been ever since I came to Clayworth. But I having little wheat threshed out, had little profit from it."

The possession of glebe and his partial dependence upon it for a livelihood certainly gave the seventeenth century parson an insight into the lives of his parishioners and a practical sympathy with them in failure and success. Nowadays glebe in most parishes provides a small proportion of the benefice stipend, and the average country parson relies for his living very largely on a quarterly cheque from the Church Commissioners. It is no longer necessary for him to know anything about agriculture, and as a result he can devote far more of his time to his pastoral duties than could his predecessors 300 years ago. But the change has not been altogether for the good of the rural ministry. The parson is no longer so closely identified with his neighbours as were Parson Sampson and his contemporaries. If (as he often is) he is town bred, he will find it extremely difficult to understand the mentality of the farmer. In the seventeenth century the vast majority of the clergy were countrymen by origin and were seldom strangers to the people.

If the working of the glebe had its advantages for the parochial ministry, the same cannot be said of tithe. From the time of its inception before the Norman Conquest until the Tithe Act of 1933, this system of remunerating the clergy has brought more anxiety into the parlours of country rectories and has caused more bitterness between parsons and their flocks than anything else. Chaucer tells us that the poor parson of the town was " full looth to cursen for his tythes". His forebearance was very commendable, but in all probability the parishioners took advantage

of it and cheated him as much as they dared. Mr. Sampson took a very different line.

As Rector of Clayworth he was entitled to all the greater tithes (corn, hay and wool) and lesser tithes (eggs, poultry, fruit) in the parish. At harvest time he sent his tithing man into the fields to superintend the laying aside of the tenths. Sometimes he appeared in person, for the yeomen of Clayworth were up to every dodge whereby they could cheat their parson of his due. With one less astute than Mr. Sampson they would certainly have had a greater measure of success.

1677. "Some began to leave their pease in the furrow never turning them up to ye rig [ridge] before they were tithed which I look upon as a new divice to defraud the Church of its due: went into the field myself and ordered ye tithing men to get ye reaps out on the rig... this I did in a plot of Mr. Wawens and this took of all them that intended to have followed his ill example."

1678. "Robert Otter sett fourth his corn ... without view of my servants . . . but it being refused by my order was afterward by consent taken out of ye stacks."

Every district had its own tithing customs. The method of separating the tenth in North Notts. was for the reaper to throw every tenth reap[4] on to the ridge leaving the remainder in the furrow. The tithing men then came to collect up the rector's portion from the ridge. It appears that if the rector or his men were late on the scene, the harvesters neglected to throw aside the tenth reap and stacked the corn away as quickly as possible so that the rector would not be able to judge how much had been gathered.

The Rector of Clayworth was also entitled to a farthing in every shilling paid by masters to their servants. Mr. Sampson valued this source of income very highly; but it involved him in many unsavoury disputes with his parishioners, for many of the servants, encouraged by their masters, refused to pay their due.

Mr. Sampson gives some interesting details about the taxation of the period. In the first year of his incumbency he had

[4] A reap was "so much corn as a person gathers in ye left hand and cuts with a sickle in ye right."

to make a composition for the first fruits; these amounted to £23. At the Reformation the first year's revenue of a benefice which previously had gone to the Pope was transferred to the Crown. Fortunately for the clergy in later times, the sum was then frozen and therefore did not increase when the value of the benefices rose throughout the seventeenth century. The rector also paid to the Crown the annual tenths which amounted to £2 13s. 0d. Charles II, with typical cynicism, used this part of his revenue for providing pensions for his mistresses and bastards. But Queen Anne, shortly after Mr. Sampson's death, handed the money back to the Church.

In 1692, when England was at war with France and taxation reached a higher level than ever before, Mr. Sampson paid 4s. poll tax, £8 for his benefice and prebendal stall at Lincoln, £24 land tax and £3 in local rates for the maintenance of a militia horse and the parish armour: a total of £41. The next year taxes were lighter, the rector paying only £31.

Unlike his poorer clerical neighbours, Mr. Sampson was able to spend a good deal of money every year on the maintenance of the house and garden. During his incumbency his two barns (or "lathes" as they were called in Notts.) were rebuilt in fashionable brick. The other outbuildings, all of which were rebuilt at one time or another, consisted of chaff house, bake house, brew house, dovecot, cow house and pig stye. The chimneys were all rebuilt in brick as a precaution against fire, and the hall paved. There is reference to the maids' dormitory, but nowhere in his book does he mention his relations with his domestic staff, a subject to which Parson Woodforde was to devote so much space. In 1692 he had four servants, two maids and two men.

In the garden the pond was well stocked with carp, and new fruit trees were constantly set in the orchard. As rector, Mr. Sampson was responsible for the upkeep of the chancel, and he did not neglect this duty. The roof was releaded and the floor paved during his incumbency.

During the last years of William Sampson's life the Rev. Samuel Wesley was rearing his numerous family twenty miles away in the rectory of Epworth. A comparison between the way

of life of these two clergymen is not without interest. The one, a hardheaded somewhat cynical[5] business man, who squeezed every penny he could out of the benefice, abandoned an academic career, remained a bachelor and lived in comfort and security to the end of his days, and was not inattentive to his parochial duties. The other was feckless, unbusinesslike, always hankering after literary distinction and achieving nothing except a large brood of infants which he consistently neglected as much as his parishioners who disliked him intensely. The one left behind him a well ordered rectory and glebe at Clayworth, a system of keeping accounts at his Cambridge College which was to last 150 years, and the reputation of a sound country parson: the other, the reputation of a fool, and a son whose influence upon the life of England was perhaps greater than that of any man since the Reformation and can never be adequately calculated.

[5] An example of Mr. Sampson's cynicism is to be found in his caustic comment upon the spate of literary eloquence which was inspired by the death of Queen Mary in 1694: "After this [the tolling of bells throughout the country, the sermons and Parliamentary addresses] the poets of the Universities were mustered up and those that lay disposed in ye Nation and all that had either fire in their heads or water in their eyes, desired upon ye occasion to let it be seen."

MODERN COSMOLOGY

By W. H. McCREA

Introduction.

For a wide variety of reasons, astronomy has always been the science with the greatest popular appeal. The recent broadcast lectures of Mr. Fred Hoyle on the *Nature of the Universe* and their subsequent publication in book-form[1] have produced almost startling evidence of this fact. The tremendous interest they have aroused is due, in the first place, to the brilliance of Mr. Hoyle's exposition and is undoubtedly reinforced by his being able to relate his subject to other matters of concern to his audience—the atomic bomb, mankind's power-resources, freedom of thought, abodes of life, religious beliefs and man's place in the universe. Nevertheless, the purpose of the lectures is to describe "the new developments of the last ten years or so" in our knowledge of the astronomical universe and it is certain that the predominant interest has been in the astonishing, purely scientific, progress denoted by these developments.

At the stage at which Mr. Hoyle takes up the story, astrophysicists had, on the one hand, considerable knowledge of the structure of the stars as individual bodies, but had only a rough indication of the source of their energy-supply and almost no reliable ideas concerning the course of their evolution. Astrophysicists had also, on the other hand, much descriptive knowledge of the structure and behaviour of the great system of stars which we call our Galaxy and of the aggregate of such systems which appears to form our Universe. They had, too, theories of the

[1] *The Nature of the Universe*, by Fred Hoyle (Oxford. Basil Blackwell. iv + 121 pp.) 5s.

"expanding universe" which seemed fairly satisfactorily to account for the very large-scale properties of the whole assembly of galaxies. What was lacking was a comprehensive cosmology that would give an account of the origin and evolution of the stars, the Galaxy and all the other galaxies as one single coherent physical universe. It is nothing less than this that Mr. Hoyle attempts to supply.

He calls this the New Cosmology. But it is, of course, a natural development from the earlier stage just described; it incorporates most of the ideas generally accepted by astrophysicists ten or fifteen years ago (as opposed to the speculations of individuals). Also it is important to notice that, up to the last stage of Mr. Hoyle's account, the pure *physics,* upon which the astrophysical conclusions depend, can all be regarded as well-established. The culmination of Mr. Hoyle's work depends, however, upon the postulate of "continuous creation". Although this is new to physics and is still speculative, we shall see that it is less revolutionary that it at first appears.

Let it be said at once that the work described by Mr. Hoyle constitutes an intellectual achievement of stupendous magnitude. While, in one way or another, it depends upon almost every advance ever made in physical science, the rapidity and the all-embracing scope of recent progress may well rank as one of the greatest surprises of scientific history.

In this recent work, Mr. Hoyle himself has played the leading part. During the last few years he has made fundamental contributions towards the solution of nearly every major astrophysical problem. It is the integration of these contributions into a comprehensive system of cosmology that he propounds in his lectures. At the least, he succeeds in demonstrating that such a system is apparently within our grasp.

Nevertheless, owing largely to the requirements of simplicity and clarity, but in part also to the courage of his own convictions, Mr. Hoyle has been more dogmatic than would be felt legitimate by most other astrophysicists. In regard to several important questions which he discusses, there are rival theories in the field that appear to have good claims to be considered. Also there has

not yet been time or opportunity for other experts fully to examine Mr. Hoyle's theories; indeed, much of the work has so far been published only in preliminary forms and some of it has not yet appeared at all in the specialist journals.

It may therefore be of service if I attempt here to state, as fairly as possible, what I believe to be the "professional" scientific view of the content of Mr. Hoyle's lectures. For this is something that those who ponder upon related philosophical problems may wish to take into account.

The New Cosmology.

On the principle that, so to speak, astronomy begins at home, Mr. Hoyle's presentation starts with a summary of existing knowledge of the Earth and of the other planets of our own Solar System. In the next lecture, he gives first a sketch of the theory of the constitution of the Sun and that of the source of its radiation. This theory is now generally accepted. Even were it in error in some particulars, it may be claimed on certain general technical grounds that the "correct" theory cannot be essentially different. But when Mr. Hoyle proceeds to discuss the evolution of the Sun he is at any rate upon less well-trodden ground. I think that his conclusion that (in the far distant future) the Sun will get hotter and hotter, can be regarded as a reliable inference from the accepted theory. His further conclusion that the Sun will swell to an enormous extent is, however, an instance of a statement whose validity can scarcely yet be judged by astrophysicists. As he says, it depends upon the theory of "red-giant" stars. These have long formed a puzzle for astrophysicists. While it is true that several investigators have recently reached conclusions in general agreement with Hoyle's, such conclusions are still under active discussion.

In his third lecture, Mr. Hoyle explains how it is considered that the stars were born in the immense disk of gas which is generally believed to have constituted the Galaxy in its earliest stages of existence. In its general aspects, the theory described has been common ground in astrophysics for a number of years. But when Mr. Hoyle goes on to describe the evolutionary con-

sequences of what he calls the "tunnelling" of stars through the still remaining portion of the gas, he is again expressing the individual conclusions of himself and one or two colleagues. Astrophysicists are certainly becoming convinced that this interstellar gas is of fundamental importance for the physical behaviour of the Galaxy. Many of them would, however, hesitate to say whether it operates in precisely the fashion described by Hoyle to produce such consequences as he infers, even down to affecting the climatological history of the Earth. (I myself cannot help being largely convinced by some of his conclusions, but they are as yet far from ranking as generally accepted theory.)

Mr. Hoyle returns in his fourth lecture to the solar system in order to present the theory of its origin to which he is led by his conclusions regarding the evolution of the stars.

This problem of the formation of planetary systems is perhaps the most famous one in the history of theoretical astronomy. It owes much of its notoriety to the fact that planets are the only possible abodes of life in the universe. Solutions have been proposed by several of the foremost astronomers of the past but none has survived subsequent criticism. If Mr. Hoyle's suggestion is correct, it is a first-class discovery.

His theory does fit into the trend of much of the preceding work on the subject and it does appear to cover all the main features requiring explanation. On the other hand, it is almost certainly the most sheerly speculative item in his whole discussion. Its relation to observable processes is very indirect, though this is inherent in the nature of the problem and is perhaps less true of Mr. Hoyle's theory than of any other.

The situation is that such a theory explains the formation of planets as a result of the cooperation of several different important processes in cosmic physics. Even if we possess valid first approximations to the theories of each of these processes taken separately, we expect that each of these theories would have to be developed in considerably greater detail before we can safely predict the consequences of the processes if they are supposed to act together. In the present case, the accumulated uncertainty in the final result is such as to compel the majority of astrophysi-

cists to suspend judgement upon its acceptability. This applies with yet greater force to Mr. Hoyle's estimate of the total number of possible abodes of life in the entire Galaxy.

Continuous Creation.

The concluding lecture deals with the structure and evolution of the observable universe as a whole. On the astrophysical side, all the features that are novel in Mr. Hoyle's discussion stem from the postulated continuous creation of matter.

This postulate states that new matter, probably in the form of atoms of hydrogen, is continually appearing spontaneously throughout the whole of space.

According to the resulting theory, some of the matter so appearing gravitates together to form the galaxies. But the whole system of galaxies and intergalactic gas is in a state of perpetual expansion, and matter in these forms is continually disappearing across the boundary of the observable universe. The rate of creation throughout space balances the rate of disappearance at the boundary so that the observable universe as a whole is in a statistically steady state. That is to say, the general appearance of the universe is the same at all epochs: it has no beginning and no ending in time.

The concept of continuous creation in its current form was first announced by H. Bondi and T. Gold in 1948, but something like it had previously been suggested by several other writers.[2] Despite its far-reaching consequences, I think it important to realize that, in the context of modern physics, it need scarcely be treated as revolutionary.

In the first place, the required rate of appearance of new matter is too minute ever to be observed directly.[3] Consequently, the postulate has no quantitative significance for terrestrial

[2] For a general discussion reference may be made to W. H. McCrea, "The Steady State Theory of the Expanding Universe", *Endeavour* 9 (1950) 3-10.

[3] To get as much matter as in a thimble-full of water, that being "created" in a volume of space the size of the Earth would have to be accumulated for about a million years.

physics nor indeed for cosmic physics until we come to consider the universe on the largest possible scale.

Further, the physicist has long ago learnt that very few of his ideas of a "particle" hold good for what he calls the fundamental "particles" of physics, i.e. the electron, proton and so on. In particular, he knows that, owing to the sameness of, say, all protons (i.e. hydrogen-nuclei) he must not think in terms of the permanent identity of any individual proton. This means that the elementary process of "counting", which is at the foundation of the mathematician's concept of number, cannot strictly be applied to a collection of protons—one cannot "count" objects that are indistinguishable from one another.[4] Therefore, as Eddington often pointed out, any statement about a "number" of protons has a meaning only in relation to some carefully specified set of observations. This must be true also of a statement about the appearance of "new" protons. Such a statement must necessarily have a highly technical interpretation: any attempt to draw inferences from a mental picture of any proposed creation process is apt to be misleading.

To pass to another aspect, we recall that current physical theory does assert the conservation of mass but that it does so only in a generalized sense in which "mass" and "energy" with their older meanings are now treated as being the same thing. Also the only way in which physics knows how to give full mathematical expression to this generalized conservation law is that provided by Einstein's theory of general relativity. From the standpoint of macroscopic physics, what is called in question by the creation-postulate is the strict accuracy of Einstein's theory.

Now it was this theory that first gave a seemingly satisfactory account of the phenomenon of the "expanding universe". But, in its otherwise most satisfactory form, this account required not only the creation of matter at an origin in time, but also the continual entry of fresh matter at the boundary in space of the observable universe. That is to say, this previously accepted

[4] For a helpful discussion of such questions reference may be made to E. Schrödinger "What is an elementary particle?", *Endeavour* 9 (1950) 109-116.

theory which in its formulation made no allowance for continuous creation does in fact require such creation and predicts an observable universe containing an ever-increasing amount of matter.

On the other hand, the new theory described by Mr. Hoyle takes continuous creation as an initial postulate but predicts a universe containing a fixed amount of matter. Thus we have the paradox that it is the new theory and not the older one that truly implies the conservation of matter.

The foregoing remarks cannot serve much more than to show that "continuous creation" describes something that, if it does come to be accepted in physics and cosmology, must enter these subjects in a highly abstruse fashion. What we evidently have to consider is yet one more fundamental property of those still mysterious concepts which we call matter, space and time.

Two further remarks may show why some physicists are predisposed in favour of the existence of such a property.

The postulated creation process is itself an *atomic* process. But, as Mr. Hoyle's account shows, it must ultimately determine everything else in the behaviour of the universe including the size, mass and expansion-rate of the whole observable system. Now the fundamental treatment of atomic processes comprises that part of physics known as *quantum theory* and the fundamental treatment of large-scale phenomena comprises that part known as *relativity theory*. For a quarter of a century past, physicists have been seeking, without definite success, for the unification of these two departments. It is seen that, if substantiated, the creation process may supply the essential connexion.

The second remark seems to go a long way towards meeting an otherwise serious criticism of all attempts to construct a general cosmology. The criticism is that these attempts require the extrapolation of physical laws far outside the regions of space and time for which their validity has in any way been established. But the creation postulate results in the conception of a universe in which the phenomena in every (sufficiently large) region of the universe are necessarily the same in all places and at all times. Thus it virtually denies that there is any extrapolation. It may be said to explain why in fact we can have a credible cosmology.

Prospect.

Mr. Hoyle considers that existing telescopes already reveal so much of the whole theoretically observable universe that any further increase in telescopic power is unlikely to reveal any fresh major features requiring to be brought within the scope of a general system of cosmology.

This is a bold view and is at variance with all past scientific experience. But, if our present general physical concepts are not completely astray, the view has much to support it. Scientists in the past have never had any such reasons for adopting such a view.

It is, of course, a different proposition to say that man's way of thinking about the physical universe will not change. Actually, Mr. Hoyle considers "that our present picture will turn out to bear an appreciable resemblance to cosmologies of the future". This again is a defensible position. For, as Einstein has said, ". . . among all conceivable theoretical constructions there always exists one that proves by far superior to the others . . . the world of perceptions determines the theoretical system practically uniquely". And as Hermann Weyl has further remarked, ". . . broadened or more precise experiences and new discoveries do not overthrow old theories but simply correct them".

Such opinions are based largely on the experience of the past three or four hundred years. Even if they are held to be borne out by that of the 2,500-odd years since the Greeks began to consider such matters, they nevertheless still apply only to a tiny fraction of the whole history of man. Mr. Hoyle actually mentions 500 years hence, but whether it takes 500 or 500,000 years we cannot but believe that, supposing man's existence to continue so long, a time will come when his concepts will differ as much from Mr. Hoyle's as Mr. Hoyle's differ from those of a cave-dweller.

Indeed, we may discern indications that future history may date a great upheaval of scientific thought from our present epoch. Just as we live in a world of unprecedented technical achievement but one also of unprecedented insecurity in human affairs, so also in the world of thought we have such unsurpassed scientific achievements as those described in Mr. Hoyle's book, but at the

same time scientists have never before been so unsure of the meaning of their work (in a purely scientific sense).

Most fundamentally, this is due to the fact that the adequacy of classical logic has been called in question, and other logics have been invented. As a result of such investigaions, it seems that no one is quite sure what mathematics really means, and, of course, all physical theory depends upon mathematical reasoning. Actually, no one doubts that mathematics is in some sense "valid" but it seems that it is no longer allowable to say it is valid because it is "pure logic".

Again, as regards the foundations of physics, there is no agreed view as to the meaning of the concepts of "space" and "time". The old idea that space and time "exist" independently of everything else has long been discarded. We now regard these concepts as part of the way in which our minds arrange or rationalize our perceptions. Such work as the late Sir Arthur Eddington's "Fundamental Theory" and Professor E. A. Milne's "Kinematical Relativity" may be regarded as attempts to give mathematical form to these views. But there is at present no agreement upon the results. Also we do not know exactly to what sets of perceptions these concepts apply; profound difficulties occur in their application to quantum phenomena.

Another new and ill-understood feature of modern physics is the fundamental rôle of *probability*. Bertrand Russell has remarked that "probability is the most important concept in modern science, especially as nobody has the slightest notion of what it means".

One could continue in this strain, but enough has perhaps been said to show where progress is needed and may be expected to occur. Moreover, many of these questions are ones about which so little is known at present that the progress required is vastly more than can be described as corrections to present theories.

To return to Mr. Hoyle's domain, we may believe that many of the questions he discusses are, in principle, capable of being settled once and for all. For instance, we are now so certain that the Sun generates most of its radiation by the conversion of hydrogen into helium that we do not expect this ever to be called in

doubt. But as regards the deeper questions as to what is to be understood by such terms as electrons, protons, radiation, gravitation, space, time, causality, existence, creation, in which a system of cosmology is expressed and as regards even the logical reasoning applied to establish it, we must surely expect prodigious changes in the future. Some of Mr. Hoyle's closing remarks show, I think, that he would subscribe to this view.

Man's Place in the Universe.

This is the subject of Mr. Hoyle's final section and the fact that he discusses it and that his remarks have attracted so much attention may be why a review has been called for in this *Quarterly*. A reviewer here might therefore be expected to concentrate largely upon this section. There are, however, two reasons for not doing so. First, Mr. Hoyle probably, and the reviewer certainly, would not regard himself as specially qualified in the domains of thought involved. Second, what Mr. Hoyle does say, he could equally well have said in relation to the scientific study of the Universe at almost any stage; it does not depend essentially upon the particular developments whose setting forth has been the purpose of his lectures. What he does, in fact, is simply to restate some of the most profound of all problems that have always confronted human thought.

All that it is appropriate to offer here are a few general comments which follow the tenor of what I have tried to say in the preceding section of this article.

Mr. Hoyle rejects the materialist or mechanist position. But he does so only because it precludes his asking certain questions —"Why is the Universe as it is and not something else? Why is the Universe here at all?"—not because he can answer these questions, nor even because he believes that they necessarily have a meaning. All he professes is a conviction that the inquiry must go on and that "all experience teaches us that no one has yet asked too much".

Mr. Hoyle says that "we are in this wholly fantastic Universe with scarcely a clue as to whether our existence has any significance". So long as we keep to the departments of thought of the

rest of the lectures, this seems to be true. But these do not comprise the whole realm of thought.

As I have said, matter, space, time, and so on, are some of the concepts in terms of which we arrange or rationalize our perceptions. These concepts then form our physical Universe. But this does not cope with the whole of our perceptions. We require other concepts, beauty, good, evil, motive, duty, love, personality, and so on. These concepts form our spiritual world.

On this view, the physical and spiritual worlds are abstractions from something which is neither the one nor the other (though this is a very inadequate description of the situation). In our existing thought the two sets of concepts are largely, though not completely, unrelated. That is to say, we cannot in general make meaningful statements involving concepts belonging to both sets; we do not, for instance, associate "electrons" and "courage" nor "stars" and "duty", while we do associate electrons and stars, and we do associate courage and duty. In particular, it is probably agreed that " significance " is a spiritual concept; we may not at present be able to associate it with the physical Universe.

On the other hand, our perceptions themselves form a single aggregate (and incidentally, but significantly, we use a single language in which to express all our concepts). So we must believe it possible for our concepts to be formed into one single Universe. This has not yet been achieved, but in its achievement probably lies the answer to Mr. Hoyle's problems.

All this amounts to little else than saying that the rest of Mr. Hoyle's lectures concern only one part or aspect of the activities of the mind and that it is certainly not surprising if difficulties arise when at the end he suddenly poses questions that involve these activities in their entirety.

This is perhaps all that should be said here. But we may do well to remind ourselves how unanalyzed is the relation of any such discussion to the problem of *behaviour*. We order our physical lives far less by physical concepts, in the sense above, than by what we call "experience", which may be regarded as a body of "implicit" or "unresolved" concepts. So also we order our moral or spiritual lives, not so much by the concepts of

aesthetics, of ethics, and of theology, as by what we call "taste", "social sense", "spiritual experience" and "revealed religion".

However, all these present matters arise only rather incidentally in Mr. Hoyle's lectures. The value of his lectures is that they give a vivid account of the sort of information we can now obtain about the universe in which we live, and such information must form part of the background of all enlightened thought.

"HEAVEN AND EARTH ARE FULL OF THY GLORY"[1]

By MAISIE SPENS

". . . HEAVEN and earth are full of thy glory. Glory be to thee, O Lord most high", proclaims throughout the ages — now in whispered awe, now in soaring jubilation—the daily *Sanctus* of thousands upon thousands of Christians the world over. Yet even amongst these thousands upon thousands affirming that "heaven and earth are full of . . . glory"—let alone among non-Christians—few, if any, can have escaped the temptation, at least from time to time, to subscribe rather to the conviction of the psalmist that ". . . all the earth is full of darkness and cruel habitations" (Ps. lxxiv, 21).

Whether is *true*: "heaven and earth are full of . . . glory" or "all the earth is full of darkness and cruel habitations"? And if it be true — *as it is* — that "heaven and earth are full of . . . glory", how comes it not seldom, nor for a brief space, to *seem* that "all the earth is full of darkness and cruel habitations"? Surely Ruskin, in "The Two Paths", has pointed us the answer: "There is only one way of seeing things rightly, and that is, seeing the whole of them".

An earth seen only as "full of darkness and cruel habitations" is an earth mis-seen: mis-seen because seen only in part—seen apart, divorced from heaven, the heaven with which it is inextricably bound up, and in conjunction with which it can alone be rightly discerned and interpreted.

[1] This article will appear in due course as part of a book bearing the title *Receive the Joyfulness of Your Glory*, to be published by Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton.

Yet—as Euripides knew—"One man does not see everything". None can see all. Nor could all be seen at once. So what's to do? With Blake:

> "To see a world in a grain of sand
> And a heaven in a wild flower;
> Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
> And eternity in an hour"?

Yes, but even this is not enough — because still it is a seer *in isolation.* Nothing less will suffice than that for which St. Paul prayed: " that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love may be able to comprehend with all saints" (i.e. using, as R. O. P. Taylor confirmed, each and all the saints *as means of perception*) " what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fullness of God" (Eph. iii, 17 ff)—which fullness is Glory.

No two souls see—or can see—exactly alike. That which serves as a medium for opening the heavens to one, may for another remain completely indifferent and uncommunicative, whilst for yet another it may prove a source of repugnance, perplexity or distraction. What matters is not so much the *medium* of vision, as that the *substance* of truth shall somehow be received. To bring home to an individual soul the realization that heaven and earth are full of his Glory, God can make use of any medium he in his loving wisdom sees fit—or even dispense with any external medium at all. The medium is, therefore, in a sense immaterial save as a spring-board whence the soul is enabled by God to take off and soar into that which he desires it to penetrate.

Such a spring-board—only one amongst many—towards "seeing things rightly . . that is, seeing the whole of them" is to be found by some in the frescoes painted by Sister Joanna Reitlinger in the Chapel of St. Basil.[2] For those who have not seen these frescoes, are unable to see them, or having seen them have not—as yet at any rate—found them such a spring-board, what

[2] In St. Basil's House, 52 Ladbroke Grove, London, W.11.

follows need in no way be invalidated on this account, because here concern is not, *except purely incidentally,* with the frescoes as such. There will be no attempt to describe them in ordered detail, let alone exhaustively, no attempt to assess their artistic or theological value as such, but rather the taking of them as the starting-point in an attempt under God to penetrate and be penetrated by something of his all-embracing, all-pervading Glory.

These frescoes have been deliberately chosen here—since selection of spring-board there must be as regards the written word—simply as furnishing what is in some way a peculiarly apt "squint" upon the twofold yet inextricable Glory in Heaven and upon earth. But it needs to be borne in mind that there is literally *nothing,* however infinitesimal or immense, which may not furnish a similar spring-board or "squint" upon Glory once irradiated by the Holy Spirit's illumination of what it betokens.

Whoever we are, wherever we are, he can at any moment, if he so wills, enable us consciously to plunge into the Triune Glory of God *through whatever lies nearest to hand,* without or within, be it person or thing; joyous or tragic; beautiful, ordinary, terrible, or seemingly stripped to human eyes of any comeliness at all.

Glory is God's signature over all and in all, and is for the asking and discerning to be found *everywhere,* at large or in miniature, transparently or hiddenly one and the same Glory—that Essential Love which is all-love and nothing-but-love.

The frescoes at St. Basil's House for the most part depict the visions imparted to St. John the Divine in the prayer-fructified silence, tribulation and endurance on Patmos "for the word of God, and for the testimony of Jesus Christ". These visions are doubtless likewise only to be understood or re-interpreted—in word or paint—in similar prayer-fructified silence, tribulation and endurance all down the ages. The vision of God's Glory cometh not by human effort; but neither can it be divorced from human silence, tribulation or endurance "for the word of God, and for the testimony of Jesus Christ". It must be the fruit or seed of these, or more likely both. It gives all in order to demand all, and it demands all in order to give all. This it

does progressively more satisfyingly and more sacrificially—more satisfyingly *because* more sacrificially—until satisfaction and sacrifice become co-extensive and co-equal in love and bliss.

Small as is the chapel at St. Basil's House, its frescoes give to it the spaciousness of all time and of eternity, and betoken the true perspective of cosmic history in its relation to the whole pre-mundane, mundane, and post-mundane Plan of God.

Centrally beyond the iconostasis, is the LAMB, slain before the foundation of the world, the rainbow round the throne, the divine A and Ω, the Morning Star, the four beasts, angels with trumpets, the redeemed with harps, and below seraphim and cherubim, and the "wheels" of Ezekiel's vision, and on either side candlesticks, stars, censers, musical instruments. It is noticeable in passing that the seraphim are traditionally depicted in two shades of red, one gloriously lighter and brighter as facing God, the other darker as facing God's creatures.

Here in the centrality of the Lamb is the quintessence of Love without beginning and without end, with intimations of all the exhaustless *worship* of heaven as life abounding. By a stroke of Spirit-inspired genius the Lamb has here been "made small on purpose"—so that the very smallness serves as a magnet to draw the eye of the beholder from all that surrounds the Lamb inwards to him himself, and with the eye the soul also to the Heart of Love in its interiority: Triune Love wholly given, wholly received and wholly given again.

This *centrality* of the Lamb, the centrality of Love's sacrificial self-donation in the Blessed Trinity and for all Creation, and the living reality, intensity, and commingled silence and melody of the worship of the hosts of heaven lighten forth as never-now-to-be-forgotten be-all and end-all behind, through and beyond the whole content of time and cosmos, and of such awe-ing significance, bliss and wonder as only absolute *silence* dare or can begin to envisage.

The multiplicity of detail, the titanic range of subject, the fathomless richness of content, in the two-tiered frescoes running the whole length of the north and south walls of the chapel seem to some to shout so loudly as to be overwhelming and distracting

both artistically and spiritually—a barrier rather than an aid to prayer. To others it is just the reverse: for them the frescoes are an indivisible word spoken in simple and luminous silence. This goes to prove that these frescoes are neither more nor less overpowering than life itself and precisely as simple or as complex as life. All depends upon the point of view. Here they will be taken simply as directing the soul clean through their imagery—as they *are* able to do, if God so wills—to that same underlying unitive life between the soul and God and oneness in him with his entire Creation which is more commonly attained by way of the prayer of imageless nudity.

The two-tiered frescoes on the north and south walls of St. Basil's Chapel contrive to produce somewhat the effect of a simultaneous laying-bare of co-existent life and happenings in the top and bottom stories of the Father's House. So vivid a shewing of the continuous intermingling of life and action in the heavenlies and their operation and extension upon earth serves as an unveiling of the *wonder* and solidarity of that "wonderful order" in which—as the Collect for St. Michael and All Angels affirms—"the Everlasting God" has "ordained and constituted the services of angels and men". Thus "the whole family in heaven and earth" is, as it were, rendered actually present to the soul, and the soul aweingly and exhilaratingly pierced by new knowledge of the fact that—be its habitual awareness or unawareness of it what it may—it is in reality abidingly "compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses". Then may follow, soon or late, such an inundation of the inflooding glory of all the divine and creaturely interchanges of love throughout time and eternity, as shall sweep the soul clean out of its strait-jacket, mean and sordid egoism into the vast expanses of that illimitable life in the Communion of Saints which—in and through Christ—is open to all who even *desire* to love God as they in fact did love him.

Within the sanctuary, in the top tier of the frescoes on a small section of wall jutting out at right angles to the main north wall, there is depicted the Holy Spirit as dove brooding over chaos. Next, on the main body of the wall, and still in the top tier, comes the pre-Adamic Creation.

Exquisite and ecstatic that dawn of life, when seen for the first time, seen through the eyes of the Logos: each and every creature seen as Love, the Lord of Creation, made and intended it and having, as it were, each its own aureole of bliss and beauty.

All here is galaxy of glory in the heavens and on earth: one glory of the Milky Way, another glory of the snow-capped mountain, glory of translucent river and upspringing meadow, glory of flowers and trees, glory of fishes, birds and beasts. To each and every creature the glory of perfection after its own kind; and—in Love's prodigality—of kinds no end.

Among beasts: lion, hippopotamus, elephant, antelope, tiger, camel, crocodile, and bull are plain to see. So diverse, yet all are alike in that already perfectly formed, each lies alone in virgin unawakened sleep hanging upon the quickening word of the Creator. Theirs is the manifest *waiting upon God* of those who cannot stir until *he* gives the word which galvanizes them into life and motion and maintains them in it. Yet unmistakably these are no lifeless puppets destined to move or refrain from moving willy-nilly mechanically at the arbitrary or despotic wire-pulling of some celestial or terrestrial master of marionettes. Even in their as yet unawakened repose a uniqueness and dignity in each bespeaks the immensity of *reverence* as well as love inherent in their creation by him who is about to impart to them the gift of life not only *from* himself but to be *in them as their own.*

In such imparting of life from himself to be in them as their own, to each and all his creatures throughout time and eternity the Creator vouchsafes—"by measure", infinitesimal or immense, each according to its God-given capacity and destiny in his Creation as a perfect whole—something of the extension of that Glorious Mystery of the Son of God which in the days of his flesh he summed up in the fathomless declaration: "For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself" (John v, 26).

Such being the case, how sacrosanct in their own God-given right are each and all his creatures. How wonderingly and reverently ought we to gaze upon them. How humbly and *without greed* ought we to use them if and when use them we needs must.

None, animate or inanimate, from a loved and loving animal entrusted to us to be a daily companion and ministering friend to a mountain peak or deeply scintillating sapphire, flaming dahlia or irridiscent dewdrop, but may—and should—be a transparent "squint" giving upon the total *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* of God in himself; and likewise a "squint" giving upon the altar of the Lamb.

Just as the Incarnate Son *of his own free will,* from moment to moment "laid down" [Gk.=offered up] in obedience even unto death upon the Cross that life which the Father gave him to have in himself, that he might take it again by and to the Glory of the Father, so the life given by the Creator to his creatures as their own is given that all may *freely* be laid down in obedience to him that he may deliver up the kingdom to the Father that God may be all in all. Till such time Creation—in a disobedient and fallen world—groans and travails: but then.redemption *accepted* in the Lamb will not only restore but even exceed that ecstatic primal bliss of the unfallen Creation when all was "very good".

Yet even now amid the groaning and travailing of the whole Creation, there is still so much trace and aftermath of its primal bliss, and so many pledges and fragmentary foreshewings of "redeemed creatures" and the transparency that will be theirs when wholly and lastingly deified, that Christians should never fail for long—even when things are blackest without or within or both—to lift up their hearts anew, and anew see with the Creator that all that he has created is "very good", and anew adore and give him thanks for that "new creation" which doth not yet appear but to which in his own best way and time Love will ultimately awaken us and all other his creatures. To precisely such quickening vision of the essential integrity within divine creation and redemption of all that is, God has already awakened one of his latter-day seers, Paul Claudel.

Claudel's

> *Ouvrez les yeux!*
> *Le monde est encore intact*
> *il est vierge comme au premier jour*

is more truly God's own categoric summons to us—who now all too often feel ourselves to be but stampeding yet stationary sleep-

walkers in unending nightmare—to awake from all self-begotten and devil-intensified distortions that make the whole world seem the prey of evil and of inevitable disaster to the recognition of reality: reality that blessed unimpairedness of things as they *truly are* in the sight—and by the saving mercy—of God.

For all its galaxy of diverse glory in the heavens and on earth, the St. Basil's Chapel fresco of the creation of sky, land and water, trees, flowers, birds and beasts and fishes, witnesses most potently to the *essential oneness* rather than multiplicity of Glory.

Many as are the creatures having each from God its own tenderly vouchsafed glory, yet all such glory is but a scintilla of the single Glory of Creation—that of the Creator himself in whom is all the fullness of the interior life of the Blessed Trinity. *Dominant over all,* radiating and imparting *joie de vivre,* here as very King of Glory indeed, arrayed in golden robe and crowned with sevenfold alternating red and green star-point halo, he literally bestrides the Creation of which he is so manifestly Lord. So consummate is "the poetry of motion" embodied in his stillness "more moving than any motion" that to many a long gaze it is as dancer on air, having no need of ground beneath his feet, that he seems strongly and purposefully in wingless flight to sweep his exultant way over and throughout Creation. Not till later does it become apparent that far from having discarded the ground beneath his feet, he has in actual fact one foot on land and one on water as, equally at ease on both, he takes river and field gracefully and serenely in his stride.

The all-embracing all-pervading Glory of the Creator is over all his works. We do well to look at them in him. We do better to look at him through them. We do well to receive creatures in and from the Creator. We do better to receive the Creator in and through creatures—until such time as he enables the receiving of him, the joyfulness of our glory and the Glory of our joyfulness, to be in all the blessedness of a nude interchange of total self-donation between God and the soul without any creaturely medium at all.

But for all too many in our crisis-ridden and problem-obsessed generation, global and personal crises and problems darken the whole horizon to such an extent that *seeing* nothing

but crises and problems they come sooner or later to believe that there is nothing else to see.

There is nothing new in the existence of crises or problems as such. All that is new is the *scale of awareness* of crisis and the *degree of complexity* of problems and of human approach to them.

In proportion as men of science have "conquered" time and space, radio and press have combined progressively to discharge upon the individual the sins, sufferings and problems of the entire world. No longer now for the individual almost anywhere do time-lag or space-barrier remain as buffers against the assault of a simultaneous and continuous awareness of world-sin, suffering and problems in the one inextricable web of past, present and future. *Thus is history in actual fact become a daily Gethsemane for each and all now alive.*

Some live this Gethsemane in varying degrees of vigil and prayer-cooperation with him who alone was capable of simultaneously and continuously bearing and taking away the sins of the whole world and whose Gethsemane was a triumphant wrestling against the powers of darkness of all time; others in impotent drift sleep it away like Peter, James and John; whilst yet others come as tools of the powers that be, or as Judases, to seize or betray him "in the least" of those whom he identifies with himself.

At bottom, from Eden to and through Gethsemane to "the times of restitution of all things" (Acts iii, 21), there always was, is, and will be, but a single crisis: obedience—or disobedience—to the declared Will of God, outside of which everything, so far as man is concerned, must progressively deteriorate into humanly insoluble problems, the most baffling and intractable of which will always be *himself.*

Man to-day may know more about many things outside himself, more even about himself *piecemeal as it were* in his "mental processes", "patterns of behaviour", etc., than he did in the past, but it is probable, if not certain, that taken by and large he knows less, far less, of his *essential* self than many in the past have known —a knowledge incomparably more necessary and salutary than the welter of material information he is ever acquiring only to lose

himself in it as in a seemingly exitless dark forest whose very density imperils life itself.

The present mass and complexity of man's piecemeal information about himself, and his specialized information about material things, far from revealing—let alone adding to—his *essential* stature, has tended to obscure it from him and to dwarf it to seemingly pygmy dimensions.

The way through and out of man's present dark forest of chaos will not and cannot be by way of any mere multiplication of knowledge as such, because knowledge amassed by man in independence of God eventually pulverizes him. If man is ever to emerge from this dark forest, there must be a reversal of perspective in regard to knowledge—a rediscovery of *what* he must learn and *why* and *how*.

A prophetic signpost for such a renewal of perspective has been clearly given us long since in William Law's divinely-inspired: "Think nothing worth a thought but that which will bring thee back to thy first glory". To many, such advice will sound "idealistic" and therefore "unpractical". In point of fact, none could *be* more resolutely and concretely practical.

Individually and corporately we have abandoned our "first glory" for the far country of barren self-indulgence with its subsequent stranglehold struggle for bare physical survival. This leaves us absolutely no ultimate alternative between perishing impenitently amid the squalid disasters we have brought upon ourselves, or of *coming to ourselves* in order to repent and retrace our prodigal footsteps. What precisely is this "coming to ourselves"? Nothing less than the realization of our "first glory", and the kindling of our desire to return to it and recover it, cost what it may in penitent confession and reparation. Only God—not we ourselves—can kindle in us this realization and desire.

So overlaid is that "first glory" for most of us, that any initial realization God gives us of it in the far country seems more in the nature of discovery than remembrance. There we must *learn* our "first glory" before we can remember it, since remembrance of it can only gradually and progressively re-awaken in proportion as we re-approach our Father's house and find ourselves once more at home there.

"Learn, O Christian, how great thou art, who hast been made partaker of the Divine nature", said Pope St. Leo the Great centuries ago, thereby furnishing the key to what such learning of our "first glory" must be—that "first glory" of our creation, sin-forfeited in the fall, and restored to us by Christ our Saviour at our baptism "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost".

Post-baptismal sin has so blinded almost all of us that we find it hard, if not impossible, even to *imagine*—let alone discern—that "first glory" of our creation with any degree of vividness. Especially is this the case in a totalitarian age progressively losing sight of the individual in the mass. Whether deliberately, or unconsciously within the drift or stampede of herd-mentality, the majority of us have become more and more superficial and standardized in our appraisal of our fellow-men and women. Oblivious of their God-created ineradicable individual uniqueness, we relegate them *en masse* to this or that physical, mental, moral or economic category—and all this *without reverence* for them, let alone charity in its connotation of genuinely disinterested sacrificial love, but primarily, if not solely, with a view to their exploitation by this or that section of the herd, in accordance with the successive everchanging exigencies of the crisis of the hour.

This is a highly unnatural and degrading process because it is, as it were, a *depersonalization* of men and women so far as this is possible within the limits permitted by God—beyond which limits it cannot go. But none can say where he will set the limit of its *human consequences,* even though he will safeguard the divine image in man in essence and in potential perceptibility whilst repentance remains open to him—thereby increasing responsibility for each and all of us individually and corporately. It seems, however, humanly probable, that such a process unless arrested and reversed will culminate not merely in an increase of *subhuman* individuals and groups, such as are already familiar to us, but in an almost universal *subhuman conception of the very nature of man.* From this it would—short of divine intervention—be but a single swift step over the precipice-edge to the existence of mankind as a whole becoming as *subhuman as its own misconception of itself.*

Even the devaluation of a national currency cannot but be fraught with far-reaching material and other problems of the first magnitude, but these are as nothing compared to the actual disasters which are touched off like a cataclysmic avalanche *in every sphere*—physical, mental, moral, social, economic, national, international, and above all spiritual—by the process of man's progressive *devaluation of himself.*

This process of man's progressive devaluation of himself in his relation to God, himself, and Creation in its entirety, God alone can halt and reverse as he gives, by a variety of means, to more and more souls willing to receive, embrace, and act upon it, a transfigurational "shewing" of man in his "first glory" substantially like to that which he has enabled Sister Joanna Reitlinger so arrestingly and unforgettably to symbolize and depict in her fresco of the Creation of Adam and Eve in St. Basil's Chapel.

In the top tier, and next on the far side from the sanctuary to the pre-Adamic Creation, this fresco of the Creation of Adam and Eve is as artistically daring as it is technically striking—which is saying much. In so far as it succeeds, as it does, in being a channel of God's communication even to a single soul, let alone to many, of an awakening or re-awakening realization of man's "first glory", its artistic boldness—or overboldness in face of accepted iconographic tradition as some might consider—is surely more than justified. Anything that can be and is used of God to stab home such realization is thankworthy to a degree: the degree of our present life-or-death need of such realization.

In the foreground of this fresco lies Adam: and behind is Eve, actually emerging from his side. Bending down over them with an infinity of loving tenderness are the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity. These—as in that best known of Russian icons, Rublev's "The Old Testament Trinity"—are without distinction in age or outward appearance. They are a rarely vivid illustration of—and potent enablement towards obedience to—the stupendous and soul-satisfying injunction of the Athanasian Creed:

> "That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity;
> Neither confounding the Persons: nor dividing the Substance.

For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son: and another of the Holy Ghost;
But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one: the Glory equal, the Majesty co-eternal.
Such as the Father is, such is the Son: and such is the Holy Ghost . . ."

This fresco, with the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity thus shorn of all *diversity* of symbolism—a diversity which at some times and in some ways may stimulate worship of God, but at others merely dissipates and distracts us from it—is indeed a "shewing" of the blessed imageless and immutable *sameness* of the Three in One and One in Three whose Interior Life in the Godhead is *in fact,* and may at any time be recognized to be, the anchor of anchors for the soul of every man, as well as the fount and preserver of his entire being.

As far as man is concerned, the most significant fact of all which this fresco depicts is that from the mouth of *each* Person of the Blessed Trinity there streams forth direct to Adam and likewise direct to Eve a ray of Glory, which Glory is the Fire of Life: the Love-life of the Blessed Trinity given to Adam and Eve to be the very foundation of their being, both *individually and jointly.* Here, indeed, is man made in the image of God and—dare it very reverently and with bated breath be said?—made by him neither confusing the persons of Adam and Eve nor dividing their substance. Just as the Threeness and the Oneness of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity is eternally co-existent in the Godhead in a perfect equipoise of a mutual love-compenetration of perfect Bliss, so did — and does — God intend that there should be for all mankind deriving from, sustained by, for the sake of, and after the manner of the Divine Society of the Blessed Trinity, this same equipoise of mutual love-compenetration between each person living in and for society one and indivisible and that sanctified society should give all it is and has to each person composing it—with never an individual contracting out of total self-donation to that Beloved Society whose Head is God, nor the sanctity of that person overridden by a society fallen away from total self-donation to God in himself and in each and all its members.

This is, indeed, to see man both individually and corporately in something at least of his "first glory"—and in his "last glory" as well, for the two are one and the same. This pristine glory, forfeited to the whole human race in the Fall, is in Baptism restored by God to the individual "as in the beginning". If forfeited by the individual through post-baptismal sin, it is again divinely restored to him, unto seventy times seven and beyond it if needs be, as often as he or she turns in penitence to re-seek it in and through our Lord and Saviour. Such penitence may be between the soul and God alone, but the deeper it goes the greater the soul's understanding of the necessity to offer it to God not merely as "from the alone to the Alone", but also through the ineffably merciful God-given Sacrament of Penance *to God in his Church*: his Church wounded and smirched throughout her length and breadth by even the most private-seeming sin of the individual.

The penitent's receiving of divine absolution "In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" is, moreover, accompanied by the transfigurational restoration of "the first robe", the ring, and the shoes which the Father *bids his servants* bring forth and put upon each and every homing prodigal. It is precisely against such return, divinely prayed for and *never despaired of,* that "the first robe" of the soul's aboriginal God-given vocation, the betrothal-ring of that union forged between God and the soul when at baptism he affianced it to himself in the family of Christ's Church, and the shoes of grace-enabled equipment to walk this unitive way for time and for eternity, all wilfully or negligently discarded by the soul, have been laid up by the Father—and *preserved by him unimpaired*—that "nothing be lost" from the instant of the self-confessed destitute soul's willingness once more to "receive the joyfulness of your glory" in and from him who "so great is his wealth of glory in Christ Jesus—will fully supply every need of yours" (Weymouth. Phil. iv, 19). But wondrous though this is, there is yet more blessedness.

Just as the consequences of personal sin are not—and cannot be—confined to the individual alone, so in like manner the fruits of personal penitence are not—and cannot be—confined to the individual alone. Peculiarly potent and far-reaching are, however, the fruits of personal penitence that is offered in and through the Sacrament of Penance.

The penitent who confesses to God through his priest, and "under the seal of the confessional", confesses only his or her own personal sins, but none the less for that this personal penitence and sacramental confession is a *social* act of *universal import.* Like all true worship—and eucharistic worship in particular—it is an act at once most personal and most corporate. It is a God-ward act of reparation *from within* the Body of Christ. It is likewise an act of reparation both *on behalf of* the Body of Christ and *to* the Body of Christ as here represented in its entirety in the person of the priest having his authority to forgive or to retain sins.

The Sacrament of Penance is not merely a means for the individual's recovery of that "first glory" forfeited by his or her own post-baptismal sin, but it is also a means whereby he or she can make vital contribution towards completing the corporate "making ready" for that final and ineffable consummation, as foreseen by the Seer of Patmos, when "the marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath made herself ready. And to her was granted that she should be arrayed in fine linen, clean and white: for the white linen is the righteousness of saints" (Rev. xix, 7-8). Any one sinner, however great or chronic a sinner, who under God truly repents and has recourse to him in the Sacrament of Penance, is in that very act empowered by him to obtain nothing less than *the hastening of the divine restoration of "the first robe"—"the first glory"—of the Total Christ.*

"All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men" (John i, 3-4). No child ever born, no matter how tainted its human heredity, nor squalid its earthly environment, but is in fact born with the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity bending down over it in infinity of loving tenderness, and breathing into it life intended—through the abundant means of grace sooner or later open to all—eventually to develop more and more in conformity with the Sacred Humanity of our Lord himself.

Fallen man is so prone to mark, magnify and dwell upon that which he conceives to be "against" him in the past, present or future, that he is all too often forgetful of or wholly blind to the

vastly preponderant forces ever at work "for" him, both supernaturally and naturally, through sacramental—and other—means of grace. All too commonly he feels—for one reason or another—that he has had "a bad start in life", or at some point "a raw deal" which makes it impossible for him ever to "get very far", or at any rate certainly not as far as ambition could wish.

In view of this, it is bracing to find that it is a doctor accustomed to large scale work amongst children coming for the most part from bad or broken homes, who has taken and stated it as axiomatic that *Baptism counteracts malign pre-natal influences;* and even more challenging to find a bishop, long since dead, saying to his Confirmation candidates—in the course of an address stressing *sanctity* as the one true "ambition" incumbent upon every man, woman and child—"If you will but continue to stir up and *use* the gift of the Holy Spirit given to you to-day, *there is absolutely no height of holiness to which each one of you may not attain*". How such a vista must for ever haunt, unceasingly smite to penitence and yet as unceasingly re-quicken to fresh effort to co-operate with grace any and all who, having received the gift of the Holy Spirit, once ponder this gift in the light of this truth of his own inspiring.

Grace and Glory having been received in the unrepeatable Sacraments of Baptism and Confirmation and, if lost, restored by penitence as needs be, whether by penitence in private or in the oft-repeatable Sacrament of Penance, grace and "the joyfulness of your glory" are progressively received by all who will—daily it may be unto their lives' ends—in the Sacrament of Holy Communion. Abbot Marmion tells us: "If we could see a person as the angels do after Holy Communion, he would appear quite transfigured, entirely plunged in the Divinity".

How holden are our eyes in regard both to aspiration and appearance! To what do we actually aspire for ourselves and for our fellow-men? How do we regard ourselves, and them? How much in our habitual trend of mind is at best superficial, and at worst lacking in faith, hope, or charity? Do outward physical defects in ourselves or others distress us more than moral or spiritual ones?

How are we accustomed to view people at home, at work, in church, in a shopping queue, in hospitals, in politics at home or abroad, in Borstals, prisons, or asylums? Do we see them only in relation to ourselves, as congenial or uncongenial, assets or liabilities, or objects of complete indifference to us?

However unattractive, shabby, weary, sad, frivolous, empty-headed, or pre-occupied with worldly cares, pleasures or even vices, the individual may be, however seething the mob, as at some big railway terminus during holiday time or in the daily "rush hour", over each one, ourselves included, as over Adam and Eve, the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are for ever bending in infinite love, communicating that triune breath of divine life without which every man, woman, or child would instantly perish body and soul. This—could the scales but fall for a moment from our physical or spiritual eyes—we should *see*: because it is a *fact*—the one unchanging and unchangeable fact about humanity.

How *transfigurational* such a "shewing" would be—and, indeed, has been for those to whom he has vouchsafed a glimpse of it down the ages—the "shewing" of each and all in his or her own inalienable God-given uniqueness: each made *for* him as well as *by* him; each having a claim both divine and human upon our *reverence* and caring love; and each having "absolutely no height of holiness" in accordance with his all-embracing unitive Will to which by the redeeming grace of God he or she may not eventually attain. How such a "shewing" would quicken us in *realization* of the all-important truth of Jacques Maritain's immortal pronouncement: "Unhappy you, if you whet your appetites for anything less than the Three Divine Persons and the humanity of Christ". How ardently it would enkindle us to seek anew on behalf of all Creation the Divine Persons both in themselves and indwelling the soul in grace, and likewise to seek the Sacred Humanity of Christ both in himself, in his members, and in each and all with whom he wills to identify himself not merely in spite but precisely *because* of their misery of body, mind and spirit so that even in what for them seems predominantly, if not exclusively, an "earth full of darkness and cruel habitations" they may be

brought by his sacrificial love-identification with them to recognize and receive in him the joyfulness of a glory at once and for ever his and theirs.

The St. Basil's Chapel Adamic Creation fresco is followed by that of the Angel preparing the Seer of Patmos for the revelation which he is to be shown in trust for the Church of his day and throughout the ages. Pen and book already lie in wait for him. The burden of prophetic recordership is laid upon him even before, during and after the shewings which—both in the heights and in the depths—he must receive at such total cost to himself in travail of body, mind and spirit. Something of the magnitude of this cost is vividly apparent before the final shewing—that of the Heavenly Jerusalem descending from above—when the kneeling seer is depicted clinging to a mountain pinnacle (*cf.* Rev. xxi, 10). Here he is patently engaged in a life-and-death wrestling of shrinking reluctance against an angel, who is having to drag him forcibly by the hand and against the grain of his whole being at that moment, to face a single other shewing over and above all others which he has had thrust upon him to his engulfing in rapture or in woe. Such desperate reluctance at the bare premonition of a final humanly overpowering shewing of Consummate Glory to which all other shewings have been leading up, and in which they and all created life in heaven and earth receive their divine vindication, plenary significance and eternal fruition, does indeed bring home that to "receive the joyfulness of your glory" takes a man's *all*. It can be received only by his selling of all that he hath—the unconditional progressive giving to God in nude faith of all that he has been, is, and hopes or fears to be—for the pearl of great price: the Glory of the Holy One with which he desires to enrobe all who will consent to be made one with him in the nuptial union of "the Lamb . . . and his wife".

The frescoes of the apocalyptic woes unfold along the remainder of the top tier of the north wall and back along the top tier of the south wall. That of the Heavenly Jerusalem descending from above is to be found within the sanctuary, on a small section of wall jutting out at right angles to the main south wall. This brings it into a position exactly corresponding to that of

the fresco on the north wall of the Holy Spirit brooding over chaos, beneath which in the lower tier is a fresco of Pentecost with Our Lady in the midst of the Apostles, she and they indissolubly one in the receiving of Glory from on high. Beneath the Heavenly Jerusalem fresco, that of the Bride, the Lamb's wife, there is in the lower tier a fresco symbolic of our life on earth and of our pilgrimage towards that "Jerusalem which is above . . . which is the Mother of us all" (Gal. iv, 26). Here below the whole landscape, though dotted with houses here and there, resembles nothing so much as a forest of crosses. A giant Cross towers over all; and round it myriads of lesser crosses of varying breadth and height and hue of darkness spring starkly from the earth, some straight as ramrods, others heeling drunkenly as though the earth itself could not support them. Thus do the frescoes—with the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity—run full circle: that full created circle from Chaos to the Twelve-Gated Heavenly City with free access alike from north and south and east and west.

In the frescoes, as in the Book of Revelation, as in life itself, the realism of human woes and apocalyptic cataclysms takes nothing from the Glory, but rather throws it into relief—and that not by way of mere contrast, but rather as showing that absolutely nowhere can *essential* Glory be excluded since in and through the Word it is, as it were, the subsoil of all Creation in general and of each and every creature in particular. "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made"—no creaturely existence without the quickening and seal of Triune Glory.

Over twenty years ago a young sailor returned from his first long voyage, told—in a way whose vividness none who heard could ever forget—the experience that befell during it. Out in the Far East a typhoon arose. The captain, a man of ripe experience, realized that there was absolutely no chance of survival at all by way of escape as the typhoon was overtaking the ship faster than she could flee from it, and would inevitably engulf her if she tried to run before it. He knew that at the heart of this—as of every—typhoon there was absolute calm, and that the sole

chance of survival lay in the possibility, if such existed, of reaching it and remaining in it until the typhoon had raged itself to an end. So alone this man of titanic courage reached his decision to put his ship about and run her straight back *into* the typhoon, if so be he might run her *through* it to the safety of its still heart.

The lad told of the unutterable dismay and fear this action caused to him and others who gave themselves and their ship up as lost for certain; and of the mounting terror as the full force of the typhoon was met head on, with mountainous seas and demonic uproar in which every instant they seemed over the brink of annihilation, and then after what seemed an eternity of abysmal horror the reaching of that *oasis of silence* and calm. He told how the wonder of that moment would never leave him as long as he lived: the wonder of that *silence* and *stillness* not as being safety, which it was, but simply *as itself*—a silence and stillness such as he had never dreamed could exist, such as made even that deathly terror and havoc *en route* to it seem a light price to pay for attaining to it simply for its own sake, and such as made him feel not himself only but also heaven and earth as though born again to aliveness and beauty wholly beyond previous ken, let alone imagining or power of description.

It is not dissimilar with the frescoes of the apocalyptic woes —which is to say it is not dissimilar with the whole gamut of created life. These frescoes of the apocalyptic woes turn their backs, as it were, upon "the Throne of God and of the Lamb", upon the pre-Adamic creation when all was "very good" and the Adamic creation when in transparent innocency man mirrored forth the image of God in which he was made. They turn instead and run head on into and through the typhoon of violence, war, death, earthquake, famine, pestilence, and every ill begotten of the Fall, until at last they reach and are resolved in the ineffable peace and bliss of the Heavenly Jerusalem where "there shall be no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for former things are passed away" (Rev. xxi, 4)—the typhoon having raged itself to an end during the victory of him who went forth "conquering and

to conquer" all that is contrary to or less than Glory in the Highest; and who is himself the peace at the heart of the typhoons of all time because he is the Quiet Heart of "the Silence of Eternity interpreted by Love".

It could not be otherwise. Man could not hope to flee successfully before the typhoon unleashed by his own disobedience to the declared Will of God. Had he kept tryst with God in obedience he would never have known God's glory and his own *save under paradisal conditions*. But once having willed to taste in disobedience of the tree of knowledge of good and evil he must in the very nature of things perforce come to recognize, re-learn and know the Glory of God—*since in the last resort that is all there is to know*—under exilic conditions of humanly stupendous sorrow, sweat and death, and through earthly darkness, travail and tumult instead of solely in and through paradisal light perpetual and bliss without alloy.

It is held by some, perhaps many, that the Fall of Man was preceded by a pre-mundane fall—a view for which the Bible would seem to furnish justification. The first Isaiah (xiv, 12) tells of the Fall of Lucifer; and the Seer of Patmos that "there was war in heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon; and the dragon fought and his angels, and prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And the great dragon was cast out, that old Serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world" (Rev. xii, 7-9).

Granted this pre-mundane angelic fall, it is natural, if not inevitable, to assume that the Fall of Man is in some way bound up with it. But this gives no warrant whatsoever for assuming that the cause of his fall was other than his own disobedience, nor that his responsibility for it is in any way diminished by the existence of a pre-mundane fall such as would seem to have occurred —since he was not descended from fallen angels, but a new creation made by God in his own image and endowed with integrity his for the keeping through grace and obedience.

At first sight an angelic fall presents the formidable problem of *how* and *why* such a fall could have occurred amongst beings in full enjoyment of the open vision of God—as though such

vision were less than satisfying. But surely the truth is just the reverse.

God created angels to enjoy in *union with him* all that he is in himself. He created them with that free-will which is the indispensable prerequisite for all genuine union, whether it be union between creature and Creator, or between two of his creatures. That angelic free-will he respected and respects as completely as he does man's free-will.

May it—indeed, must it not—be said that even such initial vision of God, and of his Bliss and Attributes, as was vouchsafed to the angels prior to the beatific vision, could not but by its very ineffability have tested angelic free-will to the uttermost? It was open to the angels selflessly and adoringly by their own deliberate choice to rejoice in God's Bliss and Attributes as *his* and, in accordance with his Will, to place their whole bliss in union with him for his own sake, regardless of his gifts. But the very desirability of his Bliss, and the magnificence of his Attributes and power, was sufficient to constitute for the angels a temptation to desire them *for self* and *apart from him*—which is precisely what Lucifer did when he said in his heart: "I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God . . . I will ascend above the heights of the clouds. I will be like the Most High" (Is. xiv, 13-14). Lucifer was not content to derive his bliss from God. He wanted to be *as God,* and to have *in himself* the source of all his knowledge, bliss, and power.

The crucial choice with which the paradisal man was faced was thus in essence akin to that of the angels. Had he deliberately chosen of his own free-will, selflessly and adoringly to rejoice in God's Bliss and Attributes as his, and in union with him contentedly and obediently to derive all his knowledge from God alone, may it not be that that would have been acceptable to God —or even perhaps intended by him—as in some measure filling up that which had been lacking in obedience among those angels who fell from their high estate in heaven?

It is surely not by accident, but of the deepest and most closely interwoven significance, that when the Serpent urged Eve to disobey God on the score that if she and Adam would but

eat of the forbidden fruit of the tree in the midst of the garden, ". . . then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be *as gods,* knowing good and evil", he elected to tempt her with what was at rock bottom the very same temptation to desire to "be like the Most High" to which Lucifer himself succumbed.

It was in compassion, not in wrath, that Adam and Eve were banished by God from Eden, where his unveiled Glory had become wholly insupportable to them after the Fall wherein—having by disobedience divested themselves of the wedding garment of the joyfulness of their God-communicated glory—they were left with nothing but their own naked shame that dared not enter into the Presence of the Lord "glorious in holiness".

God's inalienable love it was which drove Adam and Eve out of Eden into the full fury of the typhoon which their disobedience had unleashed, because he in his infinite wisdom knew that only as Jesus, "the captain of their salvation" (Heb. ii, 10), brought them and their descendants safely through it by taking their sin and shame upon him in love-obedience unto death thereby giving them his glory in exchange for their nakedness and bankruptcy, could they ever regain that pristine paradisal *silence de moi* in which alone man in utter self-oblivion gazes upon the open vision of God's Glory, communes with him face to face and thus receives for all eternity the joyfulness of his glory as in the beginning.

The lower tiers of frescoes in St. Basil's Chapel are devoted to depicting outstanding saints of all ages and many countries. On the north wall, beginning from the door, there is a group of Latin saints—St. Benedict, St. Geneviève, St. Leo the Great, St. Martin, St. Augustine of Hippo writing on a scroll, his mother St. Monica, St. Irenaeus cross in hand; then a group of Greek and Syrian saints—St. Isaac the Syrian, St. Ephrem the Syrian, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Athanasius, St. Nicolas of Myra and St. Makrina. Finally, within the sanctuary, and beneath the fresco of the pre-Adamic Creation, there is Saul at his conversion prostrate beneath rays of Glory from on high. All these groups of saints—and St. Paul also—have in the background churches representative of their day and culture.

On the south wall, nearest the sanctuary, against a background of forest trees, stands a group of Russian saints: foremost of whom is St. Seraphim of Sarov interceding with that potent depth, simplicity, charity, and ineffable joy-filled peace that is vouchsafed only after self-donation and testing to the uttermost. Then there is a group of British saints—including St. Boniface, Apostle of Germany—together with St. Bridget of Sweden; and finally a group of Balkan saints, including St. Cyril and St. Methodius, Apostles of the Slavs, King Lazarus and Queen Militza, St Sava of Serbia, and St. Gregory the Illuminator.

Here, indeed, is a galaxy of those—representative of myriads more—who have sacrificially and adoringly known how to receive from God in love to the uttermost the joyfulness of their glory, and who are interceding that we in turn, surrounded by their witness and prayer, and that of Mary, Queen of Saints, may learn to receive ours likewise.

To ponder their varied temperaments, tribulations and Christ-triumphs over all that would separate them interiorly or exteriorly from the Glory of God as all in all in them and through them for the whole Church, is to know that there is no circumstance, be it what it may, for any single soul, be that what it may, which cannot be pressed into furthering obedience to the consummate Pauline injunction: "Reach a helping hand to one another (as Messiah reached a hand to you) to uplift one another into the glory of the vision of God" (Way, Rom. xv, 7).

It is, under God, open to every soul to see some unique facet of this total vision whose glory fills heaven and earth, and is equally at the heart of darkness as of light since sacrificial love is the abiding substance of all Creation and of its divine preservation and transfigurational redemption; and then each cannot but have his or her own unique way of extending the helping hand that will enable others to gain more easily some glimpse of this vision. Some souls will find themselves uplifted towards it in one way, others in quite other ways.

All the diversity of aspects reflective of God's glory depicted in the frescoes of St. Basil's Chapel serve as potent reminder of the *inexhaustibleness* of this glory—equally open to us, had we

but desire enough to sell all for it for love and praise of him, in earth as in heaven.

"Now we see in part"—the glory for the most part hidden from our apathy, sin-blindedness, or vision-obscuring anxieties. Yet from time to time, directly or indirectly, even for the dullest of us, a chink if not a "door in heaven" may open for a moment and not only a new heaven be seen but a new earth also.

To unceasing prayer and desire, "the glory of the vision of God" is always open, to blind faith if not to sight, until such time as "the earth shall be filled with the *knowledge* of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea" (Hab. ii, 14), when the fact that "heaven and earth are full of Thy Glory" will be the sum of all knowledge inundating every man, woman and child—and the existence of every man, woman and child individually and corporately become nothing but *Gloria* unceasing.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST—II

Philosophy as Historicism

By GREVILLE NORBURN

HAVING defended the traditional view of the philosopher's task from the frontal attack of those who try to reduce metaphysical ideas to the status of mere emotive noises, signifying nothing but simple personal biography, we no sooner pause to draw breath than we find ourselves harassed in the rear by those who maintain a very different view, but one which seems in the end to be no less quixotic. I refer to those who maintain that metaphysical ideas are perfectly legitimate and must be assumed in the process of scientific thinking—nay, are what make such thinking possible; but who go on to assert—most perversely, as I think—that there is no way of telling whether such ideas and assumptions are true or false.

Of modern idealistic thinkers who represent this view, perhaps the late Professor R. G. Collingwood is the best known to us. In his third and last period—the period when, just before his brave death, he hurried to finish his fascinating book on *Metaphysics*—he bluntly stated the position in which he finally came to rest. The philosopher's task, he said, has nothing at all to do with ontology; that is to say with questions about the ultimate character of pure being. For idealism has always rightly insisted that the human mind is incapable of grasping the ultimate character of reality as it is "in itself". We have, and can have, no direct apprehension of the intrinsic nature of that which transcends our consciousness. All our knowledge is limited to "appearances". The idea of a science of pure being is a contradiction in terms—a mistake which has plagued philosophy from

Aristotle onwards. We cannot know anything about "that which is what it is" by itself and apart from our selective and symbolizing interpretations.

Consequently the real philosopher's task, Collingwood contended, is not to ask what reality is in the abstract and independently of mind. It is rather to ask why we *think* of it as we do. To this end, the philosopher is required to make explicit those deep, half-conscious beliefs which we normally take for granted, but which nevertheless we use (knowingly or not) in order to make sense of what is given to us in experience (both sensible and supersensible), and by which we understand and explain our world. The philosopher must "find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking". He must ascertain "whether different absolute presuppositions have been made by different peoples and cultures, or whether the same has been made *semper ubique et ab omnibus*". In short, his task is to show how thinking has been done, what intellectual tools it has used, and what basic assumptions have underlain and made possible the pursuit of scientific inquiry at the stage it has happened to reach in any age. But on pain of lapsing into pseudo-metaphysics, the philosopher must *not* ask whether those assumptions and beliefs (e.g. the ideas of substance, cause, laws of nature, God, etc.) have any ontological import or "hold good" for any reality alleged to exist beyond the possible range of consciousness. For, confined as we are to our own human ways of thought, we cannot compare appearances with that which is not an appearance, and consequently we can never know whether those interpretive forms which we find to be *subjectively* necessary for our thinking adumbrate or correspond to anything *objectively* real in nature.

Now if Collingwood was right in all this, it begins to look very much as though metaphysics, aided this time by idealism, has once again become its own gravedigger. As he himself put it, "philosophy as a separate discipline is wholly liquidated". It seems to have turned into a study, not of the nature of reality, not even of the nature of reality *quoad nos*, but a study simply of the history of thought. Idealism, to its own surprise, ends in

anti-metaphysic, and historicism is left in sole possession of the field. All that is required of the philosopher is to record as faithfully as he can the varieties of epistemological experience.

What was it that made Collingwood defend so assiduously this apparently quixotic view?

It has its origin, I think, in the indubitable fact that any piece of knowledge we happen to attain to is never the result of a passive "reading-off" of the given facts presented to us. That is the besetting fallacy of "realism". As Collingwood never tired of insisting, knowledge is the fruit of an active mental process in which—though often unconsciously—we put questions and give answers to ourselves beforehand, and thus meet the particular problem with which we happen to be faced with certain tacit presuppositions in our minds.

An illustration of his will make this clear. Suppose I look up from my desk and see through my window a piece of rope stretched between two posts. I immediately perceive myself thinking "That is a clothes line", meaning that it was put there for the purpose of hanging washing on. When I decide that it was put there for that purpose and for no other, what I am doing in actual fact is presupposing—probably unconsciously—that *somebody* had put it there for *some* purpose. I have already asked and answered a tacit question, and decided that it had not got there *by accident*. Only if I make that presupposition does the question then arise "What purpose?". If I did not, if I had told myself that the line really had got there by accident, then that question would never have arisen in my mind at all, and the situation in which I think "That is a clothes-line" would not have occurred. Thus it is that I am able to gain this piece of knowledge and assert confidently that "That is a clothes-line" only after I have asked and answered in the secret places of my mind the previous question "What is that thing for?". I must know, I must presuppose, that it was for something, before I can say that it was for hanging out the washing.

Now in our ordinary everyday thinking, we do not recognize that every statement of what purports to be knowledge is in fact an answer to a previous question and is based upon certain tacit

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presuppositions. Much of our thinking is automatic. But in proportion as a man is thinking scientifically, he knows that every statement he makes *is* the answer to a previous question—*and he knows what that question is.*

Collingwood next goes on to make the point that presuppositions are of two kinds: relative and absolute. The first can be verified and proved true or false by methods of observation and experiment. But the second are not capable of empirical verification; with the result—or so it is alleged—that the distinction between truth or falsity does not apply in their case.

To show how this perverse opinion is arrived at let us imagine a situation in which a friend of ours is taken ill. The doctor is summoned. No sooner has he arrived than he begins to ask questions. How long have you had this pain? Is it here—or here? Is it a sharp pain—or a dull ache? In addition to such-like questions, the doctor asks silent ones as well—as when he takes the patient's temperature and listens to his heart through a stethoscope. Having put these questions, both silent and otherwise—*and knowing why*—the doctor is in a position to pronounce a verdict.

Up to now the special knowledge presupposed by the technical skill with which the doctor puts his questions and elicits his answers and thus reaches his correct diagnosis—all this special knowledge is capable of empirical verification. The assumptions with which he works (e.g. that such-and-such a condition is the effect of such-and-such a cause) can all be tested and verified as true by anybody capable of making the necessary clinical research. His presuppositions, so far, are relative.

But now suppose the emergency is over and our friend is safely on the road to recovery. Suppose, when the doctor comes again on one of his periodic visits, we begin to ply him with questions. We shall soon find that he is not only making *relative* presuppositions (those that can be tested), but also *absolute* ones as well (which cannot).

Suppose we first ask him a plain straightforward question: "What is the cause of that particular symptom which you say always happens in this disease?" He may reply: "The cause

of that particular symptom is the presence of such-and-such a condition in the blood-stream". And if he were in a communicative mood, he might add: "That was proved by So-and-So in a piece of research now regarded as classical". Suppose now, greatly daring, we press on with our questions, and ask: "I suppose before So-and-So found out what the cause of that particular symptom was, he was quite certain that there really was a cause somewhere?". The answer would no doubt be somewhat short. "Quite sure, of course". If now we were so foolish as to ask "Why?" the doctor will probably answer testily, "Because everything that happens has a cause". If now we were importunate enough to question him: "But how do you know that everything that happens has a cause?" he will probably explode, because you have put your finger on one of his *absolute* presuppositions, and people are apt to be a bit touchy about their absolute presuppositions. If, however, he manages to keep his temper and gives a civil and candid answer, it will probably be to the following effect: "That is a thing we take for granted in my job. We don't question it. We don't try to verify it. It isn't a thing anybody has discovered like microbes in the circulation of the blood. It is a thing we just take for granted. It is an absolute presupposition".

This imaginary conversation serves to illustrate the point which Collingwood was anxious to make clear; namely, that there is a difference in kind between relative and absolute presuppositions. Relative presuppositions have to do with the way the world is conceived to work *in its details;* whereas absolute presuppositions are concerned with the way it is conceived to work as a whole.[1] The first are the legitimate business of the natural sciences: the second of philosophy. The first, because they are plain straightforward answers to empirical questions, can always be proved true or false by observation and experiment. But the second cannot. Absolute presuppositions cannot be tested by empirical means, because they are total assumptions which are applied to nature as a whole, and are not answers to empirical, intra-mundane problems at all. They are never themselves

[1] Cf. his booklet *Faith and Reason.*

experienced by sense; and therefore cannot be verified by sense-experience. Rather are they of the nature of "heuristic principles" (to use Kant's expression); that is to say, they are working hypotheses which enable science to ask the right questions and to get on with its proper job. But to ask (as, indeed, is often done) whether they can be demonstrated is totally to misunderstand their nature and function. For human beings have no direct experience of the world as a whole. We know it only in its particulars. And therefore we cannot know—and for all human purposes need not ask—whether those intellectual devices which we use to schematize those particulars are true or valid of so-called objective reality.

But, as Collingwood is very careful to warn us, let them not be despised because of that. Far from it. Though they are neither themselves experienced, nor derived from experience, yet they act as the indispensable "catalytic agents" which the mind must bring out of its own resources to the manipulation of what is called "experience", and the conversion of it into knowledge. They are genuinely *a priori,* and without them we could not understand or make sense of anything. But for them, there would be no science, no knowledge, no thinking. Even arguing would be impossible. Neither verified nor disproved by sense, they act as the foundations of thought, and cannot be contradicted without assuming the very thing that is called in question.

Consequently, we are told, we have no choice in the matter. "We must simply accept them and hold firmly to them". "We must insist upon presupposing them in all our thinking"—even if the distinction between truth or falsity cannot be applied to them; even if we cannot say *why* we should accept them or give reasons why others should. All we *can* do is to ask *what* they are.

And *that* is the proper business of the philosopher's quest. Philosophy is a descriptive, not a normative science. Its work is strictly historical. It is not called to show men what they *ought* to believe about the world they live in. Its function is simply to make explicit what they actually *do* believe about it already—a history of opinion up-to-date. The proper study of

philosophy is just the study of the *history* of philosophy, that and no more.

II.

What are we to say about all this? I think we must agree that Collingwood was right in his contention that ontology, defined as a science of pure being, is impossible. One of Kant's great contributions to philosophy was to show that we can never conceive what reality is like in itself. Our experience of it comes to us mediated and interpreted by means of those forms of intuition and categories of the understanding which are the natural characteristics of human beings. We cannot even know whether our knowledge "makes a difference" to the thing we know; for we have no means of comparing the thing known with the thing unknown. All our thinking is *anthropic*—to use a word coined by Dr. Tennant—the result of a discursive, not an intuitive, understanding.

If this is agreed, it follows that the philosopher must eschew ontology in the sense defined above, and must ever be mindful of the human situation. This means that no small part of his task will be to clarify and describe those unconscious ways of thinking which we normally take for granted, but which are in fact the tools we use in order to make sense of our experience and which moreover go far to determine the quality and amount of such practical knowledge as we happen to possess.

Where we find ourselves compelled to part company with Collingwood is in his contention that the clarification and description of these absolute presuppositions is *all* that the philosopher is asked to do. If this were so, then it would appear, at least at first blush, that once we have answered the historical question of what has been, or is being, actually assumed at any given period, then there is no more to be said. We must simply accept the verdict of history with folded arms. It is not ours to question or to justify; to criticize or to condemn. And this would seem to imply that there is nothing to choose between one set of assumptions and another, that there is no criterion of better or worse.

Some have gone so far as to suggest that a cynical indifference of this sort is what in fact Collingwood's historicism

finally leads to.[2] But I think we should hesitate before accepting it as wholly correct. Let us glance at one of his favourite examples of an absolute presupposition—a presupposition which he himself insisted on and which he insisted that others should share. I refer to the belief "that God exists".

Collingwood points out that, ever since the Renaissance, it has been part and parcel of the physicist's faith that mathematics is the language of physics. The physicist could not get along without it. It is an assumption both absolute and unavoidable. Yet, according to Collingwood's doctrine, it is a faith by no means derived from experience. It is *a priori,* and makes experience of that sort possible. Put another way round, this means that the modern physicist acts always upon the unverifiable conviction that nature is a realm of precision and is therefore intelligible. Now it is a matter of history that this particular assumption was not made by Plato, for whom nature was a realm of *imprecision;* and hence, for whom, there was strictly no science of nature. Apparently the faith of the modern scientist in the final intelligibility of nature is, in no small degree, the result of the displacement of the Platonic dogma by the preaching of the medieval Church, according to which God created the world and *behold it was very good.*[3] Nature is thus, in the final resort, ideally intelligible because an all-wise and all-intelligent Being made it.

Now is it to be supposed that Collingwood was of the opinion that the one assumption was no better than the other; that there was nothing to choose between them, and that therefore one could afford to be quite indifferent? The supposition is quite ridiculous. It is patently obvious that Collingwood was most concerned to commend and defend his conviction; namely that, as Christian Theism had been the origin, so it must continue to remain the basic assumption of the modern natural sciences. "The guardianship of the European scientific frame of mind", he

[2] So, for example, W. H. Walsh in *Philosophy,* July 1947.

[3] Whitehead was apparently of the same opinion. See *Science and the Modern World,* p. 15.

asserted, "is vested in the *religious* institutions of European civilization".

As a matter of fact, almost at the beginning of his essay on *Metaphysics,* Collingwood had indicated that there *was* a criterion by which to judge the relative *worth* of absolute presuppositions, even if there were no standard by which to determine their truth or falsity. Some presuppositions are *better* than others because they show themselves to be more "logically efficacious", that is to say, they prompt us to ask more of the right sort of questions and thereby to acquire more knowledge. This means, of course, that there was an element of pragmatism in Collingwood's thinking. We must choose one assumption rather than another because, being more logically efficacious, it helps us to ask more of the right questions and thus get more of the right answers.

If then our first impression is wrong; namely, that Collingwood's historicism leads to sceptical indifference, where *does* it lead to? It leads in my opinion to an ultimate—and quite unnecessary—agnosticism.

To show this, let us take the same example again. Having firmly insisted that the belief that God exists is one of the absolute and indispensable presuppositions of the natural sciences, as well for the recent past as for the future, he then goes on to say (characteristically enough) that there is no telling whether the belief is objectively true or false. It is *subjectively* unavoidable; but that is as far as he will go. His argument is, of course, exactly similar to Kant's in his *Critique of Judgement*—though, strangely enough, he does not refer to it. It is worth quoting. "But what now in the end does the most complete teleology prove? Does it prove that there *is* such an intelligent Being? No. It only proves that *according to the constitution of our cognitive faculties* and in the consequent combination of experience with the highest principles of reason, we can form absolutely no concept of the possibility of such a world as this, save by thinking a designedly-working Supreme Cause thereof. *Objectively,* we cannot lay down the proposition, there is an intelligent original Being; but only *subjectively,* for the use of our

judgement in its reflection upon the purposes of nature, which can be thought according to no other principle than that of a designing causality of a highest Cause". (Kr. III. Div. II § 75.)

What Kant and Collingwood are both trying to do is to steer a course midway between scepticism and dogmatism. What they are saying is that the assumption that God exists is quite unavoidable for human thought. We must think it. Yet it is only, after all, an *ens rationis*. Humanly speaking, it may be beyond doubt; but then, that is only humanly speaking. We have no warrant to assert dogmatically that an *ens rationis* corresponds to an *ens reale*. A "transcendental" God does not necessarily mean a transcendent God. As far as our human constitution goes, yes, the idea of God is reasonable and coherent with the rest of our thinking. But we cannot assert that the idea is unquestionably valid beyond human consciousness. It may be only the way we happen to be made. Our knowledge does not reach to the region of things-in-themselves, be they natural objects, other minds, or God.

From whence comes this intellectual "failure of nerve", this failure to have the courage of one's own convictions, this overcautious subjectivism? It is easy to make an Aunt Sally of Descartes and lay all the troubles of modern philosophy on his doorstep. I believe nevertheless that much of the hesitation and timidity which afflicts modern thought (of which Kant and Collingwood are the heirs) was born at that precise moment when Descartes went into his stove and decided that all that he could certainly know was his own states of mind. At that moment an artificial barrier was set up between the isolated self, severed even from its own body on the one hand, and the external world of objects and persons on the other. No wonder that philosophy has suffered from introversion ever since. But that is only because it first raised a dust and then complained that it could not see. In the ensuing murk, Descartes' "malignant demon" has had plenty of opportunity to sow the seeds of doubt and mistrust. (See my paper on *The Cartesian Faux-pas and the Malignant Demon* in the *Church Quarterly Review* for January 1946). Greek thought did not set up this artificial barrier, sever-

ing man from his world and setting him over against it. On the contrary it united him to it, interpreting whatever is found in human thought as a manifestation of things. So, for Plato, to know at all was to know *more* than one's states of mind. His "ideas" were more than mere concepts; they denoted in the world of things the objective counterpart of concept. Ideas, for Plato, are "known reality", with emphasis now on one, now on the other term.[4]

Consequently for Plato there was no impenetrable veil between us and objective reality; and good thinking, in proportion to its clarity, brings us into contact with what is really there. A quotation from a modern writer will illustrate the point. In *A Mathematician's Apology,* the late G. H. Hardy said this: "It seems to me that no philosophy can possibly be sympathetic to a mathematician which does not admit that . . . in some sense mathematical truth is part of objective reality. These (three) theorems are, in one sense or another, however elusive that sense may be, theorems concerning reality. They are not creatures of our minds. Lagrange discovered the first in 1774; when he discovered it, he discovered *something*".

That is thoroughly Platonic and is typical, it seems to me, of the sort of thinking which refuses to regard the ego as an abstract principle set over against the world, but rather thinks of it as a being united to a body and participating in the world. For this way of thinking what Marcel calls *incarnation* is the central fact. Man is an embodied soul, a percipient being in responsive *rapport* with that total energy-system which he calls the world and with which, as a living organism, he is in physical continuity. Consequently, for this way of thinking, the mind is never simply *bombinans in vacuo,* but is in commerce with something other than itself. Thought is transitive, not intransitive. Ideas may not be copies; and we may not with Spinoza go so far as to say "the order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connexion of things". We do not behold reality face to face; so far idealism is true. But this gives us no warrant whatever to

[4] See Constantin Ritter, *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy.*

suggest that our rational ideas are in *no* sense theorems concerning reality, that they are only artefacts of the mind and no index at all as to the nature of things. If they show themselves to be logically *and practically* efficacious, if they enable us with considerable success—as mathematics does—to predict the future course of nature; then (so long as we do not follow Collingwood into the Cartesian *faux-pas*) we can be satisfied that they are under some sort of empirical control from beyond ourselves. The fact that they cannot be verified by sense need not make them creatures of our minds. *Ad modum recipientis* and expressed in human language, good thinking discovers what is *there* to be known. The phenomenon is what we know about the noumenon. Appearances *do* tell us, by way of symbol and analogy, something about that which appears.

The moral of all this is perfectly plain. Collingwood has made it clear that, for an idealism which sets up a complete dualism of mind and matter and which insists that all that the mind can know is itself and its own states, Agnosticism is the final result. But Agnosticism is the death of the philosophical quest. That can only continue to flourish when it is sustained by the faith that, even though a *science* of being is beyond our powers, yet some *analogy* of being is an open possibility. And to this question we now turn.

(*To be continued*)

FATHER IGNATIUS (1837-1908)

By ANDREW L. DRUMMOND

An arresting but almost forgotten figure of the Victorian era was Joseph Leycester Lyne, Anglican monk and missioner, better known as "Father Ignatius". His life was "a restless sequence of incredible events, more likely to be read as the fantastic plot-weaving of some old-time romance, than what it really is—a monumental page in English Church History". His first biographer, the Baroness de Bertouch, was an Englishwoman who married an Austrian; a member of the Booth family associated with the Salvation Army, she had joined the Roman Catholic Church with apparently little instruction in the faith.[1] When the Baroness met Fr. Ignatius, she was working in London as a journalist. She was so impressed that she persuaded him to let her write his life. Accordingly, she pedestalled her hero as thaumaturge, reviver of monasticism, liturgical pioneer, evangelist, preacher, saint and victorious controversialist.[2] The critical reader is apt to dismiss her biography as hagiography. Yet it has been appraised by an ex-Dominican who became a prominent Unitarian[3] as "a psychological document which has not yet received the consideration it deserves". The late Bernard Manning

[1] The Abbot of Prinknash tells me that one of his monks, who was under Fr. Ignatius for many years at Llanthony, explained the circumstances. When seriously ill in Austria, her husband tried to get her a Protestant clergyman one evening; he said he would come in the morning; whereupon, the Baron (much distressed) sent for a priest, who received her into the Catholic communion. The Baroness survived and was alive as late as 1935 at Bexhill.

[2] *The Life of Fr. Ignatius, O.S.B., the Monk of Llanthony* (Methuen, 1904).

[3] *From Authority to Freedom—the Spiritual Pilgrimage of Charles Hargrove,* by L. P. Jacks (Williams and Norgate, 1920), p. 111 *n.*

confessed that he owed his "evangelical conversion" partly to "that appalling book, *The Life of Fr. Ignatius.*".[4] Behind the veil of eccentricity and credulity he discovered the real greatness of a most extraordinary complex personality.[5] Bernard Manning never met Ignatius, but was delighted when a Roman Catholic writer, Mr. Attwater, championed him in "a book which must be one of the most charitable and understanding ever written by a member of one Christian communion about a member of another".

The Bertouch Biography will always remain the chief source for the life of Ignatius as a whole; the obvious weakness of its 600 replete pages is hero-worship. Mr. Attwater not only brings his monastic life into the foreground, but sets his personality in better perspective.[6] Careful study convinced him that the *Manchester Guardian* was not wrong in stating after his death that: "In spite of the medieval garb and the halo of visions and mysticism that hung around him, Ignatius's sympathies were those of the religious middle-class Protestantism of Victorian England". This is as true as it is unrealized. Fr. Ignatius attacked practical materialism and scientific rationalism. He embraced the tenets of Romanticism, neo-medievalism and the Gothic Revival. This did not prevent him from being a fervent evangelical, a "Puritan", and a revivalist preacher. The fact that he could be in so many camps at once makes him a figure of psychological and historic interest.

I.

Joseph Leycester Lyne was born in Trinity Square, London, on November 23, 1837, the year of Queen Victoria's accession. His father, Francis Lyne, was a well-to-do merchant, belonging to a Cornish family, said to be of Welsh origin. His mother, Louisa Genevieve Leycester, of White Place, Berkshire, came

[4] *Bernard Lord Manning, A Memoir*, by F. Brittain (Cambridge, 1942), p. 7 f.

[5] Cp. *Dictionary of National Biography* (2nd Supplement, 1912), art. by G. S. Woods.

[6] *Father Ignatius of Llanthony, a Victorian.* By Donald Attwater. (Cassell and Co. 1931).

from an old Cheshire family. The paternal grandmother was the daughter of the Papal Ambassador at Lisbon. This Italian ancestry may have affected young Joseph Leycester's temperament, but his father was a staunch Evangelical member of the Church of England.

Family life among the Lynes was fairly normal, so far as amusements were concerned. The theatre and the dance were not banned. Mrs. Lyne was a moderate Tractarian. There were four sons and three daughters in this representative early Victorian family.

Leycester was a precocious child, much given to those fancies which charmed relatives called "quaint". In his fourth year he was taken to St. Peter's, Regent Square, next door to the famous church associated with Edward Irving, the scene of "prophecying and tongues" a few years earlier. Papa had told Leycester that St. Peter's was "God's house". Standing on tiptoe in the high box pew, he could not see him in the empty pulpit, nor was he "the man in the nightgown" at the desk. Gazing up at the dusky outline of the ponderous gallery above, his eyes caught sight of the crimson cushions and festooned fringes that adorned the luxurious front row. How silly he had been! Why, of course, God must have chosen that lofty and select portion of his house for his personal habitation. Going home, he collected his brothers and sisters around him and started preaching. "I must have crowds, crowds!" One day he whispered to the others: "I wonder why papa tells God such lies. If *we* said such things in the nursery, we should be punished; but I suppose at family prayers it is different". He could not understand the references to "broken cisterns" and "putrifying sores". He had climbed up the ledge of the cistern upstairs without discovering a leak; he had examined himself—not a scratch! "I suppose it's all right", he remarked, "or papa wouldn't do it, especially at prayer-time". On another occasion, one of his brothers pushed him on to the drawing-room hearth-rug (forbidden ground). "Now you are sure to go to hell, Leycester. You have broken the fifth commandment and disobeyed your father and mother, so you *know* you will go there". For nearly thirty years the incident

shadowed his life. When asked what induced him to become a monk, he would always reply: "In the first instance, as a means of saving my soul from hell. This was *before* my conversion. *After* it, I remained a monk as an act of gratitude to our Lord Jesus Christ for revealing himself to me as my personal Saviour".

In 1847 Leycester entered St. Paul's School, receiving a scholarship through the influence of a lady who heard him say at a dinner party (standing on the table): "Ladies, my heart is beneath your feet—treat it gently". At St. Paul's he developed an unusual interest in the Jews, which earned him the name of "Jew-mad" and "saintly Lyne". He would greet any old clo' man with bare head and low bow. He once stopped a little Jewish boy under a lamp-post: "Don't you long and *pray* to go back to Jerusalem?" "How can I want to go back when I've never been there?" was the reply. Leycester got into such a habit of looking at Jewish pictures in class that a master gave him forty-two strokes on the hands, two for each picture. He lost consciousness and had to be taken home in a cab. The shock to his nervous system was so great that the doctor prescribed a year's rest. He never lost his interest in the destiny of the Jews, predicting Zionism thirty years before its organization, though his mature point of view approximated to that of apocalyptic "British Israel".

At the age of fifteen, he had already an aptitude for public speaking, music and drama. As a pupil with the Rev. G. N. Wright, at Spalding, he kept apart from other boys and concentrated on Bible-reading and churchgoing; "his dormitory was his domestic chapel". Alone in Spalding church one day, listening to the organ, he heard a soft, persistent voice saying: "Why do you turn your back upon my altar—poor miserable table though it be?—the altar where I myself am so often present in the sacrament of my Body and Blood". He was prepared for Confirmation at home (1854) by the Hon. and Rev. Montague Villiers, but was chilled by his coldness. This did not discourage him in his search for a radiant faith—on the contrary, it strengthened his longing for the Sacramental worship of the High Church party. "Leycester's advanced views" were often discussed by his parents.

His father admonished him after his first Communion. "You need not put on that long face, Leycester. You have been to the Lord's Supper—a purely commemorative rite—and that is all about it" He would not let him go to Communion more than once every two months—which, of course, made him all the more zealous. He left Mr. Wright's at the age of 19, but his father flatly refused to let him go in for the Church. Indeed, he "cursed the day" when he "had first put a Prayer-book into his hands".

Leycester Lyne, like Robert Louis Stevenson, had a stern father but a devoted mother. She determined to do all she could for him. She communicated with her relative, Dr Eden, Bishop of Moray, and a lady who undertook to pay his fees at Trinity College, Glenalmond. This recently-established public school used to provide for the training of Divinity students, and was fortunate in securing Dr. Bright as liturgiologist. Leycester did not make much impression at Glenalmond (1856-9). His health benefited by living in glorious Perthshire scenery, but he found the spiritual climate arid. His education had been rather desultory since leaving St. Paul's, and he had never been at a university. One remark of his to a fellow theologue when crossing the quadrangle for chapel, was prophetic of his career: "I say, we look just like ye monks of ye 19th century processing to ye Vespers!"

Lyne finished his course at Glenalmond in his 21st year, but ordination in the English Church was not allowed before the age of 23. Bishop Eden suggested that he might act meanwhile as a catechist at a mission school in Inverness. The local Episcopalian laity considered him a social acquisition because his parents were reputed to be rich. The schoolmistress, however, was soon alarmed by his "Popish abominations" in school and reported him to the bishop. To justify his teaching, Lyne directed Dr. Eden's attention to the Prayer-book, where the festival of the Annunciation of Our Lady was tabulated. In spite of this, the bishop found him too "injudicious" for the post. Lyne declared: "Tabitha of the school-room rejoiced openly; the horn of the Kirkites was exalted for joy". Fortunately, one of his supporters, Mrs. Cameron, of Lakefield, Glen Urquhart, offered him a year's hospitality on her estate, with permission to make the most of

the Episcopal chapel (usually open only during the shooting season). Far from being content with introducing "the thin edge of the Tractarian wedge", he organized High Church services, which the people attended partly out of curiosity, and partly because they were moved by the simple earnestness of the delicate-looking youth. The Free Church minister soon heard of these activities and one evening, as the bell for Vespers rang, "long faces and sandy whiskers could be seen protruding melodramatically behind bushes", noting the names of the worshippers. Most of the old-fashioned Episcopalians went over to the Free Kirk, whereupon Bishop Eden withdrew Lyne's licence and closed the chapel.

The catechist was overwrought and suffered from inflammation of the heart. His mother was sent for and he was seriously ill for some months. It was not till December 23, 1860, that he was ordained deacon in Wells Cathedral, on the understanding that (i) not being a graduate, he should remain deacon for three years, (ii) he should not be allowed to preach till he had received priest's orders. His future was uncertain for his father was as hostile as ever to "Leycester's advanced views". Only a gift of £300 from Mrs. Cameron and other friends enabled him to accept the curacy of St. Peter's, Plymouth, the post being unpaid. Under Canon Prynne, he had plenty of scope for evangelism in a large slum parish. He was not long in Plymouth before there occurred one of the striking incidents so frequent throughout his life. He insisted on baptising a child, although the mother's attitude was unequivocal: "I don' want you or yer religion neither, so just clear out!" (The family names, incidentally, were Egg and Hatch!) Lyne shook the dust off his feet. Soon afterwards, the woman's 14-year-old daughter was struck with abject idiocy and covered with sores from head to foot. The young curate heard a mysterious voice summoning him to the house. He laid his hands on the sufferer and cured her by divine power. Whereupon the girl, the family, and the neighbours were all soundly converted. Leaving a printing office one day, the inner voice directed him to return. A man was being held down on the floor, raving. "In the Name of Jesus Christ, I command thee, come

out of this man!" One of the workmen expressed general opinion of this exorcism: "It's just like something out of the Bible".

While in Plymouth Lyne made a perpetual vow of celibacy. He organized a guild for boys and men: they were to be "brothers" and he was to be their "superior". He consulted Dr. Pusey, who sympathized with his ideals of fostering the devotional life, but warned him that he was "too young for notoriety, whether favourable or the reverse". He found Mother Priscilla Sellon warmly sympathetic. She bade him sit on a stool at her feet, "just like one of my nuns". This remarkable lady was most practical in her help. So sure was she of his divine vocation, that she put one of her local community houses at his disposal. With two companions of "The Society of the Love of Jesus" he took up residence. This experimental monastic community only lasted forty-eight hours. Lyne was struck down with typhoid, congestion of the brain followed, and his life was in danger. He was much encouraged by a message from Pusey, which confirmed him in his ideals. He declared: "I shall not die but live". The curacy was cancelled, the order dissolved, but the idea had taken root in his mind. Baroness de Bertouch, noting his conjunction with Mother Priscilla and Dr. Pusey, marked the genesis of Anglican monasticism and saw "the trefoil of forces blending into one prolific leaf".

As Leycester slowly recuperated, he travelled with his parents in Belgium. "There my monastic vocation was deepened by all I saw and heard. I longed to be to our beloved Church of England what Père Lacordaire and other religious men were to the Churches of France and Belgium". His aim was to discover a Rule native to the English branch of the Catholic Church. He claimed that no one could be "made a monk". St. Benedict was not—his vocation came direct from God. If neither Benedict nor Columbanus had sought the sanction of the Pope for forming a monastic order (according to Montalembert) why should Leycester Lyne seek the sanction of a mere bishop? When his plans materialized, he received the blessing of Dr. Forbes, Bishop of Brechin: "I thank God for putting it into the heart of a deacon of our Church to restore the Rule of St. Benedict of Nursia in our midst".

Before leaving Belgium, Lyne met Fr. Lowder, of St. George's-in-the-East, a London slum parish that had recently been the scene of ritual riots (1859-60). He accepted Lowder's offer of a curacy at Wellclose Square Mission, in a notorious slum where the clergy were publicly insulted in the streets. Here was a sphere that afforded ample scope for the work Leycester wanted when he was a little boy. ("I want to be a clergyman, but not like the *easy-going* clergymen. I should like to be more like a missionary".) His nine months' curacy witnessed striking scenes, including the raising of a dead girl, by means of a relic of the "true Cross" laid on her breast. This Lizzie Meek agreed to be dedicated as one of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart under Mother Priscilla. An old sweetheart, a coloured man, turned up unexpectedly from the West Indies. They married, and a month later—both were dead! Lyne's visit to a low dance-hall was melodramatic. "Can I come in?" he asked the door-keeper. "Well, of course you *can*, sir, but I wouldn't if I was you". Clad in cassock and biretta he entered. "We must all appear before the Judgment Seat of Christ!" he cried in a clear, ringing voice. Leaflets were distributed. There was no more dancing that night. Lyne's fellow-missioners admired his courage, though they did not find him very easy to work with. The benefactors of the mission found the Benedictine garb a stumbling-block, and as Fr. Lowder depended on their subscriptions, he had to part with his evangelist.

II.

> "So I became a Benedictine. Two other people were willing to join me now. I was twenty-four years of age. My father was very angry and refused to give me any further help. I realized that I should be penniless . . . but I had made up my mind to break away from every tie. Relatives, except my mother, would have nothing to say to me. My bright prospects in the Church would be for ever ruined; the world would say I was mad: the Church would regard me as a kind of ecclesiastical Ishmael. I should have to face persecution of every kind—want, suffering, poverty. Yet I firmly believe God was calling me, and I must obey"[7]

[7] *Autobiography of Rev. Fr. Ignatius*, Llanthony Tracts, No. 2. Abergavenny, 1896.

The first step was to publish a pamphlet on the need for reviving monasticism in the English Church, which evoked correspondence. The Rev. George Drury, Rector of Claydon (four miles from Ipswich), offered the use of one wing of his large parsonage, with furniture and food, in return for the assistance of the monks in his church, school, and parish. On Shrove Tuesday, 1863, Leycester Lyne entered into possession, along with Brothers Martin and Anselm. Monastic vows were taken in the presence of Mr. Drury and solemn offices duly observed. Lyne, as Superior, took the name of "Father Ignatius" (after Ignatius Loyola, not the martyr-bishop of Antioch).

The spectacle of a real monk in habit and sandals attracted curious sightseers, but the villagers were alarmed at "these goings-on". The old dame who kept the Baptist Chapel would execute a kind of war-dance whenever Fr. Ignatius approached, tinkling a little bell in his face or beating her tattoo on her watering-pot. "No Popery! We won't have no Popery!" became a popular slogan. A landowner promised to give £1,000 to anyone who would "clear out the monks". The rat-catcher swore he would do for Ignatius, who was nick-named "Father Blazer". The parishioners protested: "If you would not tell us we are going to Hell, we would leave you alone. We won't be told that by no man". After an evening meeting Fr. Ignatius was surrounded and dragged off to a field, where a bonfire had been kindled. He was saved by a worthy woman who seized a pewter teapot and sprang on the back of the ringleader with this weapon. *The Times* took notice of the Claydon riots. The Bishop of Norwich inhibited Ignatius from preaching, rebuking him for his "eccentricities", "absurd dress", etc. He continued, however, to preach in the rectory barn. What terminated the Claydon tenancy was simply the fact that the rector required the whole parsonage for his increasing family. Mr. Drury gave him a useful hint. If he wanted to finance his monastery, why not plead his cause in public halls, and charge for the front seats?

The experiment proving successful at Ipswich, Ignatius went on a preaching tour as far as Cornwall, and raised £300. This enabled him to take over Elm Hill, a large dilapidated house con-

taining forty rooms, on the site of a Dominican friary at Norwich. The last tenant had been a rag merchant. Ten ascetics were installed in this desolate ruin on January 30, 1864. Sympathetic tradesmen repaired the doors and windows, and supporters brought gifts of candles, onions, butter, fish and cheese (the monks were entirely dependent on these offerings). A chapel was opened and crowded by the public, many of whom were charmed by the new ritual (not even Norwich Cathedral had an altar cross in those days). Ignatius converted the easy-going Low Church rector of St. Lawrence's, the Rev. E. A. Hillyard, who allowed the monks to work in his parish. The services became "High", but the parishioners were roused one morning by the news that Ignatius had entered at dead of night, axe in hand, and by morning destroyed all the box pews which he loathed as symbols of Protestantism! Opposition was organized; and another night the monastery was nearly burnt down by a furious mob.

The enemies of Ignatius were sometimes those of his own household. On returning from a preaching tour, he found that a mutiny had taken place and he had been "deposed". Although easily imposed on by hypocrites, he had no difficulty in dealing with Brothers Stanislaus and Maurus and in restoring his authority. Newspaper controversies on "Startling Revelations in an English Monastery" he utilized as an opening for his own publicity. He had a stormy reception at the Church Congress, which met in Bristol in 1863; Bishop Ellicott, however, insisted on a deacon's right to be heard; so, attired in habit and sandals, he justified the existence of Anglican monasteries.

At Norwich, Ignatius was gaining a considerable following among the laity, which was strong enough to stand the following test. Many of these Churchpeople disregarded his denunciation of a public dance to be held in St. Andrew's Hall, formerly the nave of a Dominican church. The following Sunday he read out the names of the offenders in the priory chapel. They would be compelled to undergo public penance for sacrilege or be excluded from chapel services. His friend, the Rector of St. Lawrence, refused to submit to this humiliation, but a good number of lay

people did so. Men had to stand in front of the congregation holding a tallow candle; ladies had to lie prostrate upon ashes on the chapel floor; boys were to be soundly chastised with rods at the altar steps. Never was the power of Ignatius more signally proved; people of good position actually preferred this harsh ordeal to his "excommunication".

The young monk never seems to have been seriously bewitched by the lure of Papal prestige. He was not even impressed by the bright colours of English Catholicism's "second spring".[8] He was glad, however, to join Dr. Pusey and Miss Sellon on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, visiting Rome *en route*. He was accompanied by Brother Philip of Norwich ("if you don't take me with you I shall be damned"), Sister Ambrosia (an elderly widow) and Baby Ignatius (aged four years, adopted by Fr. Ignatius as an *oblate* in accordance with the Rule of St. Benedict). By leisurely stages the party reached Rome, much hampered by linguistic difficulties. Roman Society was intrigued and alarmed. A priest was deputed by the Holy Office to question the leader of this singular quartette. He professed himself satisfied and the party were allowed to visit the holy places. Augustus Hare remembered Baby Ignatius, in serge habit and tiny sandals, pattering up the aisle of St. Peter's and kissing the feet of the bronze patron saint.[9] Pius IX granted Ignatius an interview and reminded him: *"Cucullus haud facit monachum"*. To which he readily replied: *"Vere, beatissime pater; sed vita illum facit!"* Later, the Pope was blessing pilgrims at the head of the Grand Staircase in the Vatican. Seeing Ignatius, he beckoned to him. Cardinal Antonelli "interposed with vehement gestures". Waving the Cardinal away, the Holy Father presented the Anglican deacon with a medal of the Immaculate Conception—"Wear this in memory of a visit to an old man". Brother Philip was so impressed by their reception at the Dominican monastery of Santa

[8] On a visit to the R.C. monastery at Belmont he was scandalized to hear that when the lamp burning before the tabernacle went out, it was lit by a *modern match*. (Pugin would have called him brother!).

[9] Mrs. Lyne never cared for this "infant Samuel", *Ignatius of Mary*. Having "no vocation" at 14, he was apprenticed to sea. On returning from India, he got married at Edinburgh (1882).

Sabina that he wanted to stay and was very nearly converted to Romanism.[10]

Ignatius was thoroughly upset by this time, having left England as an invalid. He was so ill that he was unable to visit Monte Cassino, the *fons et origo* of the Benedictine Rule. The party were stranded in Messina and had to be extricated by the British consul. Dr. Pusey and the Lady Abbess, unable to wait for them any longer, had gone on to Jerusalem. After a month in Malta, Ignatius and his party, after various adventures at sea and crossing the Alps, finally reached England.

An unpleasant surprise awaited him. He discovered that the Norwich community was dispersed and Elm Hill up for sale. According to Baroness de Bertouch, Ignatius was the victim of a fraud perpetrated by a clerical friend and two lawyers: other accounts refer to the business as a "flaw in the title-deeds". Mr. Attwater elucidates: "On the advice of the Archbishop of Canterbury and with the help of his father, he tried to recover the property by a civil action. The proceedings dragged on for nearly twelve years, he spent by anticipation the whole of his reversionary interest of £10,000 in the will of his cousin, Mr. Lyne Stephens, and in the end the action failed".

Utterly crippled in health and spirits, Ignatius accepted the invitation of Dr. Pusey to stay with him in the Isle of Wight (August, 1866). His mother had prayed: "God give you a monastery and monks yet!" Only Brothers Alban and Philip remained faithful. Dr. Pusey and the Abbess Priscilla comforted him. Up to his twenty-ninth year he had had, like Luther, no comfort in his religion; he had become a monk through fear of hell. Turning over the pages of a Methodist hymn-book, his eye lighted on a crucial verse, one Sunday evening:

'Tis a point I long to know,
Oft it causes anxious thought;
Do I love the Lord or no?
Am I His—or am I not?

Pacing the beach, hymnal in hand, he realized that peace could

[10] For an interesting impression of Fr. Ignatius and his entourage at Santa Sabina, see L. P. Jacks, *From Authority to Freedom, the Spiritual Pilgrimage of Charles Hargrove* (Williams and Norgate, 1920).

only come by accepting Jesus Christ as God's free gift. New joy and strength surged into his life.[11] The note of Evangelical experience brought him into touch with multitudes who had no sympathy with ritualism or monastic asceticism.

With fresh ardour Ignatius accepted Bishop Tait's offer to ordain him priest within twelve months, if he assisted Mr. Denton, Vicar of St. Bartholomew's, Moor Lane. He was to act as "evening lecturer" at a salary of £120. So he removed to a house in Stoke Newington with the remains of his community—two brothers and "the infant Samuel". He soon won a reputation as a preacher and filled the empty city church. According to the Baroness de Bertouch, the vicar became jealous and had the gas turned off before the evening congregations had properly dispersed. At all events, vicar and curate parted just six weeks before the expiry of the stipulated twelve months' probation.

Frustrated in his attempt to secure ordination, Fr. Ignatius retired to Laleham-on-Thames and established nuns in a house at Feltham (1868). During this period he preached in London, mainly at St. Edmund's, Lombard Street. His Friday lunch-hour sermons addressed to business men, "The Blind Men of Lombard Street—High Street, Jericho", provoked a riot; a crowd of 60,000 surged round the church for four hours till dispersed by mounted police. *The Times* took notice of these disturbances in a leading article. On April 3, 1868, the *Morning Advertiser* published "Startling Disclosures about Fr. Ignatius". The source of the trouble was his former associate, Brother Stanislaus, and several youths from St. William's Guild, Norwich. He had no difficulty in clearing his character, but again failed to learn discretion. He "excommunicated" the "Third Order Sister" in charge of his mission house in Hunter Street. She appealed to the Bishop of London, who, tired of the Ignatius controversy, inhibited him from preaching in the diocese—in spite of Mr. Gladstone's appeal. "The Monk", however, hired halls and successfully resumed his old policy of charging for the better seats.

[11] Professor Denney used to say to his Glasgow students: "Gentlemen, there are only two ways of being religious: the one way is to try to put God in our debt; the other is simply to acknowledge the greatness of our debt to God."

At last a mother's ambition for her "darling monk" was realized. Towards the end of 1869, Sister Winifred Earley, of his "Third Order", enabled him to buy land for a monastery. It had for long been his ambition to rebuild the ruined monastery of Llanthony, among the Black Mountains of Wales. He could not persuade the son of Walter Savage Landor to sell this property, and is said to have anathematized him from a neighbouring eminence, by bell, book and candle! A farm of 34 acres further up the valley was acquired at Capel-y-ffin—a desolate spot, whose few inhabitants were militant Nonconformists. Giraldus Cambrensis wrote of Llanthony Priory in the 12th century that its "situation was more truly adapted to canonical discipline than all the monasteries of Britain". Even to-day it is remote—ten miles from the nearest railway station. After an uncomfortable beginning in sheds and barns, the new Llanthony gradually struggled into being—an inconvenient, ultra-Gothic Revival edifice built round a small grassy garth. The chapel was intended to be a replica of the old Augustinian minster down the valley. Above the monks' stalls ran a concealed gallery for the nuns, who had an entrance from their makeshift convent on the same level. The altar and reredos were "wedding-cake Gothick", a product of Munich and a museum specimen of that type of ecclesiastical art (1883)—it is a wonder that Ignatius was able to raise over £2,000 for these expensive furnishings.[12]

The Llanthony "Chronicle" was modelled on the traditional monastic style. It was not continued for long after 1870. A few excerpts are worth quoting:

> March 17, 1870.—Feast of St. Patrick. I Ignatius, the Monk of St. Benet, did, by the Mercy of Jesus Christ & of the Holy Virgin Mary, lay the Foundation Stone of this Holy House, after that the Holy Mass had been offered in the Monks Hut, aforementioned, by Edward Husband, a worthy but withal, a secular Priest, who had just returned to the Communion of our ancient English Church, from the Schismatic Sect established in our Country twenty years ago by the Bishop of Rome. But our

[12] The reredos was subsequently removed to an Anglican church at Newport, Mon. The choir stalls are now in the Abbey of Prinknash.

Church and bishops be not without blame in this matter, having most woefully corrupted the Old Faith, Discipline and Ceremonies of our National Church.

Augt. 28.—On this day, the Feast of St. Austin of Hippo, did the Lord Hereford, who owneth the mountains about us, visit our Monastery. He was exceedingly friendly and kind & did consent that we should open a quarry in these mountains, for the building of the Abbey Church. I did, in pleasantry say to his good Lordship, that men could not say that he was a favourer of Monasteries, just because, as a kind neighbour, he did permit us to use stone which himself would not miss. His Lordship did pleasantly answer me, that he would not care if men DID call him a favourer of ours. . . . Having taken some poor refection, he did rise to go.

Mr. Attwater, as a Roman Catholic authority on Monasticism, has pointed out that one cause for the failure of Ignatius' experiment was sheer individualism. What did not appeal to him in the Benedictine Rule he cast aside and did not hesitate to incorporate any non-Benedictine practices which took his fancy. Men of genuine vocation felt a firmer basis was needed than the changing will of one man. "The Llanthony venture can only be taken as a caricature . . . but no blame may be imputed to Fr. Ignatius for this. He had no practical experience whatsoever . . . he had no tradition, personal, national, or ecclesiastical, as a background, or any wise and well-informed advisers as a brake on his extravagances. His daily guides were Montalembert's *Monks of the West* and Butler's *Lives of the Saints,* and there could hardly be worse ones for a man of his temperament and upbringing".

Fr. Alston, in his *Reminiscences of Llanthony* (1913) confessed that "so long as we succeeded in satisfying our Superior, we did not care very much about the principles of the religious life itself". Discipline was strict and often ridiculous in effect. Thus, speaking with "a secular" (e.g. a visitor) involved the penalty of wearing for several days a lay article of clothing, e.g. a top-hat or a coloured tie. Broken articles had to be held up, kneeling in mid-choir, throughout the *Magnificat* at Vespers. A larder offence must be expiated by holding up meat on a fork and a copy of the Rule in the other hand. Manual labour was elevated to a position of pre-eminent importance (in contrast to

the original Rule of St. Benedict). Reading was discouraged. "We never allow ourselves to think", said Ignatius, "it is all decided for us".[13] Personal comfort in its most modest form was scorned. "We don't want any more namby-pamby, nineteenth century-hearted men; we want only downright, faithful, medieval-souled Welshmen and Englishmen, who can 'leave all' and 'give all' to 'Jesus only' ". (This is quite in Pugin's style.)

The services at Llanthony reflected the Superior's eclectic tendencies. He liked popular mission hymns, "Gospel addresses" and Spurgeon's sermons. He also liked florid music and gorgeous polyglot ritual, interlarded with many a *Kyrie* and *Agnus Dei*. He loved incense hot and strong, clashing cymbals, hundreds of flickering tapers. The miraculous moving of the reserved host from a locked monstrance on the altar (August 30, 1880) gave Fr. Ignatius the opportunity of making Llanthony a place of pilgrimage. On high days pilgrims were provided with excellent food, children were given sweets, and the chapel was crowded. A special notice informed priests that they could celebrate Mass every half hour from 5 a.m. till 10. "Roman, Greek, Anglican (Sarum), or even Prayer-book Rite may be used. Only Celibate Priests at the Shrine. 'Low Church' clergy permitted to celebrate in their own way, etc.".

The enclosing of a nun was a solemn rite that allowed Ignatius full scope for his symbolism; instead of being content to follow the Roman Church in this matter, he preferred the analogies of death and burial to those of marriage and life. On the Sunday within the Octave of the Assumption, 1882, "Sister Mary Ermenild-of-the-Sacred-Heart-of-Jesus" was committed to what may reasonably be called "a living tomb". Her hair was cut, she was clothed in a choir cowl, a black veil, then a scarlet veil, with a wreath, added. The Sisters laid her on the bier and covered her with a heavy funeral pall. The Abbot, vested in black velvet, and followed by acolytes and black-hooded monks, incensed the bier and intoned the funeral service. When the attendants were

[13] He claimed the right to read secular literature because he was a preacher. He must have been one of the few readers to " roar " over *Robert Elsmere* as a " funny " book !

all inside the Monastic Choir, the altar was vested in black, the lights extinguished, the gratings closed and a thick curtain hid her from the nave.

One reason for Fr. Ignatius' difficulties in keeping his monks and nuns at Llanthony was the boredom and loneliness of seclusion with resultant "accidie". Not even "miracles" could sustain *esprit-de-corps* continually. A number walked out or were sent away, one youth was returned to his parents by order of the Court of Chancery, July 24, 1873 (*"All England* rang with this case . . . I was attacked by the mob outside the court"). The numbers fluctuated continually. Thus in 1888 there were three novices, several boys, and three women in the convent; in the summer of 1890 there was a maximum of twelve adults. Again and again, he was taken in by bad, feeble or equivocal characters. And the faithful felt that their loyalty was strained by the Father's long absences. This, unfortunately, was necessary if Llanthony was to survive, for there were no endowments and the community had to depend on the collections and donations.

The public appearance of Fr. Ignatius year by year impressed his personality on thousands who would soon have forgotten his monastery in the wilds of Wales. He did not object to publicity even when the Press depicted him as stormy petrel, and ridiculed him in cartoons. His most picturesque performance was the occasion, in November, 1872, when he walked arm-in-arm with Charles Bradlaugh to London's chief "Hall of Science". He was well received by a packed assembly of secularists which included Annie Besant, Harriet Martineau and the two Holyokes. They applauded his extempore prayer and followed closely his oration on "Jesus Christ, the Central Figure of Human History". The only jarring note was when Bradlaugh threw the monk's Bible across the table. That did not prevent both men from paying one another compliments. "Fr. Ignatius is the only man whose influence I fear for my followers": "Bradlaugh is a fine, brave soul, and you always knew where you were with him".

Ignatius was not so fortunate in his relations with scholarly leaders of his own Church, whose views he denounced without discrimination as "rationalism". At Scarborough in 1876 he

publicly denounced his cousin, Dean Stanley, from the stage of the Theatre Royal; it was a "judgment" when the Spa Saloon, where the dean was to lecture, was burnt down that very night. He protested publicly against the burial of Benjamin Jowett with Christian rites because he "would put that dirty old pagan Plato before Jesus Christ". Canon Driver's opinion that the Book of Daniel was anonymous he scourged as "a most damnable, hellish position". The attempt of the *Lux Mundi* school to harmonize moderate Higher Criticism and Anglo-Catholicism he denounced as treachery from within. "If we doubt one thing, the whole thing must go . . . If Mr. Gore came into this room now, I feel as though I could tear him limb from limb". Bishop Gore a heresiarch! "Fundamentalist" as he was in his attitude to the "Higher Critics", he thought that Protestants would be better employed than in denouncing ritual; let them riot rather in Ripon, till Dean Fremantle was forced to make a speedy exit from the cathedral that he had dishonoured by "Unitarian" views of our Lord.

Fr. Ignatius had "friends at court", but he carried controversy too far and alienated supporters. With regret, Pusey and the Bishop of Chester declined to aid his mother in her efforts to secure her son's ordination as priest. She died in 1877. Within a year he was involved in a final dispute with his father, who resolved "to crush the Monk", whom he held accountable for his mother's death, and denounced unsparingly as a forger and a thief. Wherever Ignatius lectured, his father's enmity would follow him in letters to the local papers, which were inserted as advertisements when rejected. For five years the "Lyne upon Lyne" controversy dragged on. There was a reconciliation before the father's death in his 88th year.

Fr. Ignatius usually turned publicity to worthier ends than mere sensationalism. Gladstone admired his "pulpit eloquence". Mr. Peter Anson, a Roman Catholic authority on monasticism, considers that "his memory will live rather as one of the greatest mission preachers and orators of the 19th century than as a Benedictine monk". He entered whole-heartedly into Revivalism, which gained him the affection of the Welsh, whose views on

Church questions were so utterly different from his. During his American campaign in 1890, he addressed vast congregations. He came to the United States without ecclesiastical credentials, but his fame preceded him. He even preached in the equivalent of "dissenting tabernacles", which at home he would have shunned. The American Press found him "a singular mixture of the medieval monk, the Methodist revivalist, and the Catholic devotee". Unfortunately the "spell-binder" did not learn from experience. In "Fundamentalist" style he attacked clergy of his own Communion, like Phillip Brooks, as "heretics", and he outdid the more commercially-minded American evangelists in bizarre methods of raising funds. At St. Augustine, Florida, he held Lenten services in the Opera House, "intended for the upper classes". In many places he advertised "No Free Seats" (how unlike Moody!) On one occasion he returned a clergyman's cheque for $25 "with my Christian love" because he considered that he could have netted $300 in a public hall! He was appropriately nick-named "Father Pugnacious".

During his American tour he heard that one of his nuns had published *Nunnery Life in the Church of England, or Seventeen Years with Fr. Ignatius.* Miss Povey afterwards withdrew this tract (which had been edited by a clerical agent of the "Convent Inspection Society"). The three remaining nuns, doubtless disappointed that their chief had not taken them with his staff to the United States, and tired of being mewed up at Llanthony, had submitted to Rome. "I cannot blame them", said Ignatius.

The Monk of Llanthony's activities had been much curtailed by the fact that no bishop would ordain him priest unless he terminated his monastic experiments; he had been thirty-eight years a mere deacon. Unexpectedly his prayers were answered. In July, 1898, he received a telegram from "Mar Timotheos" offering to visit Llanthony, followed by a letter from Dr. F. G. Lee, of All Saints, Lambeth, who urged that "it might be useful". Timotheos was invited to come "in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ". "On seeing his most interesting Syriac documents with their authorized English translations, with the seals and signatures of the ecclesiastical and civil authorities concerned, we found that

Mar Timotheos had been appointed by the Syrian Patriarch of Antioch 'Archbishop and Metropolitan for the Old Catholics of America'; for all those who desired Catholic faith and privileges in America, but were not able to accept Roman claims and also rejected the multitudinous divisions of Protestantism. By a special bull of his Holiness Ignatius Peter III an Archbishop and two Bishops of his obedience consecrated Mar Timotheos as a priest of the Old Catholics of Switzerland, who was in the West, to be permitted to use the Latin rite" (*Hereford Times,* August 6, 1898).

Mar Timotheos agreed that Llanthony should retain the *Filioque* clause as long as the English Church did so; he assured Ignatius that the Syrian Church was no longer Monophysite, but strictly orthodox; and he declared that promise of obedience to him within the monastery need not preclude loyalty to the Bishop of St. David's outwith the cloister. Ignatius, on his side, said that dire necessity had forced him to take this step; yet there were precedents—and the Syrian Church was, after all, the first Gentile Church. The English bishops could hardly object—for their heart's desire was communion with the Eastern Church.

So Ignatius was at last ordained ("A Priest for Ever", exulted the Baroness de Bertouch) on August 2, 1898. He received the blessing of Mar Timotheos, with the Abbatial staff; the *Te Deum* was chanted and the bells of abbey and convent pealed forth in thanksgiving.[14] This event was much discussed. Anglo-Catholics were alarmed and the bishops of the American "Protestant Episcopal Church" declared the consecration *null and void.* ("They need a friendly reminder of the old proverb, *mind your own business",* said Ignatius; "they will be pronouncing the Pope's consecration 'null and void' next"). There were rumours that Mar Julius intended to establish an Old (or Free) Catholic diocese in England, with Ignatius as its first archbishop. Mr.

[14] Among the treasures of Prinknash Abbey, Gloucestershire, are the documents drawn up by Mgr. Timotheos recording his ordination. The library has a complete set of the works of Fr. Ignatius, albums of Llanthony press cuttings, and other *data* of interest, e.g., his tour to the U.S.A.

Attwater thinks that the Monk of Llanthony "at one time seriously entertained the possibility". He had read the following passage in a review: "Should Ignatius develop into a full-blown archbishop of the line of Antioch, the position of both Archbishop Temple and Cardinal Vaughan will be seriously undermined". Below, Ignatius added an autograph note—*"My greatest ambition fulfilled at last"*. When, however, Mar Julius wrote definitely suggesting such a scheme, Ignatius declined—so long as the English Church still made the Nicene Creed the public expression of her faith; if the creed was repudiated or made optional, then the National Church would be apostate and it would be the duty of Catholic Christians to renounce her and seek Apostolic succession elsewhere.

On the other hand, Fr. Ignatius was capable of asserting to a popular audience: "I make no distinction between Catholic and Protestant—I am sick of the terms". In spite of his High Toryism, he claimed that the Calvinistic Methodists had "saved the soul of Wales". Mr. Attwater has described his Catholicism as "more apparent than real". This is indicated by his forthright declaration that unless the Eucharist was received by "the saved", it was "like food offered to a corpse". His views seemed to take their colour from his latest surroundings and the moods they evoked. In spite of his own temperamental theology, he was rigorous in criticizing other men's "heresies". Even his fond biographer, the Baroness, has to admit that he was rather a bully in controversy. He had a capital command of the "rich vocabulary of ecclesiastical vituperation".

It would be easy to charge him with "Mariolatry", yet in other respects he was a Victorian "Puritan". He denounced as "unconverted" Anglo-Catholics who liked "the Continental Sunday". His views on the propriety of mixed bathing were as rigid as those of a Welsh Baptist deacon. On one occasion he accosted a Roman priest at Hereford station: "Father, what would you think if you saw Jesus Christ smoking a pipe?" To a young man enquiring about eternal life, he replied: "Shun the theatre, shun the racecourse, shun the ballroom". In his Scriptural literal-

ness,[15] he "hebraised" as much as the Evangelicals, within and without the Establishment. His evangelistic addresses were fluent, melodramatic, unctuous—differing little from the rhetoric of those who fulminated against his monasticism. Despite his decision to "retire into lay communion", he went on preaching, and entered whole-heartedly into the Evan Roberts Revival of 1904. After a stroke he died at his sister's house at Camberley on October 16, 1908. "Praise be to Jesus for ever and ever" were his last words. Large crowds attended his funeral at Llanthony.

The community buildings were left to Fr. Asaph and Mother Tudfil, the wish being expressed that in the event of their not being able to carry on, the property should be transferred to the Abbot of Buckfast, Devon. The five monks and two nuns had only a little ready money and a few small investments. The failure of Fr. Ignatius to endow Llanthony resulted in its dissolution. The nuns dispersed and three of the monks joined Dom Aelred Carlyle's community on Caldey Island, off the coast of Pembrokeshire (Anglican Benedictines founded in London in 1895: Fr. Ignatius claimed them as his "grandchildren", on the grounds that *his* monastery had been established long before *they* had been born). The Abbot of Buckfast tried to establish his claim to Llanthony, but his "wish" had no legal effect. An oblate brother was put in charge as caretaker and parties of monks from Caldey visited it from time to time. In 1913 most of the Community at Caldey, including Fr. Asaph,[16] were received into the Roman Catholic Church; on July 13 a priest of that Communion said Mass at Llanthony.[17] In 1916 it was closed owing to war-

[15] An aura of the supernatural enhanced the prestige of "The Monk". His sayings were confirmed by doings that recalled the "cautionary tales" of the O.T. "Curse your bald head!" cried a mother—her small boy lost all his curly hair.—*Elisha Redivivus*".

[16] For a clear account of these transactions see P. F. Anson's *The Benedictines of Caldey* (Burns, Oates, 1940). Peter Anson's estimate of Fr. Ignatius is of real value, in view of his own varied experiences of monasticism.

[17] Dom Asaph Harris, O.S.B., Prinknash Abbey, was the last survivor of Ignatian monasticism. He was alive in 1944, "utterly devoted to the memory of 'The Father'".

conditions. In 1924 the buildings were rented to three Roman Catholic families. A year earlier Mr. Attwater visited Llanthony. The whole place was like a "Gothick" nightmare of Scott or *The Ingoldsby Legends*. Great trees were flapping and dripping upon the roof, ivy had forced its way into the lancet windows, and the overgrown garth was an appropriate setting for a fantastic ghost-story. The outer doors were inscribed *Pax, Jesu y Unig, Jesus only. "Solemn silence"* was still painted on the wall of the staircase; here and there were represented crosses, palms, texts: and those relics of Victorian ideas of medieval religion were the most depressing things about the place. The church was ruinous, though weekly Mass was said in an improvised cloister chapel. By 1928 Llanthony was tenanted only by the body of its founder.[18]

Had Joseph Leycester Lyne been a Roman Catholic, work would doubtless have been found for him to engross his energy and fulfil his vocation within the framework of Holy Church. The Anglican Establishment did not know how to make use of him, just as it had failed to canalize the burning zeal of John Wesley. If an evangelist is erratic and eccentric, yet a sincere and effective preacher, ostracism and isolation are not likely to cure him; he will probably court martyrdom, and be tempted to glory in sensational publicity. It took courage in 1860 to assume the monastic habit, which was still a red rag to John Bull. Fr. Ignatius familiarized the British public with a religious ideal that had come to be associated only with persecutors, traitors, and spies. Considering the phenomenal growth of the High Church party in Anglicanism during his life-time, it is surprising that monasticism within the National Church revived to

[18] Eric Gill has described Llanthony in his *Autobiography* (1941). It was a backwater culturally as well as topographically and spiritually —full of shabby furniture suggesting sea-side lodgings rather than the cloister. But the place laid its spell upon Mr. Gill; he bought it from the Benedictines of Prinknash, renovated it, and one of his daughters ran it as a "Guest House".

such a slight extent.[19] Whatever the future may hold for the monastic ideal within the inclusive bounds of the *Ecclesia Anglicana,* it is safe to say that there will not be another Fr. Ignatius. Never has one personality gathered to itself so many diverse strands of Victorian religion. If *The Church Times* did not do him justice in its obituary notice, *The British Weekly* paid a tribute that was truly magnanimous. "To the end his attachment to the New Testament gospel was intense. His mind might wander upon many points, but it did not wander upon that. He fell asleep in Jesus".

JESUS † ONLY

PAX

[19] Only a few lines are devoted to Fr. Ignatius as a pioneer in a 30 pp. essay, "Revival of the Religious Life" (in *Northern Catholicism,* 1933).

A PROPHET RECALLED

By MAURICE B. RECKITT

SOME forty years ago a rather thick-set little priest might have been seen stumping along the seafront of a south coast resort with a tall young man by his side. He was carrying an umbrella and talking volubly and almost uninterruptedly, though, as a watchful observer might have noticed, apparently to himself. Every now and then he would drop the umbrella, which he made no effort to pick up, this task being tacitly left to his young attendant. Occasionally he would stop altogether and appear to give a little lecture, especially by way of reply to some inquiry which the young man had contrived to get in edgeways. They must have seemed an odd couple to the inhabitants of this highly conventional resort, and if any were readers of Chesterton's Father Brown stories, which began to appear about this time, the little priest may well have suggested to them the original of that very original character, though it seems that he was in fact studied from another model. The young man was the present writer; the priest was (*inter alia*) the most notable Anglican apologist of his generation, John Neville Figgis, then in his prime.

"The student of Figgis is faced with the problem of why so great a man and so profound a thinker has been neglected in the currents of modern thought". The question is thus posed by a stimulating little book[1] which is the occasion of this article, one which should most usefully serve to destroy this neglect, for which it is indeed by no means easy to account. The tragic breakdown which clouded the closing months of his life may have something to do with it. But more probably, as Mr. Tucker suggests, the timing of his death is the principal reason. Figgis died only five

[1] *John Neville Figgis—A Study*. By Maurice G. Tucker. (S.P.C.K.) 10s. 6d.

months after the armistice, and in a society busy with hopes for "building a new world" he may have seemed to belong to an old one. This is the more likely to have been the case since Figgis was no optimist about the prospects of that civilization which he proclaimed two years before the first World War, to be "at the cross-roads". He wrote then, as Mr. Tucker reminds us:

> The forces of civilization are imposing, but apart from Christ they are visibly dissolving. Its tall towers are shaking and the splendid spires of the western world are crumbling. Catastrophe is threatening. We can almost hear the thunder of the avalanche of war on a scale unknown. Hardly does the world even look stable any longer . . . Even the intellectual fabric is not enduring . . . The critics have built up their whole position . . . from an intellectual backwater, trusting to a philosophy which has become obsolete and a notion of science which its most disinterested representatives are now rejecting.

We have become used to pronouncements of this sort nowadays, but it was a truly prophetic note in 1912. It was not likely, however, to be a welcome one seven years later, with the League of Nations in the making, amid the post-war oratory of Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, to the almost wholly uncritical applause of the churches. Democratic idealism was at its zenith, and few men perceived that what was in fact being prepared were the great plebiscitary dictatorships and " a world fit for Neros to live in "

Perhaps Figgis, had he lived, could have cast upon the confused scene the shafts of a truly Christian illumination, for there was no one at that date (save Chesterton from a less directly theological angle) to equal him in religious insight into his times. It is easy to forget—for he looked much older and ill-health had set its seal early upon him—that he was only fifty-two when he died. If he had lived right through the inter-war period he would have been only seventy-three, and with no greatly abnormal span of life he might have been still with us to-day; he was, for example, ten years Bernard Shaw's junior. How much both "Religion and English Society"—one of his characteristic book titles—have lost by this deprivation it is impossible to estimate. Perhaps, however, it is better to be thankful that he was not required to live on, "an old man in a dry time", to see so many of his more gloomy prophecies come true.

Yet in some ways our society has become a less difficult one in which to apprehend and maintain the Faith than it was in his day. There are several reasons for this, including no doubt the effect of the witness which Figgis himself so nobly bore. One is the decay of liberal optimism under the impact of events. Another is the rediscovery of the religious approach to life by many of the cultural leaders of our time, such as T. S. Eliot, C. S. Lewis and the late Charles Williams from within the Christian fold, and men like Aldous Huxley and Gerald Heard outside it. Men inclined towards a religious faith do not find its attainment so difficult as they did in Figgis's day, or indeed as he did himself. "To me", he said, "faith is the angel of an agony", and Mr. Tucker is justified in his suggestion that "he understood the thought processes of the enemies of Christ because to some extent he had experienced them". Indeed his influence was notably due to "the impression given by nearly all of his addresses of the sense of the personal discovery of Christianity". An agnostic in his early twenties, he came through this phase because the honesty of his mind and the courage of his spirit led him to see through its inadequacy. As Mr. Tucker well expresses it, "he used his naturally sceptical intellect against scepticism itself". It satisfied neither his mind nor—still more importantly, as he felt—his soul. Hence "what gives his apologetic its strength and freshness is that he is dealing with no problems which he had not felt in his own life"—and the operative word here is "felt".

Mr. Tucker is undoubtedly right about this vital matter. But his book is somewhat disappointing, since it tells us so little of what went to determine the outlook of Figgis in all this, and in particular in regard to the three great "moments" of his life: his conversion, his ordination and his reception into the Community of the Resurrection. No doubt such knowledge is not easily come by, but the author of "a study" should, one feels, have made a more resolute effort to enlighten us upon such capital matters. Mr. Tucker modestly declares of his book that it is "in no sense a full biography". It certainly is not. Even in the matter of dates the author is extremely parsimonious; for example, we are not told the precise year of any of the three decisive events mentioned above. Moreover, Mr. Tucker's method of presenta-

tion is not wholly satisfactory for his purpose. After a "Biographical Introduction", graphic in places but very sketchy in others, the author proceeds by the method of giving outlines of Figgis's numerous and very various books. This has the advantage that by generous quotation Figgis is allowed to speak for himself, but it prevents the author from standing away from his subject in such a manner as to present a satisfactory synthesis. The many-sidedness of the man is shown to us, and justifiably insisted upon, but his total personality and significance do not sufficiently emerge. Figgis tends to appear as a sort of Christian department store, ready to supply the needs of an inquirer into a dozen aspects of Christian culture, rather than as the totally integrated person which he was, or at any rate became. A more strictly biographical treatment throughout might have avoided this drawback.

Nevertheless, Mr. Tucker has effectively performed the immediately necessary task of directing the attention of Anglicans in the middle of the twentieth century to the man who more than any other was fighting the essential battle in the Church of England (amid a lot of lesser skirmishes) in its second so crucial decade. He does full justice, too, within the limits he has set himself, to that other vital function of Figgis as an interpreter of the Christian culture of the Middle Ages and a pioneer of political pluralism, essentially two aspects of the same thing. Figgis saw, and in a dozen ways illustrated, the truth that medieval Christendom was not only a great achievement in itself but one permanently relevant to a Christian understanding of man in society, because its organs were contributory to a single and generally accepted purpose, and because the resulting order was a *communitas communitatum* and not a predominantly political state. His studies of political theory, for all their *expertise,* are not abstract treatises or mere products of a specialized research; they are glowing illustrations of the dynamic influence of ideas, true or false, in the development of human societies. I shall never forget the excitement into which I was plunged by the perusal of *From Gerson to Grotius* in the early stages of my work in the Modern History School at Oxford. It gave me insights into the signifi-

cance of political ideas such as I have never received so vividly since from any other source.

It would be easy, no doubt, to exaggerate the importance of Figgis as an original thinker in this field. He derived his political pluralism from Maitland and Gierke, just as he had learnt from Acton that historical study can never dispense with the criterion of moral judgement and from Creighton that, as Mr. Tucker puts it, "the widest humanism and cultural sympathies could spring from Christianity," or, to sum the matter up as Figgis did himself, that "human society and all human culture is possible only by the ultimate recognition of the eternal goal". Here, indeed, we come to what is more and more clearly to be seen as his central preoccupation. His problem was to show that, while, upon the one hand, a high culture is an entirely valid aim of man in a fully developed society, and there is no secure humanism but a Christian humanism, there is, on the other hand, an inescapable tension between the Church and the World, and not the "wicked world" only but the good world too. This is the paradox with which he struggled (and has, we must hope, taught future generations to struggle) not only in his thought but in his life. This is the "concern" which drove the sceptical and indulgent young don, first into the Church, then into the priesthood, then into the discipline of the religious life. Figgis could tolerate no version of Christianity, whether "liberal", plutocratic (his attacks upon the "comfortable classes" were almost violent in tone) or merely complacent (what he called "auntism") which blurred this distinction between Christian and mundane standards. Remembering this, we can accept Mr. Tucker's verdict that "as a prophet and thinker his value lies in the fact that the problems he attempted to solve are still those which vex the human mind". And above all the problem constituted by the fact that while what God reveals to us in creation is in truth "very good", what he requires of us for its redemption is not different in essence from that which he has uniquely given himself.

REVIEWS

EARLY CHRISTIAN CREEDS. By J. N. D. KELLY. Pp. xi and 446. (Longmans). 26s.

IT might at first sight seem impossible to say anything fresh on the subject of Early Christian Creeds after the great work of Kattenbusch, Harnack, Loofs and Lietzmann on the Continent and C. H. Turner, A. E. Burn and F. J. Badcock in this country. Indeed, even if Mr. Kelly had only given us a careful conspectus of recent work, making, for example, Lietzmann's important *Symbolstudien* available for English readers, he would have put us all in his debt. But he has done much better than that. He has given a full scale treatment of the subject in which old problems have been examined afresh and the stamp of a keen and vigorous mind impressed upon the whole subject. It is safe to predict that it will remain a standard work for many years to come.

Canon Kelly begins with an examination of the credal elements in the New Testament and the Primitive Church where his conclusions are fully in line with most recent research. At this period it all depends what you mean by Creeds. If your standard requirement is for rigid definitions of faith, the evidence at this period is wholly to seek. If, on the other hand, you are content to recognize formal and stylized summaries of credenda, then there is abundant evidence from the New Testament and the Primitive Church that such existed. The evidence for one-clause, two-clause or three-clause summaries of faith is fully set out and the relative influence of the Trinitarian pattern and the "Christ confession" discussed.

Full weight is given to the relation between Creeds and Baptism without neglecting, as is sometimes done, the influence of other factors in the creation of Creeds. The relative rôles of declaratory and interrogatory creeds is also passed under review. The principal conclusions are that declaratory creeds, the evidence of the Western text of Acts viii, 36-8 notwithstanding, are posterior to interrogatory creeds, and that the process of the *traditio* and *redditio symboli* belong rather to the closing stages of the catechetical instruction than to the Baptism proper. Mr. Kelly rightly refuses to draw

the distinction too narrowly, but the conclusion is a just one. The restoration of the relation between Creeds and catechetical instruction is an illuminating one, which not only paves the way for a reconsideration of the Liturgical material but also for a correct appraisal of the significance of the Creed-like material of which the second century Fathers are so full.

Mr. Kelly is rightly sceptical of the attempts once fashionable to distil a formal Creed out of the summaries of faith contained in Fathers like St. Ignatius and Tertullian. Such distillations were always more heady than healthful. Even the *Regula fidei* of Tertullian is not in itself quite a Creed, though we cannot be far from one at this stage. While the Church, at the end of the second century, was becoming increasingly formulistically inclined, she appears in no hurry to achieve a symbolic formula. We are still only at the close of the pre-history of Creeds.

On the subject of the Old Roman Creed Mr. Kelly is relatively conservative. He defends the traditional view that Marcellus of Ancyra embodied the Old Roman Creed in his personal defence to the Western Church and upholds the attempts that have been made to analyse out the Old Roman Creed as well as the Creed of Aquileia from the Commentary on the Creed by Rufinus. He inclines to the view that the Old Roman Creed can be carried back with some probability to the times of Tertullian and St. Hippolytus. Here, however, he breaks new ground with his suggestion that the common assumption that there can only have been one form of Creed current at Rome may be groundless. It is possible that we ought to speak of Creeds rather than of Creed in the Roman Church at this period. There might possibly have been a period at which both the Old Roman Creed and the Hippolytan Creed were both current at Rome. The conjecture cannot naturally be conclusive but it is worth attention.

It comes rather as a surprise, in view of the minute word-tests which he later applies to determine, or more often to reject any determination, the relation between individual credal forms and the traditions of the great sees of the East, to find Mr. Kelly suggesting that in the infancy of Creeds, the West showed a less careful regard for verbal minutiae than the East. He refuses to accept the conclusion drawn rather superficially half a century ago by writers like Harnack, Kruger and McGiffert, that the battle against heresy had more than a very minor part to play in the revolution of the Creeds. The positive explication of the Christian *lex credendi* and the transmission of this to successive generations of Christian layfolk are more important influences in the making of baptismal catechetical Creeds than the necessity to guard against heresy. This stage was to come, but it can only be antedated with disastrous consequences.

An admirable innovation on books of this character is the careful and detailed theological exegesis of the content of the Old Roman Creed. Here Mr. Kelly shows us that he is no mere *quellenkrtik* but an able theologian and historian of doctrine. There are parts of his discussion (especially upon the Christological Articles) about which different views might without impropriety be held. His reading of the type of theology held or current at Rome in the second century would not, for example, be in entire agreement with that preferred by your reviewer. But Mr. Kelly modestly disclaims any full-scale treatment of the history of Christian doctrine and on matters of detail would be the first to admit that the last word has not, and possibly in the present state of the evidence never can, be said.

On third century credal history Mr. Kelly has little new to say, primarily because the evidence is so scanty that in any case little can usefully be said. He comments on the relative paucity of credal forms. Here Rome appears to have been a pioneer, albeit in the West at least an influential pioneer. He ascribes this puzzling absence of credal forms to the rise and growth of the discipline of secrecy extending to the Church's catechetical instruction, probably as the numbers of converts increased and the tendency to dilution of membership began. Further treatment of this vexed question is much to be desired. It is possible that Mr. Kelly demands rather too early a date for the *disciplina arcani* than the facts, such as they are, would warrant. He notices in detail the differences between Eastern and Western credal forms, accepting with due reserve the conclusions of Lietzmann's third *Symbolstudien* on the fundamental character of Eastern Creeds though disclaiming any possibility of deriving Eastern and Western Creeds from a still more primitive common archetype.

For your reviewer, however, the really exciting part of the book is that concerned with the history of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. Parts of this treatment have the fascination of a theological "whodunit", with Mr. Kelly many clues ahead of his readers the whole time, although possibly unable at the close finally to lay the villain or hero of the piece by the heels. The affinities and differentia of the various credal forms, the transition between the Creeds as summaries for learners and tests for teachers, the bewildering way in which baptismal creeds were taken over and stepped up for theological purposes are all brought out clearly and cogently. Mr. Kelly rightly accepts the historicity of the Canons of the Council of Antioch in 325 (but why are his readers not referred to Dr. F. L. Cross's full and careful summary of the evidence in the *Church Quarterly Review* for April/June, 1939?) and

we appear all set for an identification of the prototype of the Creed of Nicaea with the Baptismal Creed of Caesarea, suitably buttressed against Arianism, possibly to the chagrin of Eusebius himself. But a rigidly conducted collation of the Creed of Caesarea and that of Nicaea convinces Mr. Kelly that this common assumption is in part mistaken. The Creed of the Council is no doubt a Baptismal one, but rather of the Jerusalemite than the Caesarean type. This enables Mr. Kelly to conclude that the alterations of this Creed in an anti-Arian direction are somewhat less than has sometimes been thought. He would not, for example, maintain that the replacement of the term Logos by that of Son was an anti-Arian move or in fact that there was any replacement at all.

A careful chapter analyses the Arian controversy and the repercussion of theology upon credal forms. There is little unusual in the early part of this analysis. What is, however, of far greater importance is the treatment doctrinally and credally of the period after Nicaea. Mr. Kelly starts by pondering upon the significance of two important facts: that the Nicene Creed in general and the Homoousion in particular do not appear to be sacrosanct during the earlier part of the period and that St. Athanasius, so far from having the device of the Homoousion painted upon his crusading shield, does not appear to concern himself greatly with the term until a relatively late period in his theology. He suggests that the reason for the first point is that the Homoousion at least in the intention of Constantine represented rather a policy than a theology. There is no doubt some evidence to suggest this. Constantine, in his dealings with the less unrepentant Arians, was more pleased at securing the assent of the Arian leaders to the Homoousion than in inquiring what conceivable meaning they might have without a more thoroughgoing change of heart than he had any warrant for supposing. But the sequel which showed the earliest non-Nicene type of Creeds were aimed rather against Marcellus of Ancyra and his ilk suggest a further reason for the silence on the Homoousion during this early period, not its own primarily untheological character but the theological affinities of some of its principal supporters. With regard to the attitude of St. Athanasius to the Homoousion (utilizing a recent and valuable study by Ch. Hauret) he suggests that the neglect of the term during his earlier period is less significant than might appear since he prefers to use cognate terms. The absence of the use of the term is an example rather of theological tact than of terminological embarrassment. But the old story of the relations between St. Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra might do something to redress the balance and to supplement the picture. Another puzzling feature to which he calls atten-

tion is the apparent ignorance of Nicaea and its works in the West. Marcellus of Ancyra, for example, despite his loyal and embarrassing support for the Nicene Symbol, produces nothing more searching than the Old Roman Creed. St. Hilary is apparently quite ignorant of the Formula up to the middle of the century.

There follows a full analysis of Post-Nicene credal developments. The anti-Marcellan rather than pro-Arian tendencies of the Creeds called Antiochene are laid bare. During this period, as Mr. Kelly says, the cry that the Nicene Faith is in danger could hardly be raised. A full scale Arian offensive opens during the supremacy of Constantius and after 362 the Church, less politically embarrassed, found its own slow and painful way back to Nicene orthodoxy as a vessel limps home after a dangerous storm. Mr. Kelly is inclined to scout the theory of Harnack that the Cappadocians played a practical joke on the Church by getting the Homoousion accepted in a different sense from that which it bore during the earlier period of the Arian controversy. While the statement, as it stands, as so much else in Harnack, is true only in a Pickwickian sense, the real facts behind the statement need not be denied. The Nicene Creed came to port under the pilotage of men of a very different theological temper from those who set out. Without some such supposition your reviewer cannot adequately account for some of the data so ably marshalled by Mr. Kelly.

The treatment of the thorny problem of the relationship between the Creed of Nicaea and the Creed called of Constantinople is one of the ablest pieces of work in the book. As successive theories are all tried and found wanting, the reader is tempted to cry as he proceeds, " None have won and none shall have prizes ". Mr. Kelly has his own solution, which is alike simple and ingenious. It would be sheer bad reviewing to reveal it here. Enough to say that your reviewer is almost, but not quite, convinced. Following his previous precedent, a full commentary on additional clauses is added. He notices the comparative mildness of the clauses inserted upon the Holy Spirit. The keyword Homoousion is, for example, felt to be understood but not repeated and the general position with regard to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit does not pass much beyond the teaching of St. Athanasius in his letters to Serapion. Mr. Kelly explains this doctrinal lenience on the ground that Theodosius meant the Council to be conciliatory. It may well be additionally that the Homoousion had proved such inflammable material when applied to the Doctrine of the Son that the Council was not anxious to risk more than an implicit carry over from the Son to the Spirit.

Finally, after his consideration of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan complex of creeds, Mr. Kelly returns to the later stages of the history of the Apostles' Creed. It is possible that some of his

readers (like your reviewer) might have preferred to complete the history of the one Creed before branching off to consider the other, but the motives which led Mr. Kelly to adopt this method are really clear enough. The story is told with Mr. Kelly's usual competence. Some new material bearing on the march of the Apostles' Creed to completion and final triumph in the West is adduced. The additional clauses are well treated; the discussion of the vexed question of the *communio sanctorum* is particularly well done.

The work is lucidly, within its limits attractively, written, ably argued and splendidly produced. Theologian, historian and liturgiologist will all find within its pages material of great value. For the student of creeds it can fairly be described as indispensable. But why did not Mr. Kelly add to our debt and include a treatment of the *Quicunque Vult*? It is at least as credal as the Third Creed of Antioch and its antecedents at least as puzzling as the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. Students in some at least of our universities are expected to show competent knowledge of it. Perhaps some benefactor of the *genus theologicum* will persuade Mr. Kelly to write and some publisher to produce a further work summarizing critical results and offering a theological treatment of the *Quicunque*. But for what we have already received, we are indeed truly grateful to Mr. Kelly.

H. E. W. Turner.

The Origin and Evolution of the Christian Church. By T. G. Jalland, D.D. 200 pp. (Hutchinson's University Library, 1950). 7s. 6d.

"It is difficult", says Dr. Jalland in his preface (p. 7), "for anyone who attempts to write the history of Christian origins to achieve a very high degree of originality." Anyone acquainted with the many textbooks will bear out his statement. Yet the reason is not always appreciated. There is a paucity of direct evidence for the first epoch of the Church's history which only those accustomed to the study of better documented periods can appreciate. Nor is what exists easy to interpret. The New Testament itself, a collection of writings of very different types designed primarily to circulate inside a closely knit, esoteric community with a strong sense of tradition, presents a series of puzzles capable of being fully unravelled only by an historian who *per impossibile* had shared personally the life of the early Church. The same is true of sub-Apostolic and most pre-Nicene Christian literature. Behind there remains always the uncomfortable fact that only part of what was written

is now extant, whilst, because of the ostracism of the Church, non-Christian testimony is minute in amount. Looked at dispassionately the subject is one to reduce a conscientious historian to despair.

This same paucity of evidence, however, gives very wide scope to the baser form of originality, that of the tendencious writer and controversialist, and one need not enlarge upon the damage done to early Church history by the many writers of this type. It is unfortunate that almost every controversy among Christians has involved an " appeal " to the early Church, with disastrous results for historiography—so much so that it is now almost impossible for anyone to approach the period without suspicion of axe-grinding or of attacking some vested interest.

Such were the twin dangers between which Dr. Jalland had to steer as he set out " to reap the fruit of scholarly research during the last quarter of a century or so, and to make it available for the average intelligent reader " (p. 7). That he has largely succeeded is reason for great praise. Though he has definite views they are not pressed unfairly and he keeps close to the evidence at every point. One may feel that he sometimes overpresses one point or overlooks another, but, as in a good detective story, the reader is given the clues and can form his own conclusions. The book should be a very good introduction to the subject for the general reader, who will be made aware of the considerable amount of recent work which has put many problems in a new light, even if few have been finally solved. One feels sometimes that Dr. Jalland is too apt to show undue confidence in what are at present no more than scholarly suggestions still unproved, but the great merit of the book is its acquaintance with most recent theories and the very full series of references collected in the notes. (Incidentally is it wholly useless to protest against the growing and bad habit of publishers, as here, putting all the footnotes, in minute type, in an appendix? Thus books are made inordinately difficult to study fully and scholarship is sacrificed to printers' convenience.)

So far as our author has any main thesis it is that of the overwhelming importance of Christianity's Judaic origins. His first three chapters are devoted to a study of first-century Judaism, in the light of which his remaining four chapters discuss the nature, organization, teaching and life of the Christian community of the first three centuries. Some may feel that he does less than justice to the Hellenic elements which moulded historic Christianity scarcely less than did its Jewish heritage: they have been exaggerated and the balance needed redressing, but perhaps not so drastically as here. If the Christian Church of the first centuries was as radically Jewish as Dr. Jalland suggests, one is faced by

the historical problem of explaining its relatively greater missionary success in the Greco-Roman world than in the Semitic.

There are some points to which attention should be drawn. Is it legitimate to translate the χειροτονήσαντες of Acts xiv, 23, as "ordained" without explanation (p. 82)? The word was to become the technical term for sacramental ordination and very likely this is implied in the passage, since the presbyters of the missionary churches referred to were set up by Paul and Barnabas, not by the community. But χειροτονεῖν in itself is a colourless word and one cannot assume that at this early date it had a technical, sacramental sense.[1] On p. 90 there is a slip in a reference: Hebrews xiii, not xii, is meant. On the same page an argument for the existence of a group of "leaders" of higher rank than presbyters, drawn from the unproved assumption (p. 84) that Hebrews is addressed to a local presbytery rather than to a whole Church, seems highly precarious. (Indeed, Dr. Jalland's determined refusal to allow any equivalence in early times to the titles ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύτερος seems to lead him at more than one point into special pleading and straining of evidence.) It is equally dangerous to identify the food received by St. Paul after his conversion (Acts ix, 10) with the Eucharist: in view of the previous mention of his three days' fast (ix, 9) no sacramental explanation is called for (p. 126). The passage about Domitian's persecution (p. 159) would have benefited from a study of R. L. P. Milburn's article in this *Review* (*supra*, Vol. CXXXIX, 1944-5, pp. 154-164). A study of Victor Vitensis is enough to overthrow the suggestion that Carthage's effective primacy in the North African Church ceased after the Vandal invasion (p. 174).

THOMAS M. PARKER.

[1] *Cf.* W. H. Frere, in *Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry*, ed. H. B. Swete (London, 1918), p. 266.

ENGLISH BISHOPS' CHANCERIES, 1100-1250. By C. R. CHENEY. Pp. xii and 176. (M.U.P.). 12s. 6d.

PROFESSOR Cheney and the Manchester University Press have rendered a valuable service in the publication of this book to historians and, it is to be hoped, also to English Churchmen not historians, interested in the growth of their own institutions. The book is a great achievement as a technical study of English diplomatic and palaeography, especially in the chapter called "The Documents" and the beautiful plates of episcopal *acta*; but it is no less clear and authoritative in its historical study of the composition

of the twelfth century bishop's household and his secretariat.

This country has a very fine collection of episcopal registers, outstanding because wars have destroyed those which presumably existed in other west European countries; the French Revolution of 1789 largely destroyed those of France. English historians in this century have not failed to work on episcopal registers, and the Canterbury and York societies and other local record societies have printed many of them. But these episcopal registers, for which the different categories of documents were usually entered on separate quires and only bound together at the bishop's death, only begin in the thirteenth century, when also incoming and outgoing letters in the royal chancery began to be registered in patent and close rolls. But long before the thirteenth century bishops had much spiritual and secular business: they wrote many mandates, many letters: they made grants: they held ordinations: they collated or instituted to benefices: they had, from William I's reign in England, their consistory for the exercise of their own jurisdiction. But so far, as Professor Cheney points out, not many English scholars have attempted to study English episcopal administration in this pre-thirteenth century period, because the study involved the collection of episcopal *acta* from various sources. Studies of two or three particular bishops' *acta* only can be cited. What Professor Cheney has done is to make a general study of the records, in original manuscripts or enrolled in cartularies, of all the *acta* available for the period 1100 to 1250, after which the episcopal registers begin. Such *acta*, and particularly the witness lists of charters, have enabled him to throw new light on bishops' households, and the clerical staff who wrote or authenticated their documents.

With regard to the documents themselves, written in Latin and nearly always sealed, Professor Cheney finds that at the beginning of the twelfth century, the variety of writings and the *format* of episcopal documents does not suggest that the bishop had a highly organized office staff, even if the records were made by his own clerks and not, as often earlier, by the monks of some monastery to whom a grant was made. But by the beginning of the thirteenth century "we cannot fail to be impressed by the regularity and distinctiveness of the documents issued by the various bishops." There are pretty clear indications that the bishops by now had a trained staff, a writing office, which Professor Cheney calls a "chancery"; he guards himself by noting two or three times that such *scriptoria* were not called "chanceries" at the time.

Among the most interesting passages in the book are those dealing with the first references to bishops' chancellors in England. The title was not used of the bishop's chief *scriptor* or *scriba*, the head of his clerical staff, in 1100: by 1250 it was in use in nearly

all dioceses. Professor Cheney appears to have sufficient evidence to show that the *archicapellanus* in the bishop's household was the predecessor of the *cancellarius* who came, towards the end of the twelfth century, to head his writing office; while the *scholasticus* who taught the cathedral schools was replaced by a *cancellarius,* or was given the title of *cancellarius,* at about the same time. In the later middle ages the chancellor of the cathedral was not the same as the bishop's chancellor; but round about 1200 it cannot be assumed that each see would have two such officers.

Professor Cheney's dealing with the "rise of the chancellor" brings forward new evidence and is most valuable; but nevertheless, a lurking doubt remains in the reviewer's mind as to whether he has not, perhaps, got hold of the cancellarial pig by the wrong ear. Professor Cheney has, fundamentally, a thirteenth-century mind, and he sees the chancellor primarily as an official secretary, the head of a writing office, the keeper of a seal. But the associations of a word in the mind are always of the past, never of the future. A twelfth-century clerk, whatever meaning he ascribed to *cancellarius,* would not give it the thirteenth century connotation.

Cancellarius (as the reference books tell us) was originally a variant of *notarius*: the screens (*cancellae*) the chancellor sat by were the screens of the Roman law court, and the *formulae* with which he was familiar were the *formulae* of the Roman civil law. The Merovingians used a kind of super-notary, a referendary, to authenticate their *acta*: finally, the great mayors of the palace authenticated their own *acta* and almost at once assumed the kingship. They naturally did not revive the title referendary, an instrument they had used in their own rise to power: Charles the Great adopted the little used variant *cancellarius,* equally a term for a legal scribe, a lawyer. He used, and all the Carolingians used, bishops to authenticate royal *acta*: but he called them "chancellors". The papacy, always conservative, continued to use notaries: it was not till the first half of the eleventh century that there was a papal chancellor, in imitation of imperial usage.

The beginning of the next century, the twelfth, saw the great renaissance of Roman civil law at Bologna, and the notable codification of the canon law by Gratian. The twelfth century was one of advance in legal studies: the passionate enthusiasm for Latin literature at Chartres was rivalled by the study of law, and even found more pecuniarily profitable. Neither kings nor bishops could do without trained lawyers, nor could great learned corporations, like cathedral chapters and universities.

Professor Cheney has emphasized the employment of *magistri,* whom he takes to be clerks trained in law, by twelfth century bishops, and he gives valuable exact dates for the first appearance

of chancellors for particular cathedral chapters and bishops' households: but he does not suggest a connexion between the twelfth century legal renaissance and the appearance of chancellors, nor that the word chancellor had a mainly legal connotation, not a secretarial one.

The letters of Peter of Blois, made Archdeacon of Bath in 1175, and chancellor to Archbishop Richard of Canterbury before 1178, express in several passages the indignation of humanist scholars at the growing technicalities of canon law, and its assimilation in procedure to Roman civil law. Peter had himself studied for a short time at Bologna, but he loved the old rhetoric of Chartres, and the older, simpler processes of canon law, which had sufficed in his youth. He deplored particularly, at the end of his life, the employment by bishops of legally-trained "officials", dismissable at will, instead of the old, permanent, archdeacon to preside over their consistory: he had a particular interest in the status of archdeacons, for he was one himself. But his dislike of the new, more intricate, canon law was something separate from vested interest. He wrote to a friend studying in Paris, warning him not to leave the study of theology for that of civil law, for such study did not befit clerks: "the law of the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the soul . . . but secular law, in its envelope of glorious words, with a witty urbanity of speech entices and inebriates the mind. So far, since I have turned my steps to the law of the Lord, I have given to the reading of Code and Digest only my spare time, for recreation, not for use. The practice of the law is full of danger to clerks, for it claims the whole man . . . To-day advocates in suits fight for avarice alone." He adds a list of causes in which (as in matrimonial suits) the law can be evaded or distorted for money by such lawyers.

But in spite of Peter's indignation, the more settled conditions of the age, and the greater complexity of social life, presented problems needing legal solution. Law was studied: lawyers were increasingly appointed. The sequence in episcopal administration seems to have been: the increasing use of *magistri* (Masters of the Schools), the appointment of chancellors, and, in the thirteenth century, that of "officials" to preside over the consistory.

M. Deanesly.

The Growth of the Old Testament. By H. H. Rowley. Hutchinson's University Library. 7s. 6d.

The aim of this short book is defined in its Introduction as being to present "critical orthodoxy" to the reader, with the emphasis on

" the consensus of opinion among sober scholars ". In form, it consists of a series of special introductions to the individual books of the Old Testament, arranged according to the Canon of the Hebrew Bible, while there are also rather slight chapters on Hebrew history, prophecy, poetry and wisdom. Within these limits the work could hardly be bettered. It is distinguished throughout by that clarity of exposition, mastery of arrangement and breadth of learning which scholars have come to expect as a matter of course from Professor Rowley. These qualities are most apparent in the treatment of books, such as Ezekiel, Job or Daniel, where the critical problems are particularly involved and debatable. Time and again, Professor Rowley's summary of the evidence provides not only a brilliant introduction for the reading of a beginner, but also an invaluable catalyst for the thinking of a more advanced student.

Nevertheless, it is perhaps legitimate to express some degree of disappointment that the work has been cut to so well-worn a pattern. No one, it need hardly be said, is better acquainted with the whole wide field of modern Old Testament studies than Professor Rowley, and he frequently indicates the more important challenges of recent scholars to the traditional critical positions in the course of this latest book. He also seeks to deflect charges of undue conservatism by his modest Introduction. But there are already several useful introductory works in English which adequately present the main lines of the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis, and even Professor Rowley can only supplement these at certain points. It would have been of greater benefit not only to the non-expert, for whom no doubt a University Library series is primarily intended, but also to every class of reader, had Professor Rowley devoted much more of his space to modern investigations which, while they do not necessarily contradict the older critical orthodoxy, suggest new and wider points of view. Such a method would have been highly stimulating and informative. The summaries of recent developments in criticism that Professor Rowley provides are, in the nature of the case, too brief to be of great use to the student, since he can be given no evidence by which to form a reasonable judgement about them.

In particular, it is a pity that a book called *The Growth of the Old Testament* should have virtually nothing to say about the problem of oral tradition, and especially about the form the material may have assumed before it was committed to writing. Professor Rowley pleads that he had not sufficient space for any discussion of the forms of Old Testament literature. But he also refers at one point to " the vague and gratuitous assumption of an oral transmission of formless teaching ", which suggests a lack of appreciation of the importance of the forms for what is generally, if inadequately,

referred to as the " pre-literary " stage of the Old Testament writings. One does not have to be a follower of the more extreme views of the Uppsala school to find a place for oral transmission in the growth of the prophetic books, and it is surely going too far to speak of the prophetic oracles as " formless." From this point of view also, Professor Rowley's treatment of the vexed question of the Pentateuch must appear rather inadequate. He offers no discussion of the oral tradition lying behind the present written sources nor does he consider the question of the origin and growth of the stories and cycles of legends—we miss any mention of the epoch-making work of Gunkel. Yet, viewed in this way, the Pentateuch appears in a quite different, though not necessarily opposed, light to that cast by the normal methods of documentary analysis, and it is precisely such a fresh outlook which would be of greatest use to the beginner. Professor Rowley has, indeed, a section labelled " The Sources Behind the Sources ", but this, very valuable though it is, is confined to an enumeration of the existing poetic materials embedded in the Pentateuch. Might it not have been better to have curtailed this quite lengthy catalogue in order to find space, let us say, for some examination of the legal material, which is surely more important in the structure of the Pentateuch than the poetry?

When we pass to the account of Hebrew historical writing, we again seem to find a stage left out. For Professor Rowley, the historian whom he describes as the " writer " of the Former Prophets was actuated by a conscious didactic purpose; he was " through the facts exhorting men." This is no doubt true of the final Deuteronomic editor of the books from Judges to Kings, or of the Chronicler. If Hölscher's highly speculative reconstruction were accepted, it would even be true of J. But how far is this a satisfactory description of the origin and purpose of the individual stories and heroic cycles, which have been studied in Edmond Jacob's illuminating *La tradition historique en Israël*? Worth recalling, too, is Eissfeldt's caution in his recent *Geschichtsschreibung im Alten Testament* that the Hebrew historian was often concerned primarily to relate what he considered to be the actual facts. Such considerations do not in any way contradict Professor Rowley's remarks, but they suggest that there is more to be said about the historical writing in the Old Testament than could be gathered from his pages. As with the Pentateuch, so too in the case of the Former Prophets, recent studies often furnish a new approach to the problem of the compilation of individual books; it would have been highly interesting, for example, to have had Professor Rowley's comments on Noth's analysis, in his commentary, of the Book of Joshua.

It would be absurd and presumptuous to accuse Professor Rowley of any downright mistakes, but one may perhaps venture to call attention to one or two small points, since this is the kind of work that is likely to go into more than one edition. On p. 26, we are told that J depicts the patriarchs as sacrificing. It is, however, one of the more remarkable characteristics of J that, with the possible exception of Gen. xv, 10, it does not explicitly record any offering of a sacrifice between Noah and Moses. On the same page Professor Rowley writes that it is common to use the symbol JE for passages which cannot be precisely analysed between J and E respectively. Would it not be worth explaining, for the benefit of the student, that the symbol is also—and perhaps more commonly—used to describe a hypothetical document which was formed by combining J and E ? It is possibly being too dogmatic to say that the employment of the expression "king of Persia" in the Book of Ezra proves that the Persian Empire had by then ceased to exist (p. 163), since the same expression is to be found in the so-called Nabonidus Chronicle.

In conclusion, it is only right to stress once again the considerable achievement which this little book represents. Professor Rowley has done what he set out to do, and that in itself is a very great deal. Criticism can only suggest that he has omitted to mention certain factors in the development of the Old Testament literature which rather urgently need to be brought to the attention of the student. Perhaps we may hope that Professor Rowley will still take the opportunity of doing so before very long.

J. R. Porter.

Durham Jurisdictional Peculiars. By Frank Barlow. (O.U.P.). 12s. 6d.

This volume in the Oxford Historical Series edited by F. M. Powicke and B. H. Sumner is worthy of its scholarly predecessors, and medieval historians will welcome it. Mr. Barlow, as he explains in his preface, is a member of the staff of the University College of the South West, Exeter: he began the study in the first year of the war, continued it during five years of military service, and completed it as the thesis for an Oxford higher degree. It is a study in historical origins, almost a detective story of the relations of the Anglo-Norman Bishop of Durham with his monastic cathedral, and of the peculiars within the see of Durham which finally remained as the relics of the convent's lands and rights.

In the small territorial sees of Italy and the Mediterranean coasts, subdivision and delegation of the bishop's jurisdictional powers were unnecessary. There were no territorial archdeacons: the name in the sixth and later centuries denoted only the senior archdeacon of the bishop's *familia.* It was in the large missionary sees of western Europe that, in the Carolingian period, territorial subdivision of sees was first carried through, groups of rural deaneries or archpriesteries (the old and very large parishes of collegiate churches) being placed under territorial "archdeacons". There is no evidence that such subdivisions were made in England before 1066, but they were made, in most sees, in the generation following the Norman Conquest.

The nature of the "rural parish" had meanwhile changed in a changing social order. The earliest rural parishes were long pre-feudal and were founded, mainly by the bishop, and served by a small *familia* of clergy modelled on his own. But in all the countries settled by the Germanic invaders there was much missionary work to do, and the carrying of Christianity to a largely heathen countryside was mainly carried out by the churches built by Visigothic, Frankish, Germanic or Anglo-Saxon chieftains or landowners. It could have been done in no other way. These private churches, *Eigenkirchen,* existed in pre-feudal times, as Bede's evidence shows; but the rise of a feudal society transformed them into spiritual fiefs and threatened to remove them from the general supervision and jurisdiction of the bishop.

Mr. Barlow's book is a valuable contribution to the history of the see of Durham, but it is more than that. It throws light on the question of how a monastic cathedral should serve a diocese, a matter in the eleventh century not yet decided. (It is of great interest that in 1093 Bishop William of Saint-Calais should have showed Prior Turgot to the people and announced that he had made him archdeacon for the whole see, and his general vice-gerent.) It throws light on the division of the see into two territorial archdeaconries: on the division of landed endowment between bishop and cathedral: and on the fight of the monastic chapter to claim, not only a separate landed endowment and the appointment to and rule of its own churches (some of them not in the see of Durham, but in those of York and, across the Border, in Lothian), but the episcopal rights of the Bishop of Durham (*episcopalia, consuetudines*) within its own peculiars (churches and parishes). It is, apparently, a fuller study than has been yet made of the Anglo-Norman period in any English diocese. The work which Professor Fliche's seminar has been doing at Montpellier, to investigate the effect of eleventh century reform on local church life, has a parallel in Mr. Barlow's work on Durham.

M. Deanesly.

THE CONCEPT OF MIND. By GILBERT RYLE. (Hutchinson's "University Library"—Senior Series). 12s. 6d.

THE text books usually name Descartes approvingly "the father of modern philosophy"; and there is no doubt as to his significance in European thought over the last three hundred years. Yet the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter its extension is one of the less happy features of this great thinker's legacy. Not that Descartes is solely to blame. The analysis of man into physical and non-physical parts reaches back much earlier, through the Schoolmen to the Greeks. The classical tripartite anthropology which envisaged man as consisting of σῶμα (body), Ψυχή (soul) and πνεῦμα or νοῦς (spirit or mind) still persists, save that often the psychic and spiritual natures are no longer differentiated in popular speech, so that we speak of human beings as consisting of "body and soul" and "body and mind", "soul" and "body" being interchangeable terms. There is, of course, much woolliness of thinking here; and there is no doubt that the Cartesian dichotomy has in no small measure perpetuated this confusion of thought on the subject. Nor can the idealism of the last century be exempted from blame.

In his racily-written and carefully-thought-out book the Waynflete professor of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, sets out to disprove this "official theory", as he dubs it. According to the Cartesian myth, "a person . . . . lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The first is public, the second is private". And an important corollary of this thesis is that "only through the medium of the public physical world can the mind of one person make a difference to the mind of another." Indeed, it is impossible for anyone to know, save by inference, any mind but his own. This "official view" Mr. Ryle denominates "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine." He adds: "I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle." This "philosopher's myth" is then subjected in over 300 pages to a trenchant polemic, often witty and ruthless.

He contends that this myth in effect can only lead us to solipsism. "Contemporary philosophers have exercised themselves with the problem of our knowledge of other minds. Enmeshed in the dogma of the ghost in the machine, they have found it impossible to discover any logically satisfactory evidence warranting one person in believing that there exist minds other than his own." This is because they have started out with the wrong assumptions. In fact we do not believe in the existence of other minds by some kind of inference. On the contrary, "to find that most people have minds . . . . is simply to find that they are able and prone to do certain

sorts of things, and this we do by witnessing the sorts of things they do."

Similarly, with reference to the will, Mr. Ryle not only reinforces the generally accepted rejection of faculty psychology but also shows that the will cannot be separated from the whole personality. A great deal of confusion has arisen from the application of the idea of mechanistic or para-mechanistic causation to volition as to other mental activities. But "men are not machines, not even ghost-ridden machines. They are men—a tautology which is sometimes worth remembering." Though bodily causes and effects can be detected in human actions, we cannot justifiably look for similar causes and effects where the will is concerned. "We simply say 'He did it' and not 'he did or underwent something else which caused it'".

So in his survey of almost every range of mental activity, including emotion, dispositions, self-knowledge, sensation and observation, imagination and intellect, the author educes striking arguments and illustrations in favour of his thesis that man, particularly man's mind, is not "occult", *i.e.*, known only with certainty to himself and only by others through analogy, but is obvious through what he is and does. Nevertheless, the few pages entitled "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'" in chapter VI suggest that, for each person and so for all, there is much more in mental life than what can be observed. Again, the fact that the human being has experiences which he cannot or does not ever communicate to others also suggests that man is not so obvious as is made out. One would have thought also that the well-nigh daily experiment which we make of trying to put ourselves in the position of others or of understanding others' viewpoints by analogy with our own had literally more significance than Mr. Ryle is prepared to allow. We cannot help feeling that the long-entertained notion that there can be some kind of mystical relationship between minds without reference to external bodily activities ought not to be dismissed lightly, because a snappy exercise in logic suggests otherwise. It is doubtful, too, whether the rather summary discussion of empirical psychology in the last chapter of the book really clinches the argument.

Even so, by means of his book Mr. Ryle has done at least two valuable things. He has shown the danger of the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, and he has also, in consequence, exposed a large amount of verbal and logical muddle which that dualism has engendered or fostered. In so doing he is well in tune with contemporary philosophical fashion, which has become impatient with the wordiness of idealist metaphysics. Yet he has not been able to escape using innumerable figures of speech himself in the unfolding of his argument.

The book has nothing directly to say on traditional religious ideas relating to the mind and soul. But if Mr. Ryle's contention that the "ghost in the machine" myth is untrue holds good, then it has important repercussions on theology. His thesis could be used as a weapon against the traditional Christian view of man in favour of a thorough-going materialism; but only so if the Christian view insists on the Platonist or Cartesian dichotomy. The time may well have come to realize that the immortal in man is not some occult spirit, but that man is immortal in so far as he is raised a spiritual *body*. Indirectly and perhaps without knowing it, Mr. Ryle has given another reason why Christians should pay more heed to the Hebrew view of man and less to the Greek. At any rate, *The Concept of Mind* is a welcome common-sense corrective against the flights of fancy of the idealists; and the author is to be congratulated on having written a book so much his own and so little bespattered with footnotes and quotations from what other people have written. May his style, which so much accords in spirit, if not in letter, with that of the great English empiricists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, become fashionable!

D. W. Gundry.

The Supreme Identity. An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion. By Allan W. Watts. (Faber and Faber). 12s. 6d.

Greatly admiring Mr. Watts's previous volume, *Behold the Spirit*, we awaited with considerable expectation the present publication. We must frankly confess disappointment. Not, to be sure, with the quality of the book. In many respects it is better constructed than its predecessor and is built on as wide, if not a wider, foundation of knowledge.

The disappointment is due to the realization that, after all, oriental metaphysic, to employ the author's term, has the last word, that the writer did intend to affirm a strict identity between the self and the Divine Absolute which goes beyond anything admissible by Christian theology.

Certainly the book must be read carefully, and one passage read and weighed in the light of others. For where we are concerned with the Ultimate Reality which exceeds rational comprehension and conceptual formulation it is impossible to say anything which is simply true, true in any reasonable understanding of the statement. Nevertheless there can be no question that the author does, like his oriental teachers, maintain that the knowing self is

identical with God. It is true he successfully defends himself and them, if he has understood them correctly, against the charge of monism. The Infinite, though manifesting Itself as finite, nevertheless remains Itself distinct from the finite manifestation. And the finite is allowed the secondary and incomplete reality which, after all, is the utmost it can possess. "The Infinite may be considered not only as that which illumines and knows the universe, but also as that which, by the same act, generates the things known. As light reveals squareness but is not squareness, so the Infinite generates, and yet is not, the finite." Produce would have been a better term than generate, which suggests the generation of the Word, insufficiently in fact distinguished by the author from this production of the finite. Otherwise the statement is satisfactory.

What is unsatisfactory is the identification of the self (*atma*) with the Absolute (Brahma). For, as Mr. Watts points out, since this cannot mean the blasphemous absurdity that the individual ego, the *jiva,* John Smith as distinct from Tom Brown is God, this self must be, as Mr. Watts also says, a universal self common to all individuals. And this, we submit, is not the self. The self, the knowing subject, is precisely the ego, the *jiva,* John Smith, Tom Brown. And this ego which began to exist between conception and birth is the being with whom I am, you are, he is, concerned. To know that a universal self common to all exists eternally as it does before I came into existence or you or he, is not an adequate reason for the confident and zestful life which in Mr. Watts's opinion it must produce (p. 59). Nor, if this ego must be transcended in the process of contemplative sanctification by the realization that it is not the self, what reason can there be for its permanent survival? If, however, it is impermanent and must vanish, as a passing wave on the ocean of Divine Reality what reason was there for its production? Before it and after it God is . . . it is not—the end of the entire process of man's life with all its pain and struggle is as the beginning. *Cui bono*? Mr. Watts, it is true, does not affirm this final disappearance of the finite and individual ego. Somehow, one gathers, for he is scarcely as categorical on this point as one could wish and on occasion even appears to state the contrary, "so long as the ego exists at all", it will remain as a vehicle and manifestation of the Infinite. But in that case, however, why should the true self divorce itself from the ego and become disinterested in it? Why should it be pronounced irreligious and sinfully egoistic to desire its final bliss of a conscious union with God, its possession by God?

Moreover, we are told, "Man as the self" (*atma*) "is the Infinite" (Brahma) "in the act of identifying itself with the finite

ego" (*jiva*). That is to say, the *atma* is not simply Brahma but Brahma identifying itself with the *jiva,* the ego. This, however, amounts to an identification of God with the individual ego, John Smith, Tom Brown, which is thus given a status which amounts, if the identification is pressed, to the statement rightly denied that John Smith, Tom Brown, is God and is hardly compatible with the divorce between the ego and the true (*atma*) self on which such stress is laid. After all, in fact, there are but two entities, Brahma and the individual *jiva—atma* being but a relation of the latter to the former.

On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that there is an experience of identity between the self and God. For it is attested not only by the oriental but by several Christian mystics—not to speak of Tennyson quoted by Mr. Watts. And it is, or should be, a first principle of sound philosophy to accept the self-evidence of all forms of human experience. We must not, however, conceptualize an experience so that it conflicts with another equally evident. That is to say we must not conceptualize this experience of identity so as to deny the radical distinction, another evident fact of experience, between God and finite beings—this is not done by Mr. Watts nor, *if* his interpretation is correct, by his eastern guides—or the fact, equally an evident fact of experience that the self of a man, even the radical self which subsists as a spirit above its inferior function as ensouling the body, is the individual self, the ego, A as distinct from B, B as distinct from C. And on this point the Indians, even as here explained, and Mr. Watts are unsatisfactory, though Mr. Watts, as we have seen, is not altogether consistent.

These two facts of experience—the experience of identity and the experience of the knowing self as a distinct ego—can, we believe, be reconciled by the following thesis.

Already, in the order of nature, precisely because the Divine Being is wholly other than the creature, God is in a very real sense the positive being of the creature—as the Epistle of Privy Counsel puts it: "He" God "is thy being but thou not His". The first member of the paradox states the identity between God and the human self, the second points out that it is not identity pure and simple but admits also a radical distinction.

"In truth", Mr. Watts writes, "the universal and infinite has no opposite at all, because it is absolutely all-inclusive". This, we think, is his fundamental misconception. Though the Infinite can have no positive opposite, it has a negative opposite, non-entity. A factor of non-entity, however, enters into all finite beings, as such, constitutes in fact their finiteness in virtue of which they are

comparatively unreal. Inasmuch as it does so they are other than the Infinite. The Absolute Being communicates their positive being not their comparative unreality. Accordingly He is their being, they are not His. It is this negative factor, their comparative unreality which makes imperfection and evil possible and up to a point inevitable, and his failure to recognize adequately its nature and effect has inevitably rendered Mr. Watts's treatment of the problem of evil, and incidentally the Indian, unsatisfactory.

On the basis of this natural union, identity in the paradoxical and onesided sense explained above, a supernatural union, a deification, is possible in which the self, the ego (the *jiva*) is not indeed replaced by the Divine Self, but self-consciousness is replaced by the Divine Self-conscious received by the ego. This is the mystic's experience of conscious identity with God, reported among others by Fr. Baker, an experience of God and the soul as though one thing. Nevertheless this experience cannot in fact be God's self-consciousness pure and simple. Otherwise the soul could not, as she does, look back on the experience as her own. It is God's self-consciousness as communicated to the ego and reflected, as it were, by its recipient capacity, a multiplication, so to speak, of the Divine Consciousness *ad extra*. To our understanding, in fact, it is a supernatural paradox corresponding to the natural paradox that God is the ego but the ego is not God on which its possibility is based.

This explanation of the indubitable experience of identity does full justice, we maintain, to that experience, but also takes due account of experience equally indubitable which, in our opinion, the oriental conceptualizations of the former experience and Mr. Watts's do not.

We have no space to discuss other topics raised by this important book. We would, however, protest against the denial of the name religion to its highest form, the mystics' union with God, and against the statement that the "Christian metaphysic", by which the author means the affirmation of an identity experience, "virtually" disappeared after the fifteenth century. On the contrary, it has never been asserted more strongly than by Fr. Baker and his contemporary, Barbanson, and in our day by Merton in *Seeds of Contemplation*. On the other hand, if "Dionysius" agrees with the Upanishads in his apophatic theology—he is completely silent about the identity experience.

Eggs, we might add, do not explode however long they are boiled, and light is visible only in its illumination of objects, not in itself.

E. I. Watkin.

WAYS OF MEDIEVAL LIFE AND THOUGHT. By F. M. POWICKE (Odhams). 12s. 6d. net.

IN the course of a long life devoted to the study, teaching and writing of history Sir Maurice Powicke has made innumerable friends and admirers. All these, and many more, will welcome this collection of essays and studies of his which he has been persuaded to allow to appear under one cover. To some, each and every one of them will be new, and they are the more to be envied, for their eyes will be opened wider as they turn over each page. Others will have seen one or other in the pages of a learned periodical, but no one has seen them all before and few could lay their hands on more than one or two. The fact that the selection has been made by Sir Maurice Powicke himself is a special guarantee of their quality, while in a number of cases he has corrected or improved upon some words or phrases in the original. Anyone curious enough to make the comparison and see what has been amended will be rewarded, but there are not many with the time or opportunity for this.

First comes an essay on Ailred of Rievaulx, that saintly northern abbot whom Sir Maurice Powicke almost introduced to the reading public thirty years ago. Some of the most revealing passages from Walter Daniel's biography of his admired abbot are translated or felicitously paraphrased; attention is drawn to the *Speculum Caritatis* and the story of the early days of Rievaulx is sketched firmly and surely. A study of Arthur of Brittany follows, with a convincing analysis of the chronicle evidence bearing on Arthur's disappearance. It is characteristic of the author that he refers to the original article and to the French criticisms which have caused its partial revision, but says nothing of his book on the *Loss of Normandy* in which he explained some essential matters at length. And it may be noted that he will have nothing of arguments drawn from the silence of contemporaries of that age, a belief which he shared with another great teacher, Dr. Gaillard Lapsley. Sir Maurice Powicke is equally at home on either side of the Channel, as anyone who hopes to understand the twelfth and thirteenth centuries must be. Even so, he can turn with confidence to pirates off the coast of Devon, tell a story never told before and end with the confession: "the search after truth plays queer tricks with the historian . . . sometimes, as I work at a series of patent and close rolls, I have a queer sensation; the dead entries begin to be alive". And so it is all through this series of essays.

Four essays deal with the universities of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, a subject that he has long made his own and where, since the deaths of Rashdall and Little, he has been without

a peer. Although one of these was written for a volume to celebrate the six hundredth anniversary of the University of Prague, and political events prevented its presentation in due form, the University of Paris is central to each of them. That great mother university of the civilized world has received at his hands the most sympathetic and understanding treatment and these lucid pages can be commended to all who would know something of the depth and the contents of the well from which all scholars, ultimately, draw something.

" Master Simon of Faversham " restores an English scholar to his place in the second half of the thirteenth century to which he belongs and from which he was mistakenly translated. These few pages show how the knowledge of the eighteenth century can be joined with that of the twentieth to produce convincing results and it shows also what others could do if they would but imitate the method and the purpose of their master. A few, fortunately, are now actively engaged in removing the reproach that " so far, England has done little ". The book ends with two disconnected studies, one of the pilgrim hero of Villani and Dante, Romeo of Villeneuve, the other an assessment of the work of G. L. Burr of Cornell, which will cause others beside the reviewer to revise their estimate of this little known American scholar.

All will regret that this book stands alone: a similar companion could easily be provided and would be welcome. And so, too, would an index, for it would reveal still more clearly the enormous range of the writer's mind. But for what we have we are very grateful.

GEORGE RICHARD POTTER.

THE MALAYS: A CULTURAL HISTORY. By SIR RICHARD WINSTEDT, K.B.E., C.M.G., F.B.A., D.Litt. Pp. viii, 198; 8 plates; Bibliography. (Routledge and Kegan Paul). 15s.

No one is better qualified than the distinguished author of this book to summarize what is known about the history and present organization of Malay culture. It is not merely that Sir Richard Winstedt has himself made many major contributions to Malayan studies, especially in the fields of linguistics, literature and history, but he possesses to an unrivalled degree a knowledge of the relevant literature in the related specialisms of prehistory, archaeology, art history, anthropology, folklore and comparative religion. But although we are here provided with a synopsis of a truly vast field of knowledge, the book somehow fails to achieve an integrated

presentation; it has rather the somewhat annoying quality of a collection of brief abstracts.

The form of the presentation is logical enough. By Malay culture the author means primarily the culture of the present-day civilized Malays of the Malay peninsular. His purpose is to break down this culture into its component elements and to trace these to their sundry historical points of origin. After an introductory chapter, which discusses the Malay in relation to the peoples of South-East Asia generally, we have sections on religion, sociology, politics, law, economics, literature and art. The pattern is thus that of an orthodox ethnographic description. Unfortunately the working out of this scheme is very uneven.

In discussing the evidence for the prehistoric period—which means roughly everything prior to the third century A.D.—Sir Richard Winstedt accepts somewhat uncritically the often very speculative opinions of Dr. Heine Geldern. Furthermore he fails to distinguish clearly between the concept of cultural diffusion—that is the dispersion of material objects and items of custom of a particular type—and the concept of migration—that is the movement of whole peoples. This ambiguity leads to a number of questionable inferences, as when, for example, we are assured (p. 12) " without much risk of error ", that the ancestors of the Malay " race " lived very like the present-day Khassi " race " of Assam.

So also in the discussion of arts and crafts, where the emphasis is upon tracing the origin of particular motifs, the amateur might wish that a clearer distinction had been drawn between the probable and the possible. The author is on firm ground when he points out (p. 171) that Malay *repoussé* silverwork owes its designs to India, but when we are assured (p. 164) that the discs on Dong-so'n drums " probably represent the pole-star in Babylonian cosmology " we are getting rather a long way away from anything that can legitimately be called history.

The chapters dealing with the social, political and legal systems are each divided into separate sections for the " Matriarchal " and " Patriarchal " law areas, a procedure that leads to a complicated fragmentation of the material and somewhat obscures the underlying unity that exists between the two types of organization. The use of the adjectives matriarchal and patriarchal in this context is unfortunate, for, as the author himself recognizes, power is nowhere in the hands of women. Correctly speaking, the *adat perpateh* descent system is matrilineal while that of the *adat temenggong* is bilateral rather than strictly patrilineal or patriarchal.

The author is unquestionably the outstanding living authority on the subject of Malay literature, and the chapter on this topic is naturally admirable. It is, however, the chapter entitled " Beliefs

and Religion" which is likely to be of most immediate interest to readers of this journal. The general treatment is similar to that of the author's book, *Shaman, Saiva and Sufi* (1925). Present-day Malay religion is seen as a three-stage composite comprising survivals from the Primitive, the Hindu-Buddhist, and the Islamic phases of Malay history. Certainly these phases have occurred in the historical past, but it is open to question how far any particular modern practice can be properly allocated to any particular phase or whether the process of doing so gives any increased understanding of what his religion means to the modern Malay. The author's method is roughly to identify the Islamic and Hindu-Buddhist elements by reference to literary sources and to relegate everything else to the Primitive phase. The methodological objections to this kind of historical reconstruction are considerable. For example, since "shamanistic" practices are not recognized either by Hindu or Islamic orthodoxy, Malayan "shamanism" is regarded as primitive; indeed, we are assured that it "came into Malay life in central Asia along with the Mongoloid strain in his physical make up" (p. 23). Of course there are certain resemblances between Siberian shamanism and the spirit medium cults of Malaya, but likewise there are resemblances with mediumistic phenomena from many other parts of the world including the Middle East and India. Ultimately, then, any assertion about the geographical or chronological "origin" of Malayan "shamanism" is quite unverifiable.

This last criticism is applicable to the book as a whole. History must rest on documentary records. Sir Richard Winstedt has an unrivalled knowledge of the documents and is an admirable guide to their significance. But when he goes beyond the documents and moves into the field of hypothesis he is a less admirable guide if only because he seldom warns the unwary reader as to how very speculative his interpretation of the evidence may really be.

An earlier edition of the book appeared in Singapore in 1947. The present edition has been reset and includes some additional matter, notably the plates and two appendices. The second of these, an analysis of Negri Sembilan kinship terms, should be of considerable value to anthropologists.

E. R. Leach.

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NICOLAS BERDYAEV

Some Notes on his Autobiography

By R. H. DAUBNEY

WHAT is the relation between the internal and the external destiny of man, between the spiritual pilgrimage of the individual self through the abiding identity of personal existence in time and the objective dimension of society and history in which it is wrought out as in a larger framework which appears to embody in certain periods a movement towards fate or fulfilment? This is, perhaps, the deepest question posed by the literature of the self. It is implicit in a diffuse and inchoate form in the diary as the periodical record of events involves a self-scrutiny and dialogue with existence. It is sharpened and concentrated in the confession which distils and exposes the essential attitude to life; while the autobiography in the common manner known to us attempts to give the question and its answer some kind of form and pattern, some kind of balance and integration between the inward and the outward.

This question is posed by the "Essay in Autobiography" of Nicolas Berdyaev which has recently been published.[1] It is a document which does not conform, however, to any of the recognized canons of the literature of the self. It is in no sense based on the records of a diary, we are told by the author. It is, therefore, a profound exercise of the memory, which "is characterized by a creative, transfiguring power inherent in it, and involves individual emphasis, partiality and, therefore, prejudice". In some sense it may be regarded as a confession, as a record of the multifarious affirmations and negations in which

[1] *Dream and Reality*: An Essay in Autobiography. By Nicolas Berdyaev. Translated by Katharine Lampert. Geoffrey Bles. 30/-.

the author has been involved throughout his life. As an autobiography it rides loosely by the normal patterns of that art. It contains no fictional material, we are told ironically; but it embodies little attempt at chronological arrangement, and comparatively little record of the events of personal life, although it abounds in mention of the people and movements in which the writer has been embroiled. It may, perhaps, be characterized most adequately as the testament of a religious philosopher. "It reflects", we are told, "a process of cognitive activity and an endeavour to discover the meaning of my life. Such a cognitive process is not a mere remembering or recapitulation of the past: it is a creative act performed at the present moment. The value of this act is determined by the degree to which it rises above time and is united with 'existential' time, that is to say, with eternity". So Berdyaev explains that his "book is philosophical in conception and it is devoted to the problems of philosophy. It is concerned with knowledge of self and with the need to understand oneself, to discover one's own image and ultimate destiny".

When he comes to the end of his testament, however, he is compelled to inquire concerning the limits of self-knowledge. He confesses that he does not know whether, in writing the book, he has "succeeded in combing subjectivity with truthfulness, and introspection with impartiality, or whether the limits of self-knowledge have proved a stumbling-block in my own as in so many other cases". It is for this reason that he has called the book *Dream and Reality*, "since it is, in the end, no more than the description of a fundamental conflict with this world and an evocation of an image of another one". It is, I think, in this sense of conflict between two worlds that the key to Berdyaev's life and complex character must be sought; and with this the reader, who tries to come to grips with the contradictions, inconsistencies and paradoxes with which his work abounds, must open himself to the flashes of insight and illumination given there, and with that remain uneasily content.

The sense of conflicts between the two worlds is the source of his preoccupation with the inward and the outward, with his own destiny and the destiny of the external world. "I have

experienced the world around me," he says, " and all the historical processes and events of my time as part of myself, as my spiritual biography. In the deepest mystical level everything that has happened to the world happened to me. And here I come up against the fundamenal conflict inherent in me. On the one hand, I experience the events of my age and the destiny of the world in which I live as events happening to me, as my own destiny; but, on the other hand, I am conscious of, and tormented by, the fact that the world is utterly alien and divorced from me ". This in turn derives from a peculiar feature in the Russian consciousness which Berdyaev has emphasized repeatedly in his writings: namely, the sense of the messianic vocation of Russia, and the way in which her thinkers have been concerned with the philosophy of history, particularly in its profound eschatological orientation. In this recurring theme[2] one can find the deepest level of coherence in Berdyaev's work, and the element which brought him closest to Christianity. In his case, however, it derives from a metaphysical vision and intuition rather than from biblical or historical sources; and bears little relation to the futurist or realized eschatology detected in the New Testament by Schweitzer or Dodd, for example. In Berdyaev's case, " the impetus came from a vivid experience of the transitoriness of human life and the complete lack of solid ground under man's feet ". For him, historical destiny is endowed with meaning because it strives towards an end which is paradoxical in character, since it is at once the termination of diseased historical time and the vindication of existential time, which has its roots in eternity, and in which the split in human existence is overcome.

Berdyaev's concern with the philosophy of history makes him profoundly conscious of two aspects of its eschatological orientation which are closely related to one another, and exhibit the way in which his philosophical quest is at the same time the story of his life. " There is an individual eschatology and apocalypse, and there is an historical eschatology and apocalypse; but the two intertwine: history and the end are my

[2] See, for example, *The Russian Idea* and *The Meaning of History.*

own history and my own end, and my own history and end affect the entire course and outcome of history. But this interdependence does not lend itself to clear-cut definition, for there is tragic conflict between history, with its complex movements and agencies, and man, with his unique and irreducible personal destiny". He goes on to confess that "I cannot extricate myself from the world, from humanity, from the social and cultural movements in the world, from the past, present and future. History takes place within me, for I am not an isolated entity existing by itself and for itself, but a microcosmos. My sense of history, then, involves two experiences: the experience of history's hostile and alien character and of my implication in it. The tension inherent in this twofold experience can only be resolved in the end of history, which signifies a victory over all objectification and alienation".

II.

It is in this context that we may perhaps usefully collect some of the fragmentary details of Berdyaev's life. Nicolai Alexandrovitch Berdyaev was born in Kiev, the earliest and greatest centre of Russian Christianity, in 1874. He came from an aristocratic family, with a long military tradition, representing a high level of culture, but almost totally devoid of religious background. "There were none of the traditional religious patterns of life in our family", he says; "patterns which tend to produce stifling and oppressive conditions. Our family seemed to be uprooted and exposed; it was not all of a piece; it had, as it were, affinities with the Tolstoyan world and yet had something of the intensity and complexity of Dostoevsky"—names which recur time and again as denoting profound influences in his later life and thought. The family, he continues, "marked a transition from an age of stability and settled equilibrium to one of disquiet and instability"; and thus it was the scene in which Berdyaev's deeply-rooted tendency to independence and intolerance, revolt and anarchy first manifested itself, a tendency which was to persist as a marked feature of his character throughout his life. It helps the reader of his works to understand something of the origin of his insistence upon freedom which stamped his whole philosophical outlook.

Nicolai's father, Alexander Mikhailovitch, had been an officer in the Imperial Horse Guards, but had retired at a comparatively early age, and was appointed Marshal of the Gentry. He became increasingly liberal in his views towards the end of his life, influenced by the works of Voltaire, professing a vague deism and a sentimental reverence for the teaching of Christ which he regarded as essentially the inculcation of a benevolent attitude towards his fellow-men. He believed the dogmas of the Church as a perversion of this teaching, and denounced them with great vehemence, to the great indignation of his wife. Nicolai's mother, Alina Sergeevna, was of French extraction, the daughter of the Countess Choiseul. She was reputed to be a woman of great beauty, and retained her predominantly French character to the end of her life, a fact which imprinted itself upon her household. Although she had been born an Orthodox, she always regarded herself more as a Roman Catholic. There was one other brother in the family, some fifteen years older than Nicolai, a man of considerable talent and eccentric behaviour: "rather unstable, neurotic, lacking in character, and very unhappy because he was not able to realize his gifts in life".

It was intended that Nicolai should continue the military traditions of his family; and accordingly he received his early education at the Military School of the Cadet Corps, although he lived at home and attended the school daily. He proved to be an unsatisfactory pupil, however, both in his relations with the other boys, since he found them uncongenial, stupid and coarse, and in his inability to learn. He showed no aptitude for regimented study or discipline, and rebelled against the whole military atmosphere of the place. He seemed unable to assimilate knowledge, to learn anything by heart, or even to spell; and he records with a certain malicious humour that in a divinity examination he once received one mark out of twelve. Although examinations proved to be a nightmare to him, after six years at the cadet school, he was admitted to the university of Kiev, with the intention of studying natural science. Here he came under the influence of Marx, and about 1894 he joined the Socialist Democratic Party, as the Marxists were called. He was arrested on three

occasions because of his activities in connexion with this movement, and in 1898 he was sent into exile for three years at Vologda under tolerably lenient conditions.

Berdyaev's intellectual awakening had already taken place, however, before he entered the university. "Nobody ever suggested that I should study philosophy", he says: "the impulse came entirely from within me". And he records that "from childhood I have had a strong sense of vocation. There was never any question for me what I should choose in life and which path I should take; for, while I was still a boy, I was sure that my calling lay in philosophy". Thus, about the age of fourteen, he had discovered the considerable resources of his father's library, and plunged into Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer. But even in this he proved to have little capacity for sustained and disciplined study, and it was clear that he was never destined to become a philosopher of the systematic or academic type. "All my life I have read widely", he say; "I read with ease and rapidity. I am instantly at home in the thought of any given book and very soon discover its import and implication. But I never remain passive in the process of reading; while I read I am engaged in a constant creative activity, which leads me to remember not so much the actual matter of the book as the thoughts evoked in my mind by it, directly or indirectly".

When he returned from exile in 1901 he went to Germany for a year, and spent the summer in Heidelberg attending Windelband's lectures in philosophy, and continued to take part in liberal and revolutionary movements. In 1904 Berdyaev married Lydia Yudifovna, a kindred spirit who remained his constant companion until the closing years of his life. She was the daughter of a wealthy lawyer who was also, like Berdyaev's father, a follower of Voltaire. Lydia herself showed her sympathies with the revolutionary movements, and was arrested on two occasions. She became a Roman Catholic after her marriage, and her husband records that she "passed through a phase of fanatical and intolerant religious dogmatism. Later her religious temper changed, and her attitude became more congenial . . . Lydia was also endowed with a vivid poetical imagination and

possessed unmistakable poetical gifts", as well as displaying a marked mystical and contemplative character. In one of the most moving passages in the whole book, as his narrative draws to its close, Berdyaev writes as follows: "Lydia fell seriously ill with paralysis of the throat muscles; she could hardly speak or swallow food. Her physical strength was declining with each day, but she bore this agonizing illness in a wonderful way. At the end of September 1945 she died. Her death was a source of great illumination as well as of burning pain to me. I have never known anyone inspired by such faith on the threshold of death. Her mind and consciousness remained clear until the very end, and everything she wrote (she always wrote, since she could not speak) before her death reflected her intense spiritual vision . . . When Lydia told me on the eve of her death that she would always be with me, I knew that this was true. Death is an event in time and a token of the power of time over man; but it is also an event bringing him face to face with and issuing in eternity, in which love and kinship are victorious over estrangement and disunion".

In the year of his marriage, Berdyaev moved to St. Petersburg, and there he became deeply involved in the intellectual, literary and revolutionary movements which were seething in the city during the early years of the twentieth century. It was the period of a cultural renaissance in Russia, about which Berdyaev has written in many of his books; and it saw the emergence of the peculiar type of the Russian intelligentsia, to which Berdyaev himself belonged. Both these factors are important for the understanding of his character and his work.

The Russian intelligentsia began to emerge in the eighteenth century, and Berdyaev has characterized it as "a quite special and peculiar thing; as a spiritual and social form of human life it existed only in Russia. The Intelligentsia is not a social class and its existence creates a difficulty for Marxist interpreters. The Intelligentsia was an idealistic class, a class of people wholly influenced by ideas and ready to face prison, hard labour and death for the sake of their ideas. Among us the Intelligentsia could not live in the present; it lived in the future and sometimes in

the past. The impossibility of political activity led to the profession of the most extreme social doctrines during a period of autocratic monarchy and serfdom ".[3] Elsewhere he has likened it to a monastic order with its own peculiar intolerance and set of obligations, manners and customs. Its members were not drawn from a single social class, profession or economic status, although in the early days it included many of the cultured element in the nobility, sons of the clergy and minor government officials. He has also emphasized its strongly sectarian character which appears to be natural to the Russians, so that it tended to live in schism from its actual environment which it considered to be evil.

During the nineteenth century the intelligentsia, which had hitherto existed in a sort of social vacuum between monarchy and serfdom, became exposed to, and influenced by, strong new currents of thought and feeling; but it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that this burst into a somewhat exotic flowering in what Berdyaev calls the " cultural renaissance ". He has traced its origin to three fundamental sources. The first and most significant was the influence of Marxism, although a breach was made with a number of its traditions, representing a movement towards idealism, and then further to religion, Christianity and Orthodoxy, represented by men like Sergius Bulgakov, Peter Sruve and Simon Frank. They turned their attention to the problems of spiritual culture, and inherited something of the thought of Khomyakov, Dostoevsky and Solovyev. The second source of the renaissance was predominantly literary, fostered by writers such as Merezhkovsky and Rozanov. The former's book on Tolstoy and Dostoevsky exerted an immense influence; while the latter appears to have been the exponent of views similar to those of D. H. Lawrence. The third source was also of a literary character, although it was concerned particularly with the flowering of poetry, and represented a much more profound achievement than the criticism and fiction of the other group. It was

[3] *The Russian Idea*, p. 26 *et sq.* Cp. *The Origins of Russian Communism*, p. 16 *sq.*

essentially a symbolist movement, attempting to penetrate to the spiritual reality behind the visible world, and to build a bridge between the two worlds by means of its symbols. Alexander Blok and Andrei Byelii were the most important figures associated with this movement, and were profoundly influenced by Solovyev and Nietzsche.

Berdyaev became implicated in these diverse currents when he moved to St. Petersburg in 1904. They found something of a focus in two periodicals which succeeded one another under the titles of *The New Way* and *Questions of Life,* and were intended to provide a forum for the discussion of philosophical and political matters along with the more purely literary movements. The combination proved unstable, however, and concealed conflicting elements which could not survive in each other's company. It was not long before Berdyaev was sharply critical of his associates in these ventures. "There were unmistakable signs of incipient decadence in the whole movement", he records: "sometimes it seemed to breathe the atmosphere of a hothouse with no door or window open to the fresh air. We were in fact witnesses not to the beginning of a new era but of the end of an old one". He resented their aestheticism which, as he believed, concealed a complete lack of social responsibility, just as twenty years or so later he was to resent the *literati* in France. It was as though "the wings of Dionysos swept over the face of Russia . . . Eros held decisive sway over Logos: and this involved above all a disregard, especially painful to me, of the problem of personality and freedom". There were immense discussions and conversations and meetings, such as those held in the flat of Vyacheslav Ivanov, known as "The Tower," in the fullest sense an ivory tower. Ideas were in the air, clothed in endless talk, stimulating and at the same time enervating. But "it was not the word that became flesh here", Berdyaev remarks in a caustic sentence: "but, on the contrary, flesh became word; and facile verbal constructions and literary prattle were taken as substitutes for real things and real human relations".

Although he became increasingly aware during his sojourn in St. Petersburg of unwholesome elements in the movement, which

he describes as a deeply-rooted ambiguity, a division of the mind and the consciousness, there were also a number of more healthy elements in it, particularly those of a specifically Christian character. For Berdyaev himself, however, it was not a productive period. " I had not yet discovered ", he says, " or clearly defined the ruling motive of my life and thought. But my mental horizon was considerably widened; I had a vision of new things and I was enriched by new emotional experiences . . . There was, however, some hidden process going on within me as yet not susceptible of expression, but pointing towards a deeper appreciation of the religious element ". He left St. Petersburg in 1907, and after a short time in Paris, he settled in Moscow, where the next period of his life was spent. It was this period, he says, which " coincided with a serious attempt on my part to study, and to relate my thinking to, the theological tradition of the Orthodox Church ".

The Moscow period of his life extends from 1907 to 1922, when he finally went into exile, and on the whole he regarded it as one of the happiest. Although it coincided with the intensification of his religious quest, it also brought continual warfare, which for the most part was conducted on two fronts. On the one hand, he became increasingly antagonistic to Orthodox ecclesiastical movements in Russia, and this manifested itself violently in an attack on the hierarchy in an article entitled " Quenchers of the Spirit " directed against the Holy Synod. At the same time he was seeking for a deeper religious consciousness among the *starets,* the Russian pilgrims and " God-seekers ". He was constantly engaged in educational and intellectual work, in lectures and seminars, and this led to the formation of the Free Academy of Moral Science which continued to the time of his exile. It attracted considerable numbers, drawn from all classes of society, as well as those of different religious and political creeds, including both those who accepted and rejected Bolshevism. On the other hand, he was continually and critically embroiled in the political movements of the time. It is well known that he " accepted " the October Revolution of 1917, although it was a qualified and critical acceptance. For a short

spell he found himself in the grotesque position as a member of the Council of the newly proclaimed Republic. In 1920 he was elected to the professorship in Philosophy in the University of Moscow, but even in this position he continued to deliver lectures which were highly critical of Marxism. This, however, led to his arrest on two occasions, the first at the end of the year of his election as professor. On the first occasion he was treated by the Cheka with deference due to his reputation as a philosopher, and allowed to speak his mind freely. He was arrested again in 1922 and banished into exile on ideological grounds, along with a group of scholars and writers and others engaged in various branches of social work.

There are two revealing passages in his narrative which are concerned with this period. The first records his reaction to the peculiar transformation which appeared to have taken place as a result of the Revolution. "A new type of man seemed to have emerged. There was none of the tolerance and kindness in him so characteristic of the pre-revolutionary type of Russian; none of the pining for what is not; none of the anarchism which respects no rules; no doubts, no subjective reactions, no melancholy, no introspection. All this gave place to a buoyant and somewhat aggressive optimism and a readiness to conform to anybody and to do anything". It was indeed a melancholy reflection for a man of Berdyaev's temperament and passionate concern for the freedom of the person. It is in much the same vein that he records his verdict upon Communism: "If I opposed Communism", he says, "I did so solely on account of the freedom of the spirit, not because I desired to preserve this or that social or political order". At the same time he saw in it a glaring example of the failure of Christian responsibility: "Communism was for me from the very start a challenge and a reminder of an unfulfilled Christian duty. Christians ought to have embodied the truth of Communism: had they done so, its falsehood would never have won the day".

Berdyaev left Moscow and Russia in 1922, travelling by way of St. Petersburg to Berlin, with a group of some seventy-five

exiles, where they were given a cordial reception by both the German authorities and the Russian *émigrés*. He at once resumed his educational and intellectual activity, being instrumental in the formation of the Institute of Sciences and the Russian Religious Philosophical Academy. He encountered many of the influential thinkers of the day, such as Keyserling, Scheler and Spengler, but on the whole he was disappointed with them, finding a certain kinship of ideas, but springing from profoundly different premises. "The two years of my life in Berlin", he records, "were a prelude to my Western wayfaring, Germany being in every sense the boundary of the Russian East and the European West. I came to share the life of the West fully only in Paris. I came to Western Europe as a Russian, and it was by virtue of being a Russian that I was able to love Europe and make her my own . . . Inasmuch as I have been able to contribute to the philosophical and religious discussion in the West, I regard this contribution as an eminently Russian one".

The remaining chapter of his life, from 1924 to his sudden death on March 24, 1948, is essentially the record of this discussion. It embraced a bewildering variety of topics and participants, Russian Orthodox, French Roman Catholics and Protestants, and Anglicans. He made his home in Paris, and subsequently moved out to the suburb of Clamart where he had been left a small villa by Florence West, which became the constant centre of intellectual gatherings. The outbreak of war, the invasion and fall of France, caused him intense suffering. He was urged to leave Paris and go to America, but this he refused to do. Finally, he was persuaded to seek refuge in Pilat on the Bay of Biscay, only to find this place occupied by the German army a few days after his arrival. (An amusing incident is recorded by one of his biographers concerning his interrogation by a German officer who could not understand his occupation as a philosopher. After an attempted explanation, Berdyaev gave it up, and inquired about the German's home. On being told that he came from Konigsberg, Berdyaev explained that this was Kant's birthplace, perhaps the greatest of German philosophers: but the officer replied that he had never heard of him.) Berdyaev was never

actually arrested by the invaders, and it is recorded that this was prevented by one of his unknown disciples who was actually a member of the Nazi hierarchy. In 1942 he became seriously ill, and had to undergo a critical operation. "Outwardly", he says, "a new life began with the liberation of Paris", but "for my part, I saw no reason to change my attitude to the major issues". He continued to plan and write books to the very end; and his autobiography ends with the year 1947 on a note of ironic reflection concerning his reception of an honorary doctorate in divinity from the university of Cambridge. "I lack all the virtues which, as a rule, qualify one for academic distinctions; moreover, I lack all the theological virtues for holding a degree in divinity . . . Despite the irony of my predicament, enhanced by the fact that in Cambridge I found myself in the company of Mr. Bevin and the ex-Viceroy of India, I felt then, as on a number of previous occasions, that in no other country have I met with such sympathy and understanding as in England".

III.

This is no more than a sketch of Berdyaev's life which simply tries to give some brief impression of his background and the main phases of his pilgrimage. As such it is merely a sampling of his testament which, it is hoped, will send the reader to the document itself, because there he will find much to reward and stimulate him, to give him new insight into the meaning of human life and courage to face its trials. He will make the acquaintance of a singularly rich, paradoxical and exasperating personality; and having been exasperated, he will do well to look long at the portrait which forms the frontispiece to the book, and which in many ways is as revealing as the writing itself. It indicates an underlying calmness and steadfastness; the lined forehead and the eyes and the slightly ironical twist of the mouth bear the imprint of suffering; and the black velvet bonnet, the straying white hair and the trimmed beard betoken at once something of the visionary and the prophet along with a certain aristocratic jauntiness.

Berdyaev is likely to remain an enigmatic personality. He was a man capable of great courage, as when on a certain occasion he faced a company of soldiers and prevented them from firing on an unarmed mob; and yet the same man displayed an almost pathological fear of any form of illness or disease, and could confess quite unashamedly that he was reduced to tears on the death of Muri, his favourite cat. Many labels have been given to him: religious philosopher, mystical anarchist, moral revolutionary, captive of freedom, as he was once described by a reactionary Russian bishop, as well as the more familiar terms, personalist and existentialist. Yet these simply point to facets of his character, and leave much unexplained. He was above all a Russian, with a Russian sense of calling and destiny; and he was also an exile, and exile is the symbol of alienation, estrangement and homelessness in the world. From these two characteristics were born the conflicts with which he wrestled, and sought to illuminate in that struggle. They were for him symbols of man's predicament, pointing to the dignity and inviolability of human freedom, as well as to its suffering and frustration in the world which, nevertheless, must ultimately be transfigured as man realizes his creativity by which he participates in the divine life.

What he has written in this book, he declares towards the end, " certainly goes beyond the accepted limits of philosophy and represents a confession of faith; my philosophy is informed with this faith and is born of spiritual experience, rather than deduced from ascertained and assured premises . . . The practical conclusion derived from this faith turns into an accusation of the age in which I live and into a command to be human in this most inhuman of ages, to guard the image of man for it is the image of God . . . Life appears to me as a mystery of the spirit, a drama in which man strives in a constant but strangely unavailing effort to embody the creative vision of his spirit . . . The meaning of life lies in a return to the mystery of the spirit in which God is born in man and man is born in God. But the return is not a relapse into some primal innocence, but a process of creation which contains in some sense all the experiences, trials and ordeals which attend the destiny of man ".

THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLICY OF HENRY II ON THE CONTINENT, 1154-1189

By I. P. SHAW

THE spectacular nature and violent end of the controversy between Henry II and Thomas Becket have for nearly eight centuries given to their quarrel a celebrity which the issues at stake scarcely deserved. The quarrel was essentially a personal one between the king and the primate, not between the king and the Western Church, nor between the king and the English bishops, not even between the king and the province of Canterbury.

Within his dominions Henry II could count ten ecclesiastical provinces, two in England, four in Ireland and four on the Continent. Of these ten provinces, Canterbury was territorially the largest, with seventeen bishops owing obedience to its head—an obedience which Becket strove to exact but never received. He failed, indeed, completely to win the co-operation of his diocesans, still less their affection. And in the wider background of Angevin power his fellow archbishops treated him with indifference if not with hostility: his opposition to the king evoked no corresponding support at Rouen or Tours or Bordeaux.

Becket combined much in his own person. But as archbishop he was only one among more than thirty metropolitans who recognized Henry Plantagenet as their temporal overlord. As primate, his successors at Canterbury and his contemporaries at Armagh enjoyed the same dignity. As legate of the apostolic see, his rival at York and his equals at Tours and Bordeaux held the same rank. As chancellor and the king's lieutenant, his

power had certainly been great,[1] but Rotrou of Rouen gave Henry more constant service. As a leader in war, Becket's position at Toulouse in 1159 was not unique, for in 1190 Richard made the Archbishop of Auch[2] a justiciar of his fleet. Nor was Becket the only martyr among Henry's bishops, for Haimo of Leon suffered a like fate in 1171, and if his canonization was unusually rapid,[3] even as a saint Becket shared the honours of beatitude with another of Henry's creations—St. Hugh of Lincoln.

The extent of the king's authority over the Church varied in his several possessions. In Normandy he inherited the tradition of close ducal control over elections and ecclesiastical councils. And if Normandy was the strongest unit in Henry's empire, the fact that it was a self-contained province of six bishoprics dependent on the metropolis of Rouen unquestionably strengthened its homogeneity.

In Anjou, Maine and Touraine the position was much more complicated. Angers and Le Mans, the respective capitals, were bishoprics—the only bishoprics apart from those in Brittany—in the province of Tours. Tours itself, the greatest religious and commercial centre west of the Rhine, the land of "Martinopolis", had been ceded by Henry I of France to its conqueror, Geoffrey Martel, in 1044. The cession was of vital importance in the formation of the Angevin empire, but it did not carry with it control over the archbishopric.[4] The kings of France remained titular abbots of St. Martin, and the occupants of the see on more than one occasion fomented quarrels between Capetian and Plantagenet. In what was strategically the key position of his

[1] *Secundum post regem in quatuor regnis quis te ignorat?* Peter of La Celle to Becket as chancellor—*Materials for the History of Becket* (Rolls Series) V, p. 4.

[2] Gerard de la Barthe, *c.* 1173-*c.* 1192. *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* (R.S.) II, p. 110.

[3] He was murdered December 29, 1170. Alexander III's bull of canonization is dated February 21, 1173. A comparison with St. Bernard is not without interest. He died August 20, 1153, and was canonized January 18, 1174.

[4] In 1199 the legate Peter of Capua's abortive scheme for peace would have included Philip II's renunciation of this lordship. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy*, p. 186.

dominions, Henry could not rely on the loyalty of its chief ecclesiastic.

It was possibly for this reason that the king did nothing to discountenance the claims of the Breton bishopric of Dol to be independent of Tours. There is little clear evidence of his attitude to this dispute which had gone on for centuries, but at least his political aims would not have been seriously impaired by the success of a demand which would have reduced the importance of Tours. And it is significant that of all the popes Adrian IV was most generous in his concessions to Dol.[5] The same pope, too, had re-asserted the primacy of Lyons over the four provinces of Lyons, Rouen, Tours and Sens, about which Ralph of Diceto later showed such interest.[6] The bull conferred no actual power whatever and as far as Rouen was concerned was a dead letter. But again Henry registered no protest at a move which if only in theory affected adversely the status of Engelbald of Tours.

By his marriage with Eleanor of Aquitaine in 1152, two further provinces came under the sway of Henry Plantagenet, Bordeaux and Auch. But as in almost every other field, ecclesiastically this heritage proved troublesome to its master. There was little unity of any kind in Aquitaine. Since about 950 Poitou had been the real centre of the duchy, but Poitiers, like Angers, ranked as a bishopric only. The metropolitan city, Bordeaux, for a century after the same date had belonged to the dukes of Gascony. Its wealth, its commerce, its archbishop made it important, but this alien sea-colony possessed little centralizing influence, and in any case since the end of the eleventh century the Gregorian reform had been particularly successful in the South-West.

Still less conspicuous in Henry's ecclesiastical policy was the province of Auch. Presiding over ten small and unimportant sees, the two long-lived Gascon metropolitans with whom Henry had to deal played little part in his affairs.[7] The racial exclusive-

[5] Jaffé-Lowenfelt, *Regesta*, 10063, 10065, 10102, 10367, 10504.

[6] Radulfi de Diceto, *Opera Historica* (R.S.) I, p. 5.

[7] (Though this does not hold for the reign of Richard.) In May, 1166, at the Council of Le Mans, there were four bishops from the province of Bordeaux, but only one, the Bishop of Bazas, from Auch. Gervase of Canterbury, *Opera Historica* (R.S.) I, p. 198.

ness of the Gascons extended to their church, and with this, it would appear, neither king nor pope chose much to interfere.

Besides Bordeaux and Auch, Aquitaine had formerly numbered a third metropolitan city, the ancient capital of *Aquitainia Prima* of the Romans, the city of Bourges. It would seem that here Henry II's interest in history was of a practical nature, for we are told that in 1170 he claimed that the archbishopric ought to belong to his duchy of Aquitaine.[8] Louis VII, however, knew too well from experience the ambitions which his rival entertained about Berri, and the claim was rebutted. But Limoges, which lay within the province of Bourges, concerned Henry more closely. It was here that the young Richard was crowned Duke of Aquitaine in 1167, here that Henry made the fateful alliance with Humbert of Maurienne in 1173 which precipitated the great rebellion, and here, in 1183, that he carried out a sack of the city which foreshadowed the awful destruction of 1370.[9] With the bishops Henry was on bad terms; and at his command Peter of Blois wrote an attack on one of them.[10] Here he could reckon on no support, or even obedience.

Such, in outline, was the ecclesiastical background with its traditions in Henry's continental possessions. What was his policy, and who were the men chosen to enforce it?

In 1913, at a time when interest in the millenary celebrations of Normandy's beginnings was still high, an eminent historian wrote "there is abundant evidence that Henry II regarded his continental dominions as a whole, in contrast with England".[11] More than forty years previously Stubbs had said that the main purpose of Henry's life was the consolidation of kingly power in his own hands. From the standpoint of ecclesiastical history

[8] G.R. I, p. 10.

[9] G.R. I, p. 303. *ita quod in destructione ejus (Limovensis castellum) et civitatis et munitionum suarum, lapidem super lapidem non reliquit.*

[10] "*Quales sunt*" Migne, P.L. CCVII, cols. 1006-1056. The author was writing against the Bishops of Limoges, and the Bishop of Saintes in particular.

[11] Powicke, *Loss of Normandy*, p. 33.

it is easier to agree with the latter than with the former opinion. Unquestionably Henry sought to bring the clergy, if not the Church, within the orbit of his administrative reforms, and to this extent he was the true successor of his Norman and Anglo-Saxon forebears, but it is difficult to believe that he regarded his relations with the Church in Aquitaine in the same light as he looked on his Norman episcopate. It would seem, rather, that in the ecclesiastical sphere the king observed, lief or loth, the advice of his dying father not to try to impose the customs of one country upon the rest.

The twelfth century knew and employed the term *Ecclesia Gallicana* just as it used the phrase *Ecclesia Anglicana,* but it is more than doubtful if *Gallicana* here implied much more than the Capetian provinces of Reims and Sens and possibly Bourges. When Alexander III wrote on a spiritual matter, the Nature of Christ,[12] equally when he wrote politically, threatening the continental lands of Henry with interdict,[13] he did so individually to the French metropolitans concerned, not as a body to the archbishops of the Gallican Church. When in May, 1163, the pope sent tidings to all the faithful of the assembly of his council at Tours, the mounting paean of his letters listed severally and not collectively the heads of the French provinces who came *universam occidentalis ecclesiam honorare.*[14] No archbishop was Primate of all France, as Canterbury was of England or Toledo of Spain. In France, as elsewhere in the West, the papacy was breaking down regionalism. For different reasons Henry II may have favoured the same policy, but in his time the ecclesiastical barriers remained standing: Auch and Rouen were separate from each other, and separate again from the *ecclesia Gallicana.*[15]

[12] Jaffé, 11809.

[13] Jaffé, 11722-11727. Letters to Roger of York, Joscius of Tours, Peter of Bourges, Bertrand of Bordeaux, William of Auch, and to all the bishops in the province of Rouen.

[14] Jaffé, 10719.

[15] In 1179 Alexander wrote to the church of Troyes (prov. Sens) allowing to be introduced there "constitutionem ecclesiarum Gallicanarum" concerning the sharing of the cathedral's revenues among the canons. Jaffé, 13282.

The most useful Norman chronicler for the reign, Robert of Torigny, abbot of Mont St. Michel, makes no suggestion that Henry II regarded his churches on the continent as a whole. Mont St. Michel lay just within the diocese of Avranches, adjoining Brittany. Robert naturally wrote with knowledge and authority of the six Norman sees, their occupants, and their metropolitan at Rouen. He was acquainted personally with several of the Breton bishops whose obits he records,[16] and he plainly knew much of the aims and activities of Joscius of Tours (1157-1173/4), and his successor Bartholomew (1174-1206). But for the province of Bordeaux, beyond recording the succession of archbishops he has nothing to say of the occupants of the five suffragan sees, except in the case of John de Belmeis—*vir jocundus et largus et apprime litteratus*—of whose subsequent election to Narbonne (quashed), and then to Lyons with its magnetic primacies, he says a good deal.[17] Still further south, in Gascony, two archbishops and more than thirty-five bishops were consecrated during Henry's reign, but Torigny has not a single reference to one of them.

The English chroniclers pay little attention to Henry's ecclesiastical policy on the continent. The most official of them, the author of the *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* indeed gives a fuller account of the Irish provinces and dioceses than he does of Bordeaux or Tours. Similarly Roger Hoveden, Gervase of Canterbury, Ralph of Diceto mention occasionally a prominent Norman or Angevin prelate in the course of their narratives. But there is no suggestion that the bishops of Le Mans, or Nantes or Bayeux were conscious of their character as Gallican dignitaries. Like the more illustrious occupants of the see of Rouen they were men whose services to the king earned an international recognition as counsellors, arbiters, ambassadors.

[16] An unusually instructive obit concerns his friend, Albert of S. Malo: *Obiit venerabilis vir Albertus, Aletensis episcopus, quem moderni de Sancto Maclovio vocant, cujus episcopatus antiquitus civitas Aleta vocabatur. Chronica Roberti de Torigneio* in *Chronicles of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I* (R.S.) IV, p. 306. cf. Jaffé, 10803.

[17] Torigny, p. 214, 302.

One of the ways in which ecclesiastical unity expressed itself was in councils. Henry II's reign saw many of them. Within his dominions Alexander held his great council of the West at Tours in 1163, and Henry's bishops were there in force if not in unison.[18] Sixteen years later a greater council was convened at Rome, and again Alexander, no longer in exile, but in triumph, summoned the episcopate of England and Ireland and of the cismarine Plantagenet lands. Many went, but they went as individuals, and many stayed away, particularly from Normandy, where Henry's hand was strong.[19]

From the king's point of view, provincial were more important than general councils. In Ireland such a council met at his orders in 1171 to reform the Church there. In the province of Rouen there was a long tradition of these assemblies, and the council of Lillebonne in 1080 had enacted a set of decisions which were the prototype of the celebrated Constitutions of Clarendon themselves.[20] The dukes had often presided at these councils of the Norman Church, and Henry II was fully alive to their significance. In 1162 he "complained of the bishops and their officers and his vicomtes, and ordered that the provisions of the Council of Lillebonne should be observed".[21] Presumably his orders were obeyed, as no opposition came from the clergy, a clergy which was already equally justiciable with the laity to the duke for breaches of the forest law. Three years previously, in 1159, he had expresed dissatisfaction at the way in which deans administered justice, and had set up a jury of accusation for criminal matters.[22] Under Rotrou, and his successor Walter of Coutances,

[18] Alexander undertook that the attendance of Henry's bishops should not redound to the discredit of his kingdom, nor be taken as a precedent. *Materials,* V, p. 33. One of the matters to be dealt with at the council was the quarrel between Canterbury and York.

[19] Only one bishop, Giles of Evreux, attended from the whole province. Six months later, *catharro impediente, in fata concessit, Gallia Christiana,* XI, p. 578. Also Hist. Littéraire de la France, XIV, pp. 18-21.

[20] Foreville, *L'Eglise et la Royaute en Angleterre,* p. 144.

[21] C. H. Haskins, in the *A.H.R.* XX, p. 40.

[22] Torigny, p. 327.

Norman councils continued to be held, but independence of ducal control was out of the question.[23]

Further south the archbishops of Tours presided over provincial councils, both in their capital and at various other centres.[24] Henry apparently exercised little influence over the Breton Church. He was present at Le Mans in 1161, when Archbishop Hugh, elect since 1154, resigned his see of Dol;[25] he must have known of the transference of the *Cathedra* of Aleth to St. Malo in 1164; he may have been aware of the papal letters sent to the bishops of St. Brieuc, and Treguier, commanding obedience to Dol before the unhappy Hugh resigned,[26] but as has been previously observed, Angers and Le Mans were the two bishoprics in the province of Tours which concerned Henry closely. And the councils he held at these centres were indeed councils at which bishops were present, but at which wider matters than the purely ecclesiastical were discussed.

These greater councils furnished the occasions when Henry II declared his policy. Throughout his reign and throughout his dominions his bishops figured among his principal and most faithful advisers. It has often been remarked that in the tremendous crisis of 1173-4, only two members of the episcopate, Hugh of Durham (King Stephen's nephew) and Arnulf of Lisieux gave support to the king's enemies—and a half-hearted, uncertain and hastily-withdrawn support at that—two out of a possible hundred. Bishops were formally forbidden to take part in secular government,[27] but for centuries to come the prohibition was of necessity a dead letter. In England all the great assemblies included the episcopate.[28] On the continent the council at Le Mans in 1188, convened to levy the Saladin tithe, saw gathered together the

[23] For a very adequate survey of the ducal control over the Norman Church see S. R. Packard, *King John and the Norman Church*, in *Harvard Theological Review*, XV, especially pp. 16-19.

[24] Bartholomew held a council at Rennes with the bishops of Brittany in 1175. Torigny, p. 269.

[25] Eyton, *Itinerary of Henry II*, p. 54, quoting Torigny, p. 210.

[26] Jaffé, 10504.

[27] Decrees of the Lateran Council of 1179. Canon 25.

[28] Eyton, *Itinerary, passim.*

Archbishops of Tours, Canterbury and Rouen, the Bishops of Evreux, Angers, Le Mans and Nantes and the elect of Séez and of Coventry. At Christmas in 1180, before the issue of the Assize of Arms, Henry presided over a similar assembly of continental dignitaries. The splendid setting for his purgation at Avranches in September, 1172, witnessed the gathering of another council.[29] Still earlier, in May, 1166, when the king held two meetings at Le Mans at which a tax for five years in aid of the Holy Land was decreed, he was attended by Norman, Breton and Aquitanian bishops.[30]

In the assemblies concerned with purely secular affairs the episcopate was equally prominent. The Bishop of Avranches witnessed the treaty of Falaise with the king of Scots in 1174. The peace of Ivry in 1177 and its confirmation in 1180 were attested by bishops on both sides. The Archbishop of Bordeaux and his suffragan of Poitiers were present in December, 1177, when Henry purchased the County of La Marche.[31] Rouen and Evreux accompanied his daughter Joan to St. Gilles in 1176. Bertrand of Bordeaux and Peter Minet of Perigueux went to Castille on a similar matrimonial mission six years earlier.[32] In strictly legal matters, the customs of Brittany, dated at Rennes in 1185, were drawn up at the petition of the bishops and barons of Brittany.[33] There is nothing unusual in this employment of bishops as ambassadors or sureties or recognitors, but the whole of his activity on the continent reveals Henry II using their services to the full, and as the provisions of his will of 1182 show, he made no distinction between those of England and the rest of his lands.[34]

[29] The legates who presided issued decrees and exercised a power over the Norman Church unknown since 1128. cf. Foreville, p. 336-7.

[30] Gervase of Canterbury, I, p. 198. The list contains one of the few allusions to the Bishop of Vannes in Brittany, and Bazas in Gascony.

[31] G.R. I, p. 197.

[32] Letters of Peter of Blois, in Migne, P.L. CCVII, col. 110. This Peter Minet was possibly a relation of the Archdeacon of Bath.

[33] Powicke, *Loss of Normandy*, p. 69, n. 1.

[34] Eyton, *Itinerary*, p. 246.

The question of the men and the type of men who occupied these continental sees raises many problems. In the south, in the two Aquitanian provinces, it would seem that Henry had little say in their selection. In 1137 Louis VII, as Duke of Aquitaine, had recognized the right of canonical election: he had gone further and renounced not only the right of nomination, but also the oath of fidelity due from the bishops.[35] There is no available evidence that Henry interfered in elections in the province of Auch, but in Bordeaux, one account relates that he attempted to force the canons of St. André to elect his nominee to the archbishopric in 1158.[36] The story is unlikely, as Henry was not in Aquitaine in 1158. But in 1160 he secured the election of Harduin, Dean of Le Mans.[37] Two years later, on Harduin's death, Bertrand de Montault, Bishop of Lectoure in the province of Auch, was elected. He ruled at Bordeaux for ten years in harmony with the king, becoming legate of the holy see in 1166. Bertrand's pontificate saw the whole course of the struggle between Henry and Becket, but there is no evidence that he took any steps to support the English primate.

Henry's action on the death of Bertrand in 1172 is more apparent. The settlement of Avranches scarcely concluded, he presided at a council at Limoges, where on February 25, 1173, William the Templar, Abbot of Reading, was consecrated Archbishop of Bordeaux in the royal presence.[38] William ruled the province for precisely nine years, and in 1173-4 suffered imprisonment at the hands of Henry's sons. His most distinguished suffragan, John of Belmeis, Bishop of Poitiers (1162-81), like himself was an Englishman, and represents Henry's direct influence in the ecclesiastical affairs of the duchy. The friend and correspondent of Becket, John of Salisbury and Diceto, John

[35] See Delisle, *Receuil des Actes de Henri II*, Introduction, for Louis' title.

[36] Foreville, p. 99.

[37] Torigny, p. 206.

[38] Torigny, p. 255. At the same council the king made the marriage settlement for John Lackland with the daughter of the Count of Maurienne.

found himself in 1163 threatened with orders from the king which gravely impaired the judicial privileges of his church. Although the orders were published at Poitiers, he remained consistent in his determination to guard his rights,[39] and this attempt of Henry to enforce something approaching the Constitutions of Clarendon in Poitou came to little. John himself, elected to Lyons in 1182, retired to Clairvaux in 1194, and never seems to have incurred the enmity which Henry unquestionably felt for the Bishops of Saintes and Limoges.[40] As far as Aquitaine went, the Church on the whole retained its canonical rights of election, a large measure of self-government, and in its personnel a marked independence from royal control.

Henry exercised more power to the north. In Tours itself, as has been said, the archbishopric was beyond the influence of the Count. Of the three metropolitans with whom he had to deal the first, Engelbald de Preuilly (1147-56) gave Henry little trouble, but Joscius, who succeeded him, caused some friction between Henry and Louis VII in 1167.[41] The canons of the cathedral preserved their right of election, and in 1174 chose Bartholomew, formerly Dean of St. Maurice—*juvenis strenuus et genere nobilis* Torigny calls him. He was certainly active. It was he who signed Richard with the Cross in 1189 without the counsel and against the wish of Henry; who later consecrated Geoffrey Plantagenet as bishop, and who served Philip Augustus better than he had served the Angevins until his death in 1206.[42]

At Angers, the capital of his patrimony, Henry II inherited the powers of his predecessors with regard to episcopal elections. It appears that the Count of Anjou enjoyed the right to select

[39] *Materials*, V, pp. 37-41. In 1176 John again intervened to protect clerical rights, in the case of Adam, the young king's vice-chancellor—G.R. I, p. 122.

[40] Migne, P.L. CCVII. cols. 1006-56.

[41] Torigny, p. 230. Joscius suggested that money collected for the relief of Jerusalem should be sent by Louis' messengers, *quia ecclesia Turonensis sua est.*

[42] Diceto, II, p. 50. It is perhaps worth noting that in June, 1199, the claim of Dol to metropolitan status was finally quashed by Innocent III: Philip was no supporter of Breton particularism.

one out of three candidates submitted by the cathedral chapter, but in 1156, three years after the death of Norman of Doué, the canons refused to observe this custom. Henry appealed to Adrian IV, and lost. The pope informed the chapter in a famous letter, that in the presence of Rotrou of Evreux and William of Le Mans (two of Henry's staunchest supporters), he had absolutely condemned the former custom.[43] Henry took the rebuff calmly and accepted as bishop Matthew of Loudon whom the canons chose.[44] But on Matthew's death, in 1162, his influence must have been at work, for the new bishop, Geoffrey Moschet (1162-78) had been Henry's clerk, and then Dean of Angers. Throughout the Becket crisis and the great revolt he remained loyal to his master, and on his death Henry secured the appointment of his cousin Ralph (1178-97), a member of the distinguished Beaumont-Neufbourg-Warwick family.

The see of Le Mans occupied an exalted position in the province of Tours. Its bishops came first in dignity after the archbishop, could alone consecrate the metropolitan, and administered the arch-diocese on his death.[45] From 1143 to 1186 the bishop was William of Passavant, a member of a seignorial family of Saintogne, a man frequently employed as a judge-delegate by the pope and as ambassador by the king, and one with whom Henry's relations were entirely cordial.[46] His successor, Reginald (1187-90), was, it seems, regularly elected by the canons from their own body.

Britanny, remote and uncivilized, mattered little ecclesiastically. But both Nantes and Rennes were cities of some importance, and at the former in 1170, Robert, its archdeacon and

[43] Jaffé, 10174. April 25, 1156, "*sese . . . consuetudinem penitus damnavisse.*"

[44] Boussard, *Le Comté d'Anjou sous Henri Plantagenet*, p. 98, says he came from Séez, and was the first non-Angevin to be chosen since 1093.

[45] *Letters of Arnulf of Lisieux*, ed. F. Barlow, p. 159 n. *a*.

[46] Delisle, *Receuil*, Introd. p. 475. At his death William must have been the senior bishop in all Henry's dominions, outliving Jocelin of Salisbury by more than two years.

nephew of his predecessor the Cistercian Bernard (1156-68) *consensu regis factus est episcopus.*[47] The king was in the city at the time, and his choice was good, for Robert served him well at the treaties of Falaise and Ivry, and in England during 1176. He was a friend of Robert of Torigny, and died on his return from Jerusalem in 1185.

But if Robert was *vir magnae honestatis,* his contemporary of Rennes, Stephen de Fulgeriis (1168-78) shone with the twin ecclesiastical lustre of distinction and humility. Probably a chancery clerk from 1161, he became successively king's chaplain and Precentor of Mortain. From May to July 1168, Henry was in Brittany, and it was most probably during this period that he created Stephen bishop. Always styling himself *Dei Gratia Redonensis ecclesiae presbyter et regis capellanus,* Stephen was not only one of the most learned of Henry's servants,[48] but gave his master loyal support in the capital of a region where Henry's nominal position was that of Seneschal of the King of France.

Apart from Dol, which played a more conspicuous part, the remaining sees in Brittany afford little interest. At St. Brieuc, Quimper, St. Pol de Leon, St. Malo, Tréguier, and Vannes not even the succession during Henry's reign is always clear. Torigny helps with an occasional obit. Gervase of Canterbury records the presence of a Bishop of Vannes, Rotald, at the Councils of Le Mans in 1166.[49] Certain names figure from time to time as witnesses in Delisle's great work. Two of them died a violent death.[50] Two of them attended the third Lateran Council, but on the whole these bishops mattered no more to Alexander III than they did to Henry II.[51] It is worth remarking, however,

[47] Torigny, p. 244.

[48] *Histoire Littéraire de la France,* T. XIV, p. 10. As bishop he turned from the writing of poetry to the more proper composition of local hagiography.

[49] Gervase, I, p. 198.

[50] Haimo of Leon (Diceto, I, p. 346) and Ivo of Tréguier (Torigny, p. 280).

[51] The two bishops were Godfrey of Quimper and Godfrey of St. Brieuc. For the whole of Alexander III's pontificate Jaffé's *Regesta* contains only two references to the bishops of Brittany, 10719, 10803.

that with the one exception of Bernard, Chancellor of Chartres, who became Bishop of Quimper (1159-67) the occupants of the sees appear to have been Bretons, elected by their own chapters, if not always canonically,[52] though previously they might have found preferment as archdeacons or archpriests at Rennes or Tours. And there was at least one translation, that of Joscius from St. Brieuc to Tours in 1157.

This Joscius naturally had a particular interest in the affairs of the peninsula. In 1172 at the Council of Avranches he renewed his predecessors' claims to supremacy over Dol, "*sed clerici de Dolo contradicebant*".[53] As has been suggested above, Henry probably had little real interest in this ecclesiastical question, and the papacy itself adopted a policy of tergiversation susceptible of no very obvious explanation. Hugh of Dol, blind and disappointed, had resigned his archbishopric in the presence of Henry and the cardinal legates at Le Mans in March 1161: in his place was chosen Roger de Humez, one of the king's chancery clerks, Archdeacon of Bayeux, and a member of a famous Norman family.[54] And clearly Henry consented, if he did not nominate. Sixteen years later the canons of Dol chose a more catholic figure for their archbishop, Rolland, an Italian, already Dean of Avranches, who was to be sent on a mission to Scotland by the pope in 1181, and made a cardinal by Lucius III in 1184. His election was attended by two Norman bishops and Torigny himself, and Rolland probably met Henry at Gorton in 1182. But despite his sponsors, his ability, his learning and his eminence, at his death in 1188 Rolland had been unable to prevail over the appeals of Bartholomew of Tours; he died "elect" of Dol.[55] His successor, Henry, Dean of the collegiate church of Mortain, died on his way to receive consecration at Rome in the same year, and though the indefatigable canons chose yet another arch-

[52] Torigny, p. 262, states Haimo's successor was elected simonaically.

[53] G.R., I, p. 34.

[54] Torigny, p. 210.

[55] Torigny, p. 275-6, and Delisle, Introd., p. 454.

bishop, that chapter of Breton independence was running swiftly to its close.

Conditions in Normandy were different. As is well known the duchy became one of the first examples of centralized power in medieval Europe, and Henry was not the man to neglect such a heritage. His chief ecclesiastical minister, the Archbishop of Rouen, presided over a compact province of six dioceses where the reform movement of the eleventh century had indeed made remarkable headway, but the resulting strength redounded to the advantage of the duke rather than to that of the pope. The relations between Henry II and the three archbishops of Rouen testify to the essential underlying similarity of their aims. The early dukes had protected the home, the plough, the church, and Henry continued their policy: the early dukes had set up barriers against papal interference, and again Henry followed their example. The Norman Church was highly organized, and Henry respected its organization and enriched its resources. But he maintained his predecessors' rights in appointments to the episcopate, and he chose able men.

Some of them came of great families. Henry of Bayeux (1165-1205) was Beaumont, a relative of Rotrou of Rouen, of Robert Seneschal of Normandy, and of Ralph, Bishop of Angers. Richard of Coutances (1150-79) was a Bohun and brother to the long-lived pro-Angevin Jocelin of Salisbury. Others, notably Walter of Coutances, archbishop from 1185 to 1205, and his predecessor, Rotrou, were among the very greatest of Henry's servants and counsellors, and almost to a man they had graduated through the deaneries and archdeaconries of ecclesiastical preferment. Only on one occasion, it seems, did Henry intrude his nominee. This was at Séez in 1157. Achard, abbot of St. Victor at Paris, had been chosen by the Austin canons of the cathedral on the death of Gerard, and had obtained confirmation from Adrian IV; but Henry opposed his election, and successfully got his almoner, Froger, installed as bishop in 1159. But Séez was a hotbed of

trouble, and Achard was himself advanced by the king to Avranches in 1161.[56]

With the exception of this affair at Séez, Henry respected the form of canonical election. But his influence in nominations is patent. His clerks were well rewarded.[57] John Fitz-Luke, a man possibly related to the mayoral family of that name at Rouen, had been in the service of Richard of Canterbury, Walter of Coutances, and of Henry himself before his promotion to Evreux in 1182. In 1181 Arnulf of Lisieux had resigned full of years and disgrace, and the king at once secured the election of his chancellor, Ralph of Warneville (1182-91). Arnulf had been the most Francophile of Henry's Norman bishops; his loyalty to the king had not been sufficiently single-minded, and at the end of a career that had achieved much and promised more, his fall was to prove the truth of Giraldus Cambrensis' remark about Henry II —"*quem semel exosum habuerat, vix in amorem revocabat*".[58]

But Giraldus added that once Henry had given his confidence to a man, he rarely forsook him. This would appear true for most of the Norman bishops, and especially for Walter of Coutances. A Cornishman of outstanding ability, Walter became Archdeacon of Oxford, clerk and then vice-chancellor to the king, and was chosen to occupy the see of Lincoln after a vacancy of seventeen years in 1183. From Lincoln he was translated to Rouen in the next year by Lucius III *voluntate ac precibus Henrici regis* despite some opposition from the Norman chapter.[59]

[56] Except for Hugh of Amiens, Archbishop of Rouen 1129-64, formerly abbot of Reading and a Cluniac, Achard was the only Regular among Henry's Norman bishops. He may have been an Englishman —*Anglia me genuit, docuit me Gallia.* Gall. Christ. XI, 481. At Séez, Froger increased the confusion by upsetting the conventional constitution, and securing the election of his nephew John as archdeacon. cf. *Letters of Arnulf of Lisieux*, p. xxxv, and for Séez at the turn of the century, S. R. Packard in *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. XV, p. 21-24.

[57] Cf. C. H. Haskins in *A.H.R.* XX, p. 282.

[58] Giraldus Cambrensis, *Opera*, (R.S.) V, 304, and also the letter of Peter of Blois to the Archbishop of Palermo, sketching Henry's character—Migne, P.L. CCVII, cols. 195-210.

[59] *Gallia Christiana*, XI, Instr., c. 26.

Walter's real importance, however, lay with the future and in his relations with Philip Augustus and Innocent III, but for the last five years of his life Henry II had no need to fear trouble at Rouen.

Rotrou of Beaumont, whom Walter succeeded, had been equally a staunch supporter of the Plantagenet. Promoted from Evreux (1139-64) to the archiepiscopal see, he was constant and ubiquitous in his services to the king. It was he who was chosen to crown the young Henry and his queen at Winchester after Becket's death, he who acted as arbiter between the two English metropolitans in 1175, and he who, nearly thirty years before, had been a witness for Gilbert de la Porée at Reims. He also served Henry for a time in a secular capacity as Seneschal of Normandy. But, above all, it was his unfailing support of the king, from 1164 to 1172 as ambassador and legate, which demonstrates how completely Becket's opposition to the king failed to win the sympathy of Henry's continental bishops.[60]

Three other Norman bishops deserve mention. One of them, William of Avranches (1182-90), had been dean of Henry's royal chapel at Le Mans, and is a clear case of the king promoting a faithful ecclesiastic.[61] Of the others, the career of Philip Harcourt, Bishop of Bayeux (1141-63) is of interest because it reveals the close connexion between the English and the Norman Church. Formerly Dean of Lincoln, he became Archdeacon of Evreux, and in 1140, being then King Stephen's chancellor, was nominated by the king to Salisbury. Neither the chapter nor the legate would admit him, and two years later he was rewarded with the see of Bayeux. According to Torigny, he fulfilled the duties of his office with vigour and success, restoring various rights to his see at the expense of the abbeys of Fécamp and Troarn, and bequeathed a number of valuable books to Bec.[62] He also played

[60] Delisle, Introd. 455 for this important man. At Suger's great ceremony at St. Denis in 1144 he dedicated the Altar of St. Hilary: he was equally prominent at the translation of Edward the Confessor in 1163.

[61] Torigny, p. 308.

[62] Torigny, p. 217.

some part in the controversy over Dol, and was probably instrumental in securing the election of his archdeacon, Roger, to the archbishopric in 1161.

On Philip's death, Henry of Beaumont was elected to Bayeux from the deanery of Salisbury. He ruled his diocese for forty years, was much in Henry's service, and high in his confidence. He assisted at the young king's coronation in June, 1170, along with Froger of Séez—an act which brought no suspension of office for them. Two years later, according to Gervase of Canterbury, who was well informed on such matters, the king tried to persuade Odo, prior of Christ Church, to elect Henry of Bayeux as archbishop in succession to Becket. He would, it seems, have been a welcome change after the intransigent Londoner.[63] But here the king failed to get his way.

It was one of his few failures during his reign of thirty-five years. The more fair-minded writers of the age realized that Church and State were complementary, that neither could exist without the other.[64] There is no evidence that Henry II was anticlerical,[65] no evidence that he sought to undermine the standing or the resources of his bishops in England or abroad. On the continent there were no long vacancies—the worst case is that of Evreux, without a bishop from 1164 to 1170—and, as has been suggested, the men he appointed were often distinguished a d always capable.

Personally the king's religion may have lacked the sincerity of Henry III's—it certainly lacked his simplicity—but Henry of Anjou was not a simple man. Experiment marked his government: restlessness was the strongest element in his character.

[63] Gervase, I, p. 240. *Volebat enim rex et priorem exorabat, ut episcopus Bajocensis eligeretur. Erat enim vir ille nimiae simplicitatis, qui de facili ab intentione sua alias quolibet valeret avelli.*

[64] cf. Diceto's classical statement on the mutual relationship and interdependence of the royal and ecclesiastical power. I, p. 335.

[65] On Sept. 20, 1172, four months after the purgation at Avranches, Alexander III wrote congratulating Henry on his victory in Ireland, and expressed the hope that *in prescripta terra iura beati Petri nobis studeas sollicite conservare, et si etiam ibi non habet, tua magnitudo eidem ecclesiae eadem iura constituat et assignet.*—Jaffé, 12162.

But it was experiment devoted to furthering the peace of his peoples, restlessness seeking incessantly in thought and speech and action the best means to achieve this end.[66] No doubt his experiments bore hardly on many. In the lay sphere they provoked the great rebellion of 1173. But there is much to make us think that Henry made innovations only as a means to reform, though reform might mean centralization. On the continent he subjected the Church to little change,[67] because little was necessary. As Peter of Blois remarked, he exercised the traditional powers of influencing elections, and through these elections he controlled the episcopate.[68] There was no call for reform since the king and the Church worked together in traditional harmony. In England, on the other hand, Stephen's lack of rule made necessary the restraint of a Church grown too powerful. This Henry attempted in 1164, and this Becket, and Becket alone, opposed. The opposition cost the primate his life: it cost the pope a deal of inconvenience: it cost the king his reputation, but it did not seriously affect his aims or policy, and it caused no corresponding opposition among the bishops of the king's dominions.

[66] *Super omnia desiderabilia hujus mundi zelatur et procurat pacem populi sui. Ad pacem populi pertinet quidquid cogitat, quidquid loquitur, quidquid agit.* Pet. Bles. *Epistolae,* Migne, P.L. CCVII, cols. 38-9.

[67] Roger of Hoveden (R.S.) I, p. 221, states that the Constitutions of Clarendon were *intended* to apply in all Henry's lands. There is no evidence that they were in fact applied.

[68] *Cum autem juxta regni consuetudinem in electionibus faciendis potissimas et potentissimas habeat partes, habuit tamen semper manus ab omni venalitate innoxias et immunes.* Pet. Bles. *loc. cit.*

THE HOLY TREASURY OF GLORY[1]

By MAISIE SPENS

"MARY is the canon of Jesus". Such were the exact words in which the Holy Spirit once saw fit to articulate and sum up for a priest an interior "shewing" of the Mystery of Our Lady vouchsafed to him—as is ever the case with all spiritual truth—in trust also for each and all who can and will receive it. How luminous, profound, and inexhaustible a crystallization of that Mystery they constitute only begins to be apparent once it is discerned in which of its diverse meanings the word "canon" is to be understood, namely its *musical* signification.

In order to penetrate as deeply as may be the radiant transparency and simplicity of this Mystery of Mary as the canon of Jesus, it is not sufficient merely to know in a general way that a canon is "a species of musical composition". It is essential that on this much more, at least, we must be absolutely clear: that it is "a composition in two or more voice parts, employing *imitation* in its strictest form. The melody of the leading voice, at a few beats from its beginning, is taken up by another voice and imitated precisely throughout its extent. The canon either winds up with a *coda* (tail-piece), or, as each voice finishes, commences anew, in this latter case forming a perpetual fugue or round"; and that *imitation* is "the repetition of essentially the same theme, phrase, or motive, on different degrees of pitch, in a different key, by one or more of the other voice parts, or with some modification of rhythm or intervals. Imitation is *strict* when the original theme or phrase (the antecedent) and its

[1] This article will appear in due course as part of a book bearing the title *Receive the Joyfulness of Your Glory*, to be published by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton.

repeated form (the consequent) are identical in intervals and note values ".

Seeing that the Mysteries of Jesus are to be reproduced in each and all his members, there is nothing surprising in the fact that they should be most perfectly and completely reproduced in her who, simply by virtue of being—and freely consenting to be—his God-chosen Mother, stood and stands to him in a humanly unique love-relationship in time and for all eternity. It would be surprising indeed, if not incredible, were it otherwise. " The Mysteries of Jesus ", as Abbot Marmion so truly discerned, " have this characteristic that they are ours as much as his ". In unique degree his Mysteries were and are hers because hers was an uniquely unreserved response to his unceasing invitation to " Receive the joyfulness of your glory ". By her " Fiat " at the Annunciation this receiving of the joyfulness of his and her glory was the glory of the Word made flesh (the glory as of the only begotten of the Father) full of grace and truth, and " the Virgin's womb " thus became " the holy Treasury of the glory of God ". But the Orthodox Kontakion for the Feast of the Presentation in the Temple of the Most Holy Mother of God (November 21) wherein, albeit still an infant, she is already proclaimed " the holy Treasury of the glory of God " witnesses to the primarily *ontological* character of the Mystery of her being " the holy Treasury of the glory of God " and that in relation not merely to Jesus, of whom it is said " in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily " (Col. ii, 9), but in relation also to that Godhead Itself and to each of the Three Persons of the Blessed and Undivided Trinity.

Since " the Mysteries of Jesus have this characteristic that they are ours as much as his ", the Mysteries of Mary, as canon of Jesus, must likewise have this characteristic of being ours as much as hers—and so indeed they have. She is the canon of Jesus for our sakes as well as his. Not only did she herself close with his "All that I have is thine " by receiving from him the joyfulness of his and her glory, but she in turn, as canon of Jesus, wordlessly declares to us, as he to her, this "All that I have is thine ", in order that individually and corporately we too may in

our turn become ever more truly the canon of Jesus. The interior silence of "the King's daughter all-glorious within" is the canon of the ineffable silence of Jesus, "the silence of eternity interpreted by love", or as St. John of the Cross expresses it: "The Father has spoken a word, it is his Word, and it is his Son: he spoke it eternally and in eternal silence, and it is in silence the soul hears it". Her silence is all compact of love, and is her supreme ministry toward us as it is her supreme worship toward God. Not only is it the intrinsic guarantee that never will she "come between" us and her Son, or between us and the Father or the Holy Spirit, but it is moreover a ceaselessly *unitive* and self-effacing energizing on our behalf—to still us little by little to such *silence de moi* as shall enable Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to indwell the soul and make it progressively one with its Lord and God and so with all creation.

Centuries ago St. Sophronius asked of Our Lady: "Who shall worthily set forth thy glory? Who shall make bold to say what thou art? Who will hold himself able to tell of all thy splendour?" Obviously, the answer is: no one can. Yet all down the ages countless Roman Catholics and Orthodox have been unable to refrain from the attempt—and what glorious attempts many of them have been. Even though at times their teaching on this or that Mystery of Our Lady's life has differed—or seemed to differ—sharply, to Roman Catholics and Orthodox alike devotion to Our Lady may be said to have come naturally, and likewise a profound perception of her essential role in the "great Mystery . . . concerning Christ and the Church".

But, with notable exceptions, this—largely owing to ignorance, misunderstanding and prejudice—has not been and still is not so for all too many other Christians, Anglicans included. These regard as fatal—and rightly so—any stopping short *in* Our Lady as an end in herself (a stopping short which in point of fact, however, any real knowledge of Catholic or Orthodox devotion to her shows to be equally precluded in both by more than ample safeguards). What is not so generally recognized—and urgently needs to be—is that it is scarcely if at all less fatal to stop short *of* Our Lady for the simple reason that it is clean contrary to the all-embracing Will of God and his divine economy of unity.

Whilst to so many Christians, whether on corporate ecclesiastical grounds, or individual psychological grounds, or both, it comes natural to accept, venerate, and love Our Lady, there are many others also for whom, likewise on corporate ecclesiastical or individual psychological grounds, it comes no less natural to ignore or positively reject her. Such rejection may take the form of wilful resistance to her or—perhaps more hurtful still—the form of indifference, the refusal to take her in any way seriously, let alone courteously or lovingly. For such the loss is incomparably more theirs than hers, though they in their lovelessness be as insensible to this as she in love is aware of it.

All are free to accept, reject, or ignore Our Lady—just as all are free to accept, reject or ignore her Son. But sooner or later in regard to Mother as well as Son a definitive decision as to acceptance or rejection must be made. There is no possibility of permanent mid-way alternative.

Even if any finds himself or herself wishing to reject or ignore Our Lady, that does not and cannot alter the fact that *whether we like it or not she is our Mother,* because in our Lord's giving of her to St. John at the cross *as Mother,* she was likewise given *as such* to each and all of us individually and corporately for time and eternity. We have no choice as regards the fact itself, only as to how we will react to it. "When Jesus . . . saw his Mother, and the disciple standing by, whom he loved, he saith unto his Mother, Woman, behold thy son! Then saith he to the disciple, Behold thy Mother! And from that hour the disciple took her unto his own home" (John xix, 26f). Happy are we if when we hear—in that hour and way of his own choosing—his "My Mother and your Mother", we do likewise. Even though at first it may needs be done solely out of love and obedience towards himself, and as yet without any sensible desire for joy in her, subsequently he and she will not fail to vouchsafe such a joy, and one profound in proportion to its long tarrying.

The Mystery of Mary as canon of Jesus is inexhaustible because he and his mysteries are inexhaustible. Any verbal attempt to penetrate—let alone plumb—so inexhaustible a Mystery must inevitably necessitate rigorous selection and much calculated omission. Such high lights as are now chosen are, therefore,

chosen with definite intent, and not from any lack of recognition of the existence and importance of others fully as great or greater, repeatedly treated of both devotionally and dogmatically from the Gospels to the present day, which it is here impossible even to mention. Omissions must include—and this likewise of set purpose—any attempt to enter into discussion of age-long controversies, whether of east or west, where such underlie the high lights chosen. This omission is due not only to lack of theological and historical competence to do so, but even more to the desire and sense of urgent need—following upon years of intensive study of differences in, as well as between, both eastern and western teaching on Our Lady and that which underlies it or stems from it—for some attempt at approach from a fresh angle which might possibly point beyond seeming controversial deadlocks towards a synthesis of which all in east and west have equal need. The deliberately chosen starting-point for such a venture is *the sinlessness of Our Lady.*

Why, it will almost inevitably be asked, choose what has been and still is—apart from Roman Catholics and Orthodox who alike accept the fact that Our Lady committed no sin—a stumbling-block for so many? Precisely for *this very reason* and because not until it ceases to be such can there be that plenary obedience to and fulfilment of that saving command to " Receive the joyfulness of your glory " which is not only God's Will for us in time and for eternity, but also the imperative and overruling necessity for all humanity in our historic present vertiginously balanced upon the razor-edge of willed choice between that glory and an abomination of desolation which with ever-quickening *tempo* progressively admits of no intermediate alternative. To those for whom Our Lady's sinlessness is a stumbling-block or seems at best a remote academic issue of scant import, it must seem incredible that it should be so inextricably, practically and demandingly related to ourselves now—as to man in every historic crisis down the ages. Yet so in actual fact it is, and not until this Mystery of her Sinlessness is opened up to us by the Holy Spirit can we truly glimpse " the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ " and begin realistically to understand that to which we individually and corporately are called in him.

Our Lady's sinlessness may come as a stumbling-block either to the imagination or to the will. There are those who *cannot* believe in it; and there are those who do not *want* to believe in it.

Sin begets in us all in varying degrees the tendency to take for granted the inevitability of sin. Imagination boggles at the bare thought of any purely human creature, such as we know Our Lady to have been, having passed one day, let alone a life-time, without a single sin of commission or omission. Experience and reason would seem to conspire with imagination to prove it a sheer *impossibility*. Oft-repeated lack of correspondence with grace blinds us to its real nature and power, and renders us incapable of imagining all it would be to be "full of grace". But once we realize that if—as would certainly seem must be the case—it is by permission and enablement of the Spirit of truth that myriads down the ages have hailed Our Lady as "full of grace"[2]

[2] Although Catholic tradition, after the manner of the Angelic Salutation (Lk. i, 28), hails Our Lady as "full of grace", "the much discussed κεχαριτωμένη", as Hastings Dictionary calls it, has no component meaning "full". A.V. and R.V. translate it "highly favoured". R.V. mg. "endued with grace" brings out the meaning more fully. The Vulgate translates it *gratia plena;* and Douai Version "full of grace", as does the R.C. Westminster version from the Greek. But the latter adds this note: "In the context 'full of grace' seems the most apt and felicitous translation—though somewhat free—even as it is the earliest English reading (Tyndale, Coverdale, Cranmer) of κεχαριτωμένη lit. 'endued with grace' . . . or 'highly favoured' (χάρις, grace, favour)". Since it is thus apparent that a *literal* translation of the Greek word used by St. Luke will not take the weight of "*full of* grace", we cannot but wonder why *gratia plena,* full of grace, rather than a literal translation of κεχαριτωμένη should have been permitted by the Holy Spirit to become the Church's traditional form of salutation to Our Lady. Surely it cannot have been by accident or mistake. May it, perhaps, have been that since any account of the Annunciation must in the last resort have come from Our Lady herself, the κεχαριτωμένη used by St. Luke is a direct echo of *her own humility in interpreting the angelic salutation,* as "highly favoured", "endued with grace", which it is open to any soul to be in lesser degrees and ways; whereas the Holy Spirit has been desirous not only to exalt her who abased herself, but also to lead the Church into the knowledge that he intends her to be hailed as "full of grace" in a unique sense seen to be incompatible with sin because such in actual fact she was?

then at least her sinlessness can no longer appear beyond the bounds of imagination, reason, or possibility, but is free to shine forth as *fact* seeing that, since grace and sin must always mutually displace one another, had there ever been any sin in her she could not always have been *full* of grace and nothing but grace.

It is possible so passionately to appreciate the wonder of our Lord's sinlessness as to become quite literally jealous for it, and in defence of its uniqueness fiercely to resent and reject the possibility of Our Lady's having been sinless, in the sincere belief that any achievement of perfect sinlessness on her part, or that of anyone else, must of necessity detract from—if not positively dispel—the uniqueness of his. Yet what grievous confusion is here, and how far-reaching the distortions to which it gives rise.

The *qualitative* uniqueness of our Lord's sinlessness needs no defence. His sinlessness is an ontological *absolute*. It abides for ever, and none can add to or detract from it. But this sinlessness is not *quantitatively* unique. It does not intrinsically preclude the sinlessness of any and every other soul as destructive of its own essential uniqueness. Nothing could, in point of fact, be more clean contrary to our Lord's own desire than for us to try and appropriate human sinlessness *exclusively* to himself alone in his Sacred Humanity. This would be to dishonour rather than to honour him, since it would be virtually to isolate him in individualism; and isolationist individualism is diametrically opposed to his whole mission, his essential *unitive* life, and would be the violation of his prayer *in toto*.

Our Lord in his High-Priestly prayer specifically prayed that all whom the Father had given him might "behold" his glory (John xvii, 24). This beholding of his glory, as the original makes abundantly clear, was not to be any merely external beholding from without, but the beholding by a unitive *partaking* from within. Whilst still on earth we can never know all that was and is comprehended in this prayer of his for us to partake of his glory; but of this much we can be certain, however much more it may comprise, it comprises not less than a definitive demand for us to be partakers of his sinlessness, to be sinless even as he is sinless of whom it could never once be said that he had "sinned and come short of the glory of God" (Rom. iii, 23).

To be sinless even as he is sinless—such words fall startlingly, shockingly upon us, sin-hardened as we are. Yet they are not more shocking than his own categoric command, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matt. v, 48)—the all-glorious Father in whose glory Christ the Only-Begotten Son *with the Holy Ghost* is most high.

Thus did our Lord pray for souls to partake of his own sinlessness, as of all else of his—"All that I have is thine"—and we know, as he himself knew and let it be recorded for us, that his prayer is always heard of his Father. All his prayer cometh from God and goeth unto God, in other words, is creatively and redemptively initiated and fulfilled by the Pure Act of God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Seen thus, Our Lady's sinlessness shines forth as a fulfilment of this prayer, which could not go unheard, and as the creaturely first-fruits, as it were, which pledged a Christ-redeemed humanity ultimately entering into his sinlessness as its own. Her sinlessness, far from detracting in any way from his was, as it were, its crown, and the revelation and proof of its "moral creativeness". Yet just as there are lesser and greater stars, each perfect in its own measure, so *perfect* sinlessness in Our Lady still leaves room for the necessary *transcendency* of our Lord's qualitatively unique sinlessness.

It goes without saying that absence of sin is a *sine qua non* for sinlessness. But sinlessness is something much more dynamic than any mere absence of sin. It is, to say the least, the positive achievement of holiness—and that not simply in face of earthly temptation, but in terms of *never missing love's mark.* This rules out sinlessness as beginning only with incarnation, since love can "miss the mark" even in heaven as did Lucifer, who loved God not purely in and for himself but with a covetous and uncreaturely would-be possessiveness of his attributes apart from himself.

Our Lord's sinlessness, therefore, his achieving of Love's mark, did not begin with his Incarnation, but is as eternal and "before time" as his whole self, prayer and Being. Hence this *ontological* sinlessness of his did not have to *wait* until his Incarnation and the moral achievement of his Sacred Humanity, in order to prevail for Our Lady (and for all souls living before his incar-

nate entry into time). His sinlessness has been "from the beginning", i.e. simultaneous and co-eternal with his begetting by the Father.

It is Our Lady herself who is—and who in the *Magnificat* has expressly given—the blessed and absolute safeguard against our getting her sinlessness out of true perspective in relation to that of her Son. Never has there been so humble and profound a "There but for the grace of God go I", at sight or thought of any sinner, as Our Lady's *Magnificat,* with its joyful and thankful recognition of and insistence upon her nothingness apart from God and the positive *need*—and fact—of her *redemption* from sin. In it she lays no claim to an achieved sinlessness of her own. All her creaturely boast and exaltation is solely in "God my Saviour" to whose grace alone she knows with every fibre of her being she owes that being's *total* redemption from sin in its *entirety.* To be brought to understand, in so far as God can and will enable us to do so, just what is involved in such "*total* redemption from sin in its *entirety*", to understand it in such a way as to have begotten in us individually and corporately the true *desire* unreservedly to *ask* and implore it of God for ourselves likewise, at whatever cost it takes to receive it from him, is now and always foremost among all the burning needs and urgencies of a fallen—and therefore necessarily chaotic and bedevilled—world.

For centuries the majority of theologians have been accustomed to treat of sin for the most part *analytically,* rather than as an essentially indivisible whole. Indeed for practical purposes it was found both doctrinally and morally convenient, if not inevitable, to treat of it under the long-since familiar terms and accepted heads of original and actual sin, actual sin with its subdivisions of mortal and venial sin — original sin being defined as "that guilt and stain of sin which we inherit from Adam"; actual sin as that which we ourselves commit; mortal sin as grievous offence against God which "kills the soul and deserves hell", and venial sin as "lesser and more easily pardoned" offence which displeases God without killing the soul although all too often liable to lead on to mortal sin.

Doubtless such definitions are necessary, and true as far as they go. But there is also a very real sense in which it is *artificial* to try and *departmentalize* sin, whether it be in an attempt to isolate original from actual sin, or to draw too hard and fast a line between mortal and venial sin—a line which, in the last resort, probably God alone can truly draw, since what might be "mortal" *in* and *for* one soul might, in his eyes, be "venial" in another and *vice versa,* according to the exhaustive knowledge which he alone possesses of that soul's total circumstances in regard both to graces vouchsafed, awareness of divine demands made upon it, and also to human handicaps in heredity and environment.

The more sin is analytically split up the more its essence is obscured. The more possible it is to see sin in one "simple regard", the truer, and profounder, will be our understanding of it, since the truth of a thing, be it what it may, is always so much more all-embracing and penetrating than the analytical juxtaposition—or even sum—of its component parts. Thus over rigid differentiation between one and another category of sin is bound to mean loss rather than gain in understanding of sin itself, especially if it should happen so to stress the *distinctions* between these categories as to make them appear different *in essence.*

Needful as it may be, and is, to recognize distinctions within sin, and the virtually clear-cut categories which it comprises, it is equally if not more needful to recognize the *indivisibleness* of sin, sin as "a lump", a totality, no part of which can, as it were, be qualitatively or quantitatively pigeon-holed apart from the rest, as though intrinsically different from the rest, since *sin is in essence all of a piece.*

Sin, to be seen for what it really is, must be measured *not in terms of itself*—by analytical comparison between this and that kind of sin, or between this and that degree of sin—but *only in relation to Glory.* To view sin in this way is not to obliterate the rightful distinction between original and actual sin, nor that between mortal and venial sin so as to run any risk of minimizing deadly sin or rating it on a par with peccadilloes. It is, on the contrary, to grasp with a quite new profundity the interconnectedness of *all* sin, so that the so-called "least" sin is recognized

to be part of—and contributory to—total sin, and total sin to be behind each "least" sin.

Just as all too many Christians use the term "glory" as a *word* without having sufficiently tried to plumb it as a *Mystery,* so all too many use the term "original sin" rather as a technical convention than with any *precise* notion of what they mean by it. For some, it is merely a convenient and comfortable device for shelving responsibility for personal sin. For others, it is the (perhaps unconscious) acceptance of *fallen* human nature as the *norm* instead of as *abnormal*: a departure from the norm in which God created it in his own image.

To say *merely* that "Original sin is that guilt and stain of sin which we inherit from Adam who was the origin and head of all mankind", true though it may be, is to take a very legalistic, and indeed it may be said a *secondary* and *negative* attitude towards it. This raises more momentous issues than might at first appear, for the simple reason that the fundamental crux in our understanding of sin lies in whether we conceive of it for the most part negatively (i.e. superficially) as wrong-doing or positively (i.e. radically) as "coming short of the glory of God".

Although ultimately and in essence the negative and positive in sin coincide, our finite minds can perhaps seldom if ever keep both negative and positive aspects equally and simultaneously in the foreground, and our whole reaction to and aim in life will in fact be radically coloured if not determined by which emphasis, negative or positive, is habitually uppermost and why. Neither emphasis may be wholly nor permanently ignored if ever union with God is to be attained. It is essential to have what may be called a *deterrent* awareness: an awareness that serves to deter us from what must not be done or from what must not be left undone. Yet such awareness of means to an end is not of itself enough and may even become pernicious if, in translating it into action, we allow the means to become self-tainted or an end in themselves. It is incomparably more essential to have what may be called an *incentive* awareness: awareness of the one only goal deservedly and unswervingly to be sought for its own sake. This can never be less nor more than *the glory of God* to be sought at

all times and in all places simply *because he is what he is* and *we are what we are*—creatures doubly his: his by divine right from the side of the Creator, and his by existential necessity from the side of our utter human dependence upon him and creaturely nothingness apart from him. Hence it becomes apparent that to conceive of sin negatively is to conceive of it *ethically,* whereas to conceive of it positively is to conceive of it *ontologically.*

To say that it is a negative conception of sin to reduce it to a merely ethical character is no more than the truth. But it cannot sufficiently be stressed that this is not to belittle actual sins of commission or omission. The ethical character of sin is, alas, only too real as far as it goes, and it can and does range through every gradation of venial and mortal sin from least to greatest. Yet even so this—boundless as it is—is far from all, because each and every sin of commission is only a particularization, or translation into doing or not doing, of something which is far more profound, something ontological.

Herein lies the reason why so many penitents, despite knowing they have made as honest, concrete and complete a sacramental confession of their sins as it is in their power to do, nevertheless feel they are nowhere near reaching rock-bottom and never can be except by the soul's presentation of itself to our Lord as High Priest with a nude: " My confession is me: *I* am my confession ". So transparent an *ontological* confession as this would of necessity include all that stems from it ethically. But it would also go far beyond the merely ethical to beget far profounder penitence: penitence for the *substance* and totality of sin in one's very being and not merely for its sporadic and episodic translation into ethical sins of commission or omission. Thus what one *is,* rather than what one *does* or *fails to do,* would become the core of one's contrition—and that essentially *because of what one is not* (i.e. *no longer intact in the image of God*) *which is prevented by what one is.*

There is in the Bible so obvious—and with moral theologians so habitual—an equation of original sin with *ethical* disobedience and concupiscence that it has, for many Christians, obscured the further Biblically attested fact that *ethical* disobedience and con-

cupiscence *as such,* far from being the entire sum and substance of original sin, is but the offshoot and translation into action of an *ontological* disobedience and concupiscence. Indeed it is this fundamental and all-inclusive ontological disobedience and concupiscence of the creature carried to its furthest possible Godward extremity that constitutes the essence of original sin which is none other than the creaturely desire and attempt *to be as God.*

How clean contrary to the mind of Christ, and the humility of her whose *silence de moi* magnifies the Lord in perpetuity, is the crazy self-inflation of the creature desirous to appropriate to itself the life and attributes of God in order itself to *be* its own all-sufficing source and goal of all-glory, bliss, and knowledge. In any such attempt to seize all-glory for itself, the creature not only defeats its own ends—since any attempt to appropriate that totality of Divine Glory, which God never will nor can make over to another simply because he is the ultimate in *sacrificial* Love, is intrinsically foredoomed to failure—but it loses its own glory as well, that measure of "the glory of God" which God wills lastingly to communicate to it *as creature made in his own image.* Original sin is, therefore, tantamount to man's trying to deify himself independently of God rather than letting himself be deified by God through union with him consonant with his creatureliness; and its inevitable outcome is forfeiture of that sanctifying grace, which is the supernatural life of the soul—since precisely in proportion as man overreaches himself does he fall beneath his true self as made in the image of God and predestined by him "to an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven" for him.

It would be idle to deny that there is an intrinsic importance attaching to the *temporal* element in original sin. But because there is such an objective obviousness about the first committed sin of the first man, there has been an all too common tendency superficially to over-emphasize this aspect of original sin, as though its *firstness in time* and the fact that Adam *did* wrong constituted its *main* significance. This is unfortunate since all over-emphasis upon any given truth, however important, of necessity leads to under-emphasis or failure in explicitation of a

complementary truth which may be not less—and perhaps even more—important.

Undue preoccupation with Adam's sin of commission obscures the truth that although it was this concrete act of Adamic disobedience which actually forfeited sanctifying grace and occasioned the setting in motion of the whole process of that death, spiritual, moral, and physical, which is the wages of sin, yet nevertheless this ethical act of disobedience was of small moment compared to the incomparably greater and radical ontological sin of his trying to *be* that which he was not and ceasing to be that which he was created to be, and was indeed merely the outcome and intended furtherance of his would-be self-deification.

The Adamic disobedience was simply and solely the inevitable ethical fruit of Adam's ontological concupiscence to be *as God,* and it is this ontological concupiscence to be as God which he, as origin and head of the human race, has *with one single exception* tranmitted to each and every one of its members to all time. Any and every form of human disobedience to the Will of God, from least to greatest, be it individual or collective, is neither more nor less than the ethical fruit of this inherited ontological concupiscence. Our helpless enslavement to it can only be—and is—countered by baptism. But such a fire in each and all of us is this basic ontological concupiscence to be as God—even though in our varying ignorances of him we recognize it not for what it is and let it drive us in pursuit of a whole gamut of false gods from speed and noise to power in every shape and form, physical, material, national or racial—that each and every infidelity to baptismal vows rekindles this fire and feeds its flame to an ever-increasing conflagration.

Thus at the heart of everything we are finally confronted with the inexorable fact that absolute freedom from that ontological concupiscence to be as God which constitutes the essence of original sin is categorically indispensable for perfect sinlessness and total obedience to the Will of God in its entirety. The sublime integrity of this freedom in our Lord Very God and perfect Man—as St. Paul so transparently discerned and proclaimed to

the Philippians (ii, 5ff)—was carried, beyond all that we could ever humanly have dreamed, to such an abyss of humility as cannot but kindle to ecstasy those admitted even to an infinitesimal glimpse of it. How complete a reversal of—and reparation for—the ontological concupiscence of the creature to be as God it was shines forth perhaps most luminously of all in Monsignor Knox's translation of this ineffable Pauline "shewing" of the mind of Christ: "Yours is to be the same mind which Christ Jesus showed. His nature is, from the first, divine, and yet he did not see, in the rank of Godhead a prize to be coveted; he dispossessed himself, and took the nature of a slave, fashioned in the likeness of men . . . and then he lowered his own dignity, accepted an obedience which brought him to death, death on a cross". And here in the indispensableness for sinlessness of his freedom from ontological concupiscence to be as God, the Mystery of Mary, the bondslave of the Lord, Mary the Mother of Jesus, Mary the canon of Jesus, passes into the Mystery of the Immaculate Conception.

The Mystery of the Immaculate Conception has been, and alas still is, the subject of much theological controversy. This of itself, however, provides no justification whatsoever for unthinking dismissal of the Mystery as untrue, or if not untrue at least of insufficient significance to constitute any serious spiritual, mental or moral claim upon us. Rather it indicates the exact reverse, for the simple reason that it is the common—and in a fallen world inevitable—fate of every profound and life-giving spiritual mystery, such for instance as the Bible, the Church, the Sacraments, and the Ministry, to become the subject of human controversy precisely in proportion both to its intrinsic greatness and its importance within the divine plan for the redemption of all creation. However uncongenial, distressing or perplexing may be the fruit of such controversy, its existence as such need not—and ought not to—constitute a stumbling-block for us. The Holy Spirit indeed guides into all truth as promised by Christ, but only slowly, gropingly and blunderingly, and at times partially and with apparently intellectually irreconcilable contradictions, do or can sinners gradually follow him, and progressively appro-

priate—let alone re-echo—the timeless truths into which he leads the Church of God. Thus, not the existence of past or present controversy about the Immaculate Conception, but rather the *absence* of any such controversy from start to finish would of necessity render it suspect, since only irrelevant superficialities can wholly escape the burning human controversy that must of necessity sooner or later emerge and assail in connexion with every deep truth of God, man, and creation as it confronts us with impacts and issues in which everything is at stake and in which, knowingly or unknowingly, our whole being, will, and way of life or death, are challenged.

Much of the past and present controversy which centres around the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady is due to misunderstanding and ignorance as to the real nature of this Mystery —but not all. Much has been due also to genuinely thoughtful and prayerful difference of opinion. This could hardly have been otherwise in view of the supernatural profundity and uniqueness of the Mystery. No individual thought and prayer however genuine can ever preclude honest and *legitimate* differences over any and every matter unless it is—or becomes—a bounden article of faith.

It is common knowledge that even in the Church of Rome, despite a very long and widespread *tradition* of belief in the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, there were some—eminent theologians and saints not excluded—who opposed it in bygone centuries before it became binding upon all Christians belonging to the Roman obedience on December 8, 1854, with its proclamation as dogma by Pope Pius IX, in the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* wherein he defined that "the doctrine which declares that the most Blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instant of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the human race, was exempt from all stain of original sin, is a doctrine revealed by God, and therefore must be believed firmly and constantly by all the faithful".

It is likewise common knowledge that the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady is not merely not a defined dogma in the

Orthodox Church, but that both Greek and Russian Orthodox are *officially* opposed to belief in this dogma. But it is almost certainly not so generally realized that the official stand *against* belief in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception hardened up appreciably after its papal proclamation in 1854, and that prior to that *Orthodox* as well as Roman opinion in regard to it had been divided—so much so that a present-day Orthodox writer, after detailed research, finds throughout the history of Orthodox theology the proved existence of two continuous lines of eminent Orthodox theologians, one explicitly denying but the other *teaching* the Immaculate Conception. It is good—and needful—that Anglicans and Protestants should realize and take this into account in a serious attempt under God to penetrate on their own account to the truth (or otherwise) of this Mystery. It is still more imperative that all should realize that in view of these Orthodox facts being as they are, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception *need not be*—let alone remain for ever—a fundamental and irreconcilable factor of disunion between Christians of the West and East. On the contrary, both have immediate and permanent need of this doctrine as a divinely-intended quickening and unifying principle of all life both in the Church and in the world.

Some have argued against the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady on the ground that it would take from her being one of ourselves. But this is an entirely fallacious argument since carried to its logical conclusion it would apply similarly to our Lord and the Virgin Birth, as though that constituted a breaking of his identification with the human race in its entirety—whereas that identification is absolute. Indeed it is always sin, and not sinlessness, that breaks identification since identification is love's mark, and perfect love alone can perfectly achieve it. The Immaculate Conception made Our Lady substantially one with us, sinners though we be, as no fallen creature ever has been or could be. Indeed it made her more truly one with us—our true self that is—than we are one with ourselves interiorly or exteriorly with one another.

Others have argued against the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady on the ground that in order to share with all other human beings their common responsibility for the fall, she needs must have been born under the law of original sin. This argument is likewise fallacious, and due to incomplete understanding of what really is meant by her sharing " responsibility for the fall ". If by this " responsibility for the fall " is meant personal *guilt* either in regard to its occurrence or continuance, then most literally by the grace of God it is simply untrue that she ever has had any share in it whatsoever. But just as our Lord was " without sin ", yet the one and only one capable of being fully responsible, fully answerable for the sin of the world by being the only one completely and uniquely empowered to take it away, so in her lesser measure was Mary the canon of Jesus, Mary as Mother of God, Mother of the Lamb that taketh away the sin of the world, what one might call *redemptively* (although not guiltily) responsible for the fall—responsible not for its initiation or perpetuation, but responsible toward God, man and the cosmos (as, in our God-predestined varying measure, we each and all of us are or ought to be) for obtaining from him its annulment. This responsibility she freely and absolutely discharged—and continues to discharge—by perfect correspondence with grace in her divinely predestined vocation as Mother of God our Saviour. With her Son she has shared to the uttermost in the *consequences* —but not the *causes*—of the fall and its perpetuation. Her " responsibility " for it—like that of her Son—begins, continues and ends with its penitential and sacrificial annulment to the Glory of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit for all eternity, and the oneing in him according to his Will of all his creatures.

There can be—and is—no intrinsic impossibility about the Immaculate Conception since nothing in the way of grace is impossible with God. The longer and more profoundly Our Lady's unique vocation as Mother of the Incarnate Lord and of his Mystical Body is prayer-pondered, the more transparently the singular grace and privilege of God in preserving her, in the first instant of her conception, exempt from all stain of original sin, would seem to emerge not merely as spiritually, morally and

physically "fitting", but also as ontologically and ethically *necessary* for the sake of the Blessed Trinity of whose Glory she was predestined to be the Holy Treasury, for the sake of the Word made flesh, for her own sake in a vocation whose aweing demandingness was second only to that of her Son, and not less for all our sakes. But for this singular grace wrought out for her by God, she too like every other living soul from the fall to the end of time would have inherited that stain of original sin which is the breach—and bequeathal of forfeiture—of ontological *intactness* in that Triune All-Glory of Love wholly given, wholly received, wholly given again in which, by which, and for which God first created man in his own image.

The whole initiative of this ontological preservative redemption of Our Lady lay with God, and within his divine economy of the "restitution of all things". It was *conferred* upon her by God, through no doing or merit of her own, and was on her part a purely *passive* receiving of his and her glory. But none the less for that it was a fullness of grace in no way violating her free-will, in no way endowing her with an automatic or effortless sinlessness, in no way diminishing her life-long unceasing need to correspond with grace from the very moment in which awakening childhood conscience first presented to her will the necessity of choice between obedience and disobedience.

It is singularly unfortunate that theological reference to "the *preventative redemption*" of Our Lady has for many unaware of the exact technical usage of "preventative" evoked an idea of "prevention" in the sense of "rendering impossible", and hence given rise to a notion of Our Lady's sinlessness as an *externally imposed inability to sin* consequently without moral worth or achievement from her side—than which nothing could be farther from the truth. So false a notion misses the whole essence of Our Lady's sinlessness as being a mutually perfect and complete *συνέργια* —joint-work—between God and herself. It misses the unremitting day to day necessity for her progressive willed co-operation with grace in inexorable choices between magnifying the Lord by self-oblivion or dethroning him by self-preoccupa-

tion, between an *active* as well as passive receiving of the joyfulness of her glory through creaturely embrace of her nothingness apart from God or the forfeiture of All-Glory by would-be self-exaltation to attain and possess it as her own. In short, any such false notion of mechanical sinlessness misses in its entirety the Mystery of *the Immaculate Heart* of Our Lady whose ontological humility and ethical obedience was the canon of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

Still more unfortunately, two other terms correctly used in connexion with the redemption of Our Lady—"prevenient grace" and "the foreseen merits of her Son"—have been similarly misunderstood by not a few to imply a redemption somehow mysteriously wrought out for her *in advance* and therefore wrought out *independently of herself*. Such misunderstanding misses the fact that notwithstanding its historic occurrence *in time* the atoning life and death of Jesus Christ, Very God and perfect Man, was also and essentially a *timeless* redemptive Mystery—that of "the lamb slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. xiii, 8). As such, it *operates retroactively* for all souls back to the first moment of time and *prospectively* for all souls to the last moment of time; and each and every soul, Our Lady included, *irrespective of his or her historical before or after* this atoning life and death of Christ—both which "before" and "after" are one eternal simultaneity—can and must by *faith* and *co-operation with grace* appropriate this timeless redemption wrought out by him for the soul, and applied and proffered to it, in time. This Our Lady did to perfection in *the flawless obedience made ontologically possible, but not ethically inevitable*, by God's freeing her from all stain of original sin in the first instant of her conception.[3]

[3] Here, thanks to the generous permission of Dr. E. L. Mascall of Christ Church, Oxford, it is possible to quote from a letter in which he expresses himself as "particularly impressed by stress on sin as *ontological* and not merely *ethical* in character", his profound and superbly formulated insight that this "stress on sin as *ontological* and not merely *ethical* in character . . . also shows the organic connexion between the Immaculate Conception and Our Lady's obedience, the former being to the latter as the ontological to the ethical, and the ethical arising from the ontological".

So glorious and thankworthy is it, far more than the majority of us ever take sufficient time or thought to ponder, that amid a fallen race even one creature should by a singular grace and privilege of God be preserved exempt from all stain of original sin, that it is small wonder that the emphasis in teaching on the Immaculate Conception should have been so predominantly, if not exclusively, upon what may—without in any way belittling it—be termed its *negative* side: namely this freedom from taint of original sin. But such an emphasis tends to obscure, and for many does obscure, the *positive*—hence still more ineffable—side of the Mystery. A Roman Catholic writer has said: "I agree we should regard the Immaculate Conception positively. Simply as freedom from original sin it means no more than that Our Lady's soul was always in the state of grace yours and mine received at our Baptism. And that *can't* be its entire significance".

Where, it will be asked, are we to look for this positive, this entire significance of the Mystery of the Immaculate Conception? To this there can, surely, be but one reply—there where God himself appointed; the now world-famous Lourdes, where as a very young lady, visibly of flesh and blood, clad in snow-white *bridal* array, save for the addition of a girdle of wondrous blue, and golden roses on each bare foot, Our Lady, on a number of occasions between February 11 and July 16, 1858, appeared and spoke to a poor peasant girl devoid of human lore. To this girl, Bernadette, Our Lady not only communicated her wishes and commands, amongst the most urgent of which were "*Penitence*" and "*Pray for the sick world*"; but also, in response to Bernadette's eventual wordless *asking for her name*, that explicit avowal "I am the Immaculate Conception", with regard to whose utterance by "the Lady" nothing and no one could ever subsequently shake Bernadette, despite her subjection to repeated ordeals of interrogation both by ecclesiastical and medical authorities bent on safeguarding objective fact and to that end ruthlessly determined to discover and expose any fraud, wilful or otherwise, if such existed in Bernadette, which—as they were perforce eventually constrained to recognize and admit—it did not.

Some at least of those who have longest and most deeply pondered our Lord's Transfiguration as one of the major Mysteries of his incarnate life must sooner or later have found perplexing Our Lady's apparent exclusion from any share in this Mystery. Granted, there was no need for her to *see* what she already *knew* of her Son by faith. Granted, it is not impossible if God so willed it, that there may have been some unrecorded occasion or occasions upon which Jesus was transfigured before *her* eyes alone. Be that as it may, there remains an intuitive sense that she must in some profound way be linked with our Lord's Transfiguration on the Mount, and her exclusion from share in that Mystery be only in seeming and not in fact. And so indeed it is.

True, she was not present when Jesus was transfigured before Peter, James, and John: when he, the God-Man, shone forth before them as God in Man *and* Man in God, " the Proper Man ", Man created in the image of God, Man as God meant him to be, as he wills him redeemed and deified to be again. Yet, *as Mary canon of Jesus,* her share in that Mystery was incomparably more intensive and extensive than theirs: her providential appearances at Lourdes being in a very real sense a canon of our Lord's Transfiguration upon the Mount, which Mystery of his, no less than all the rest, he desires to be reproduced individually and corporately in all to whom the Father has sent him as Redeemer.

Our Lady of Lourdes was appointed by God *to be in her own person*—to all who then or ever could and would receive it through Bernadette's " seeing " of her—a " shewing " *of the creature perfect as in the beginning*: perfect *from* the beginning and, never once having deviated from this aboriginal perfection of creation in the image of God, perfect in that end which knows no end. Such a " shewing " could not fail of being a " shewing " of herself " full of grace " in time and for eternity. Yet, as Père Avril stressed in a sermon broadcast from Paris on November 13, 1949, Our Lady's " I am the Immaculate Conception " at Lourdes was not to claim for herself a unique privilege, but rather to affirm that she has *received* all—gratuitously. She is nothing. God is all. She knows it, and glories in it. One can even go further

and say that the Mystery of Our Lady's appearances at Lourdes, with her " I am the Immaculate Conception ", is in truth as much *our* Mystery as hers because appointed by God for our sakes rather than hers, and destined as an ontological " shewing " of *ourselves* no less than of herself as *individual.*

God in his wisdom appointed these Appearances of Our Lady at Lourdes in 1858, just at the very time when humanity stood in direst twofold need to be shown its true origin and end: and the way to spiritual recovery of that which it had lost ontologically and ethically, and in consequence physically as well.

It was *not by chance* that these Appearances virtually coincided with the " scientific " revolution in man's thought of himself as expressed in—and disseminated by—the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species.* However physically and mentally true in regard to *fallen* man, evolutionary theories are neither exhaustive nor the last—let alone primary—word on man's total existence. They are but a partial truth on one phase of that existence. In proportion as any such theories stop short at man's " animal ancestry "—thereby discounting, or even it may be explicitly denying, his high origin and creation in the image of God—they by their " debunking " of man progressively and inevitably lead on at one and the same time to the two extremities of man's " sinking lower than the beasts " (who even in a fallen creation still abide by many of the God-implanted sanctions of their nature) and of that would-be compensatory, but suicidal and homicidal, pride of man, " the clever animal ", who desires and believes nothing in heaven or earth to be beyond the dominion of his " science ". Thus man, as marionette of his own insane and self-contradictory delusions, alternates ever more wretchedly and perilously between *no belief in himself as other than bestial* or *idolatrous belief in himself as god of the material universe;* and tries by way of living " the law of the jungle " to attain an ultimate press-button Utopia of effortless mechanical comfort where everything material shall fall into his lap free alike of charge and labour.

The Appearances of Our Lady of Lourdes were God's *creaturely* " shewing "—as the Transfiguration was his *divine*

"shewing"—to humanity of its origin and destiny alike: the "shewing" of its original coming from God and its ultimate going unto God. Just as the Transfigured Lord reveals "the Proper Man", so Our Lady of Lourdes, canon of Jesus humble above all other in his Incarnation, may be called, and in the Mystery of her "I am the Immaculate Conception" truly is, the *Proper Creature,* who is more—and not less—creaturely than the rest of us, who unlike her, try in so many ways to repudiate our creatureliness. She is God's "shewing" of humanity both in the aboriginal perfection wherein he created humanity in his own image and in the endless perfection of soul and body whereto—in an eternal "grace succeeding grace", grace perpetually offered by the Bridegroom and as perpetually received by the Bride in mutually overflowing bliss—he predestined it in the marriage of the Lamb and his Wife. She is God's pledge of the perfection to which even now, when the ends of the earth are fallen upon us, he *still predestines it* since his purposes change not even when sinners having dared in the "One Man", "the Proper Man", to kill their God go on to leave no man safe in their ever more wholesale extermination of one another.

The re-iterated "Penitence", "Penitence", of Our Lady to Bernadette was nothing less than the expression of God's will for us sinners though we be—and indeed just *because* we are sinners —to *recover* an intactness in his Image such as she by his grace, and her fidelity to it, never for an instant forfeited.

Penitence does not come naturally to sinners. Even if and when genuinely desirous to repent, we often seem not to know how or where to start, and usually end by concentrating upon our ethical sins of commission or omission so far as we are capable of recognizing them. By amendment of conduct we hope somehow to reach eventual newness of life and being: to progress from the ethical to the ontological. But with Bernadette and Our Lady it was just the reverse.

Bernadette was not initially conscious of being confronted by an unparallelled *ethical* perfection in the Lady and then drawn on through that to recognition of her ontological perfection. Quite the contrary. Though Bernadette herself could not—and rightly

would not even if she could—have analysed it, it was the *ontological* perfection of " the Lady " which from the first " shewing " of the radiant beauty of her entire being, wholly conformed to and mirroring the image of God in which she was created, captivated Bernadette for time and eternity. Never could she sufficiently slake her thirst to gaze and gaze upon this beauty and absorb it into the depths of her own being, but drinking in to the full all that was vouchsafed her during the Lady's Appearances, she came gradually and intuitively so to sense the Lady's mind and correspond with her every wish, spoken or unspoken, that the Lady was enabled to ask and to obtain from her *ethical* obediences in which, at cost of untold humiliation and suffering to Bernadette herself, not only was Bernadette's own life wholly transformed ontologically and ethically, but also quite literally the whole world benefited by a fresh spiritual and corporal outpouring of God's redemptive mercies through her obedience to the Spirit-obedient Mother of the Saviour of the world. To us who all too commonly behave as though we thought we could by ethical conduct alone raise ourselves to the vision of God instead of letting God as he is in himself, after transfiguring us ontologically at baptism develop that transfiguration through the ontological into the ethical offshoots of it, this is of incalculable importance as showing that it is *contemplation* which is the direct way to bed-rock penitence and recovery of both ontological and ethical intactness in the image of God and under him to release of his world-redeeming action.

The " repentance " to which Our Lady of Lourdes called, and calls us now, is far more radical than mere contrition for this or that ethical sin of commission or omission, however grievous, or even for the whole sum of individual and corporate ethical sins. It is to an immediate and progressive *ontological* repentance she calls us: to a change of vision—to such realistic seeing of the Glory of God in himself, and of ourselves created in his image, as shall lead on to total individual and corporate self-abandonment to be brought back to that first glory in which we

were created in him and for him and to enjoy him for ever. To this end she calls us also to the renunciation of all that is not ontologically or ethically in keeping with Glory, i.e. love at its most sacrificial and resplendent, love at its most hidden and self-emptied and hence at its most potent and pervasive.

To-day by the mercy and grace of God it is still open to us —as to-morrow it may not be—to hear and respond to her call, which is in truth but the echo of his own ceaseless invitation and bidding to all to "receive the joyfulness of your glory". Our free and full consent so to do for love of him, and on behalf of all creation, could even now halt us sinners rushing on our doom, and enable him—in the measure of his Will, and of our fidelity to sanctifying grace—to make us both individually and corporately, as members of Christ, canon of Jesus and Holy Treasury of the Triune Glory of God as was Mary his Mother and ours.

THE PALEYAN ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN

By D. W. GUNDRY

THE classical English presentation of the theistic argument from apparent design and purpose in nature to the existence of deity is that of Paley,[1] which appears in his *Natural Theology,* published in 1802. Paley was not, and did not profess to be, original in what he had to say. He was, as it were, summing up the arguments of those who, at the end of the seventeenth and all through the eighteenth century, had seen in the Newtonian world-picture not something antithetic to traditional natural theology, but something corroborative of it. Nor was Paley's famous initial illustration of the watch and the watchmaker at the beginning of his book original: strangely enough it comes from Voltaire. Paley also borrows extensively from much earlier works, particularly John Ray's *The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation,* 1691, William Denham's *Physico-Theology,* 1713, and *The Religious Philosopher,* translated in 1730 out of the Dutch of Nieuwentyt. Paley is the counsel for the defence bringing forth all the evidence he can on behalf of traditional Christian faith, and he does so not in obscure metaphysical abstractions but in a popular manner, calculated to appeal to the intelligent, cultured reader of his day. In so doing he won widespread approval; and his line of argument was further amplified in the famous *Bridgewater Treatises,*[2] published in the thirties of the last century.

[1] William Paley (1743-1805) was successively fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, and Archdeacon of Carlisle. He is remembered in the history of ethics for his theological utilitarianism.

[2] *v.* D. W. Gundry, *The Bridgewater Treatises and their Authors,* in *History,* September, 1946. Contributors to the *Treatises* included Whewell, Bell the surgeon, and Roget of *Thesaurus* fame.

The theistic argument from design was not, of course, new. Even Kant, who was not at all convinced of the validity of the teleological argument for theism, or the physico-theological argument as it was commonly called, admits in his *Critique of Pure Reason* that it " deserves to be named always with reverence. It is the oldest, clearest, and most suited to our common understanding ". Similarly, Dr. Austin Farrer in his *Finite and Infinite*,[3] says of " the classic figure of God as Demiurge, working upon materials; as in the biblical account of the creation of Adam, or in the Paleyan comparison of the watchmaker ", that while " there is no more vulgar or trivial statement of theism " yet " there is no statement of theism which can dispense with this analogy ".

Both Kant's remark and that of Dr. Farrer remind us that the apparent design in nature—its " indication of contrivance ", as Paley called it—is something which has long impressed human beings. The Old Testament is full of instances of the Hebrew conviction that God is Creator and Designer of the world and of its history. A similar conviction underlies much of the most ancient religious literature of the Near East, as, for example, the Assyro-Babylonian epic of the Creation and the Egyptian hymns to Amen-Ra and to the Aten. Moreover, the New Testament, inheriting the Semitic idea of God as the Lord of history, interprets the advent of Christ as happening " in the fulness of the time ", *i.e.*, at the climax of a divinely guided historical process.

The first systematic attempts to present a teleological cosmology, however, were made by the Greeks. The early physicists groped after the idea of a cosmic Intelligence which permeated all things. But it is in Plato that we find the first elaboration of a clearly teleological picture of the world. This is continued in Aristotle, but with a difference. Indeed, Plato and Aristotle seem to have sown the seed for the two main types of teleology, which persist up to our own time: the one an " external " teleology, *i.e.*, a view of purpose as imposed *ab extra*

[3] *op. cit.*, p. 24.

by a Supreme Intelligence; the other an "internal" teleology, *i.e.*, a view of purpose simply as a force inherent in all things. Needless to say, it was the former of these which found approval in Christianity, as in Islam, and which is expounded in a specifically theistic form by the philosophers of the Middle Ages, notably St. Thomas Aquinas.[4] Yet Aquinas's connexion with Aristotle is stronger than that with Plato; but it has to be remembered that he champions a definitely theistic teleology because he is a Christian first and an Aristotelean only second. In other words, the Judaeo-Christian belief in the transcendant Creatorhood of God is basic in the Thomistic natural theology.

Nevertheless, the immanentalist teleology of Aristotle shews some influence in the Fifth Way of Aquinas. Aquinas's teleological argument is not identical with Paley's argument from design. In simple terms the latter says that the world, including the living beings in it, on examination shew signs of marvellous contrivance, which proves the existence of a great Artificer. In other words, Paley's is an *a posteriori* argument. He reasons empirically from the evidences in the world around him, and, in so doing, calls the findings of the natural sciences of his time to his aid, as do the *Bridgewater Treatises* a generation later. The doctrine of final causes, so prominent in Scholasticism, has fallen, not out altogether, but certainly into the background. It is not quite so with Aquinas. In the *Summa*[5] the Fifth Way is inextricably bound up with the four-fold Aristotelean theory of causation, so that final cause is assumed from the outset. In short, Aquinas says that, as all things, even insensate, have a final cause, or purpose, therefore, there must be an originating Intelligence. This is an *a priori* argument, at least as neo-Thomists usually elaborate St. Thomas's Fifth Way. Even so, the difference between the Thomistic and the Paleyan teleology should not be exaggerated. There is no escaping the fact that St. Thomas explicitly states that his argument is *ex gubernatione rerum*; and

[4] Aquinas is indebted in this respect to St. John Damascene, whose *De Fide Orthodoxa* contains a version of the argument from design.
[5] *Summa Theologica, Qu.* II.

there is, after all, not a great deal of difference between *gubernatio* and "contrivance". Indeed, it may be contended that Paley's concept of God as the Great Artificer is the richer, in that he suggests, in his argument from design, a combination of Aquinas's Second and Third Way, the aetological and cosmological arguments, with the Fifth, the teleological, and adds emphatically that this points to a personal deity, because design implies intelligence.

It must be remembered that Aquinas did not live in an age of empirical science: whereas Paley did. This necessarily determined the precise manner in which their argument was stated; but fundamentally it is the same. It is an appeal to common sense. As Marcus Aurelius[6] had put it many centuries before: "Either it is a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together. Can order existing in yourself be compatible with disorder in the All?"

The pros and cons of teleology, as of most of the great problems which have perplexed the human mind throughout history, are well known and well worn. But theists have resolutely held fast, as they must, to the belief that design and purpose are imposed upon the universe by God. The varying twists in the teleological argument for theism are reflexions of the particular way of thinking current at any given period. For the Hebrew sage, as is shewn in the Old Testament, it was sufficient to contemplate the wonders of the heavens, the works of God's fingers, and the strange way in which the history of Israel appeared to have been guided to convince him of an overruling Providence. All this was, no doubt, based on a simple anthropomorphism: what man could do or would wish to do was attributed, quite uncritically, to God to a supreme degree. Nor should we regard this as simply the product of a primitive mind; for, although the Hebrew mind did not consciously sort out the problem, there is something of perennial and profound importance in the question of whether human personality and human activity in any way resemble that of God. When the Hebrew

[6] *Meditations*, IV.

poet declared that man was made " in the image of God ", he was making a profound metaphysical statement; and its implication is not far removed from the Greek idea that there is a universal νοῦς or λόγος pervading all things.

Again, when Aquinas sets forth his particular version of the argument from design, he does so in the setting of the metaphysic of Being and Becoming, baptized into Christian service. For the Schoolmen God was He Who Is, so that the world had no meaning apart from God. This explains why, in the sphere of education, the several branches of knowledge were ordered in a hierarchy, with theology, the queen of sciences, the study of the Being of God, reigning supreme over all.

The Renascence brought into prominence a different picture: we witness the birth and growth of the detached method of observing and measuring of tangible phenomena, which has become modern science. The Aristotelean theory of causation was abandoned, or rather, it was pruned down, so that only the efficient cause, the active agent, was recognized as the one admissible cause of anything. In particular was the notion of final causation abandoned by the natural philosopher as a gratuitous assumption: it was no longer to be assumed that any natural phenomenon necessarily had a purpose or end.

The fact that the new scientific approach to nature, as illustrated by the work of the Renascence experimenters, *e.g.,* Galileo and Kepler, not only worked but also appeared to give a simpler and better explanation of natural phenomena the more strongly recommended the abandonment of final causes in scientific thinking. Our own Francis Bacon, *buccinator novi temporis* as he has been called, expressly recommended this. Not that final causes had no place at all in thought. Teleology was still to be the concern of religion; but not of natural philosophy, where mathematics and not metaphysics was to provide the key to knowledge. It is unnecessary here to enumerate the many factors which brought about this change from the medieval to the modern outlook.[7]

[7] *v.* the relevant section in such standard histories of science as those by Dampier or Singer. E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science,* 2nd ed., London, 1932, gives a succinct account.

This does not mean that the idea of design and purpose was discarded altogether. Rather was it relegated to the sphere of religion. Nearly all the great Renascence natural philosophers believed in a cosmic purpose, but they did so differently from philosophers of the Middle Ages. Dr. E. A. Burtt contrasts the Newtonian teleology with that of the Scholastics. "For the latter, God was the final cause of things just as truly and more significantly than their original founder .... God had no purpose; he was the ultimate object of purpose. In the Newtonian world .... the cosmic order of masses in motion according to law is itself the final good. Man exists to know and applaud it; God exists to tend and preserve it".[8] This is, of course, a rough generalization, a caricature; but it does emphasize the difference between two distinct world-pictures.

The end of the seventeenth, the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries witnessed the formulation of a mechanistic cosmology, which metaphysicians and theologians of the time accepted. They applied themselves to the task of constructing a natural theology consonant with it. Consequently we find that at almost every stage in this period theism is justified on the ground that the marvellous mechanism of the universe implies the existence of a great Master Mind who made and regulates it. Newton himself, contemplating the universe revealed in his system, writes in a letter to the contemporary divine, Bentley: "To compare and adjust all these things together in so great a variety of bodies, argues that cause to be not blind or fortuitous, but very well skilled in mechanics and geometry".[9] This remark is strangely reminiscent of the late Sir James Jeans's description of God as the Supreme Mathematician.

This mechanistic view of Nature was used to formulate the physico-theological argument for the existence of God, wherein every apparent trace of design was seized upon to this end. Paley's *Natural Theology,* so to speak, sums up the several varia-

[8] Burtt, *op. cit.,* pp. 293-294.

[9] Quoted in Burtt, *op. cit.,* p. 286.

tions on the physico-theological theme which had been composed for the century-and-a-half before. It is a remarkable book for more than one reason. One is its long vogue: it was seriously esteemed as a pre-eminent work of theistic apologetic for nearly a century after its publication in 1802, and that despite the tremendous revolution in scientific thought in the 1850's and after. One may in part attribute this popularity to the dignity and lucidity of Paley's writing. Again, the book is remarkable because, despite the fact that it is a defence of the argument from benevolent contrivance in Nature to the existence of God, it was written by Paley in his last and fatal illness, which was accompanied by much pain and discomfort. But, perhaps most noteworthy of all, is the fact that, together with his *Moral and Political Philosophy,* 1785, and his *Evidences of Christianity,* 1794, this work forms a complete theological system. It is doubtful whether any other British divine has ever composed so inclusive a trilogy as that of Paley.

As we have already noted, his *Natural Theology* is by no means original. He is summing up the arguments of a century or more; but he does so in his own straightforward, masterly style. Even his initial illustration, for which he is remembered, is not his own, though he develops it in his peculiar way. As Paley's watch is so often mentioned cursorily in philosophical works, let us hear what he himself says: "In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a *stone,* and were asked how the stone came to be there: I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I know to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a *watch* upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given—that, for any thing I know, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, *viz.,* that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and

put together for a purpose, *e.g.*, that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it .... The inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker: that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer: who comprehended its construction, and designed its use ".[10]

Now this analogy is trivial enough; and it is only fair to Paley to point out that as such it is nothing more than an introductory illustration. It is unfair to leave his argument there; for he has more to say on the watch and watchmaker. After answering a number of obvious objections, Paley develops his illustration a stage further. " Suppose ... that the person who found the watch should, after some time, discover, that, in addition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing, in the course of its movement, another watch like itself (the thing is conceivable): that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a complex adjustments of lathes, files, and other tools, evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us inquire, what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion ".[11]

Again Paley meets a number of obvious objections, and ends his introduction: " The conclusion which the *first* examination of the watch .... suggested was, that it must have had, for the

[10] *Natural Theology*, ch. I. Quotations are from *Paley's Works*, 7 vols., ed. by Edmund Paley, London, 1825. This watch illustration is usually referred to at second-hand. So eminent a scholar as M. Gilson, in his *God and Philosophy*, New Haven, 1941, even speaks of " Paley's carpenter "!

[11] *Natural Theology*, p. 6.

cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A *second* examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found .... to produce another watch, similar to itself .... What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What .... but to increase, beyond measure, our admiration of the skill, which had been employed in the formation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once turn us round to an opposite conclusion, *viz.*, that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business? .... Can this be maintained without absurdity?" "Yet," adds Paley sonorously "this is atheism .... for every indication of contrivance .... which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation".[12]

He then proceeds to apply his argument by reference to the eye as perhaps the most remarkable instance of design in nature, and then, over several chapters, to a very large number of alleged instances of design in the natural world. At least Paley's book reveals unusually wide and intelligent reading in the natural science of his time. But his impressive accumulation of instance after instance of apparent contrivance did not, in fact, render his case as irrefutable as he liked to imagine. It will be as well here to consider in turn some of the more serious criticisms which have been made against him—and so against the teleological argument generally.

First, a brief remark about dysteleology, the recognition that, even allowing the appearance of design in nature, that design is not always benevolent. Indeed, there are plenty of instances of natural phenomena which suggest, at first sight at any rate, a malevolent designer. But the inference to be drawn from such a criticism is that it is unthinkable that God would design what is harmful and cruel. This contention shews, of course, that God is believed in and that certain attributes of his

[12] *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

are recognized. In this case we are presented with a dilemma. The existence of God is evidently admitted; but the universe must equally evidently be, in part at least, beyond his power, since it disregards the values which inhere in God. The teleologist may reply, as Paley in fact did, that dysteleology does not really invalidate the argument from design. Evil, strictly so called, can only be the product of evil wills. Consequently the natural world cannot be regarded as evil, even when it betrays signs of apparent cruelty. Paley does not admit that the ills of the natural world are a serious objection to the belief in the existence of a benevolent Contriver. He speaks of a gradation of imperfections in nature, and points out that, if any kind of design there be, that design is ultimately beneficial.[13] Paley has the same difficulties to meet here as any theistic writer; and we need not spend further space on this objection, since it is a side-issue. Dysteleology does not disprove teleology: the most it can disprove is a thorough-going benevolent teleology. Design and purpose are not affected by remarking the apparent evils of nature.

One of the most serious and fundamental objections to the argument from design is that it proves—or perhaps we should say argues, since any kind of mathematically demonstrable proof is impossible—only the appearance of design. This is perhaps the most popular modern objection—the one most frequently urged from scientific quarters. But is not this objection applicable to every observation we may make about the external world (or what our senses suggest is an external world)? It will equally apply to the concept of natural law, whether in the Newtonian sense or in any more modern sense. Stated thus simply the objection that design and purpose are only apparent and that there is no conclusive proof in their favour must be applied to every other statement we make about the world.

But there is more point in the objection when it is contended that natural law is arguable from the pursuit of scientific method:

[13] *op. cit.*, pp. 316-372, discusses this at some length.

whereas teleology is not. Thus, observation demonstrates that the sun is the centre of the solar system. But there is nothing to demonstrate that the sun is there in order to provide the heat and light which the universe, including man, requires for its continued existence. It is for this reason that long ago the natural sciences decided to have nothing to do with final causes. Nevertheless, whether the age-old belief (or superstition, if you will) that there is purpose in the universe is valid constitutes a question which human beings must both ask and try to answer. The natural scientist may prefer, like Occam, to proceed on the assumption that causes must not be unnecessarily multiplied in order to restrict the field of his work; but categorically to deny that it is impossible to know whether there is design and purpose in the world suggests an intolerable dogmatism. Poets and religious thinkers must speak: otherwise we are driven into an extreme pyrrhonism. It may, however, be allowed that it is legitimate to comfort ourselves by projecting the idea of design and purpose, derived from human experience, into the external world, provided we remember that in so doing we are merely constructing a myth. But this is to reduce non-scientific thinking to a mockery; and, if the notion of cosmic design be no more than a flight of fancy, it is best discarded altogether. We shall, however, return to this point again.

Another cogent objection to the argument from design is that it demonstrates, if it does anything at all, nothing more than the existence of a Designer or Designers. This is the gist of Kant's discussion of physico-theology in his *Critique of Pure Reason,*[14] published incidentally in 1781, over twenty years before Paley's *Natural Theology*. Kant maintained that the teleological argument was dependent upon the ontological and cosmological arguments; and, as both these are false, it necessarily follows that little can be said in favour of the third. Here Paley's argument betrays a weakness, in that he appears to lay so much stress on the conviction that contrivance implies a Contriver. The bulk of his book is devoted to giving instance after

[14] *op. cit.*, Transcendental Dialectic, Bk. II.

instance of alleged contrivance. As Kant says, "This proof can at the most .... demonstrate the existence of an *architect of the world,* whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are subject". Yet it is conceivable that Paley, who, by the way, seems to have been unaware of Kant, would reply that his argument is not to be treated *in vacuo*: it is but one of several grounds—the most popular in appeal—which cumulatively confirm our belief in God. Further, we must remember that Paley's approach to natural theology is primarily that of a theologian, despite his appeal to scientific evidence. What is so often forgotten in discussing his teleological argument is that it is a preliminary to revelation. Let me quote: "The existence and character of the Deity is, in every view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of *Revelation.* It is a step to have it proved, that there must be something in the world more than what we see. It is a farther step to know that, amongst the invisible things of nature, there must be an intelligent mind, concerned in its production, order and support. These points being assured to us by Natural Theology, we may well leave to Revelation the disclosure of many particulars, which our researches cannot reach .... Above every other article of revealed religion, does the anterior belief in a Deity bear with the strongest force upon that grand point, which gives indeed interest and importance to all the rest—the resurrection of the human dead".[15] At least, Paley points out clearly what evidently is of less significance for such philosophers as Kant, that Revelation is inextricably bound up with a teleological interpretation of the world. In his rather plodding but painstaking way Paley's apologetic was a case of *fides quaerens intellectum.*

The most spectacular criticism of the Paleyan thesis came as a result of the change in the scientific world-picture during the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of our own, particularly in biological studies, on which Paley had so

[15] *Natural Theology,* pp. 376-377.

much drawn in his *Natural Theology*. If the world, and even the living things in the world, work with clock-work precision, it is perhaps easy enough to accept, by analogy, the existence of the Supreme Artificer. "Contrivance proves design". But it is all very different if one postulates, as did the more revolutionary nineteenth-century naturalists, that living things are not machines. The advent of the evolutionary hypothesis brought a tremendous change: in a generation or two men were thinking of the world as an organism: and an organism does not necessarily require a Designer. It is interesting to note that this very change in conception has been anticipated by Hume in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* published in 1779, some years before Paley's *Natural Theology*. Here Hume points out that an animal-Generator analogy is as good as a design-Designer analogy. Some modern scientific thinkers have gone further, and maintained that there is no need to postulate the existence of anything prior to the organism since the organism contains within itself all that it needs for its development. The cosmological inference from this is that the universe just evolves, and if we detect any trace of purpose at work in the universe it is not the imposition of a Creator but is a "blind purpose" or "unconscious purpose". This is no new idea. It is suggested in Aristotle: it certainly appears in the cosmology of the Eastern religions, as we should expect, since they generally have no clear belief in a personal transcendent God.

But there is something extremely unsatisfactory about the notion of "blind purpose". The term is self-contradictory. Purpose must be conscious: otherwise it is not purpose. Purpose necessarily implies rationality and will. It would, therefore, be better to abandon the idea of cosmic purpose altogether. One suspects, however, that those who put forward the thesis of unconscious purpose are often those who, having abandoned belief in a personal, transcendent creating God, are less inclined to go the whole way, and want to retain something mildly metaphysical in their world-picture.

Yet so far we have not touched upon the fundamental

problem in the Paleyan natural theology, namely, that of analogy. How far are we justified in drawing an analogy from human contrivance and so postulate the existence of a Divine Artificer? Or, as we remarked above, when we say that apparent design in the universe proves the existence of a Designer are we doing anything more than projecting human artifice into the world on a grand scale? This is the most important point in attempting to evaluate Paley's teleology—and, indeed, any kind of anthropomorphic imagery above God.

To many to-day the attempt to seek some empirical justification for theism seems futile. There is no purpose—at least no assured purpose in the world, apart from what man puts into it: so attempts to deduce the existence of God from universal design merely duplicate the fiction. The theist faced by such drastic assertions and finding them difficult to rebuff, has often turned elsewhere for his justification for his belief—to feeling, to moral demand, to aesthetic values, to mysticism. All these fields, doubtless, enforce their own conviction (or lack of it); but they are all so individual, so personal, that they are unlikely to satisfy the general demand for a corroboration (the term is better than "proof") of theism. Such an argument as Paley's at least has the merit of general intelligibility; and, unless we are to regard the long Judaeo-Christian tradition of natural theology as no longer significant for us, we cannot ignore it. It may not be the whole story, but without it we can hardly tell any story at all. The conviction that God exists results from many different, yet complementary, "confrontations" which human beings experience; and the appearance of marvellous contrivance is one of the most universally recognized.

What vitiates Paley's argument is his constant reiteration of his watch illustration and the mechanistic principle it implies. Indeed, so much so that Paley became for many an object of ridicule. Moreover, the fact that his works, particularly his *Evidences,* were set books for undergraduate study at Cambridge all through the nineteenth-century did not help to preserve for him a serious reputation, especially as a critical study of his

works was not required, even discouraged. It is quite clear, of course, from his book as a whole, particularly from the last five chapters, that he intends his illustration simply as introductory; but, as J. S. Mill pointed out, although the argument from design has a good deal to commend it, " its force is very generally overrated. Paley's illustration of a watch puts the case much too strongly "[16] Paley overworks his illustration, so that the reader is in danger—as Paley himself seems to have been—of forgetting what fundamental truth he is trying to express in this figurative manner.

This fundamental truth is that human purposive activity is a key to the nature of the universe itself. Or, to turn the matter the other way about, we only engage in purposive activity because purposive activity existed before us. But we must inevitably ask what precisely it is in human beings which they share with whatever gives design to the universe. To many the Thomistic philosophy will supply the answer. It is our being and the being of the universe at large which must be considered. In the scale of being we, like all other finite things, are incomplete, derived, dependent. There must be that Necessary Being who is the origin of all that is and who gives meaning to all that is. But, while admitting this as far as it goes, are we not to-day bound to admit that this view of things is somewhat skeleton-like? It needs clothing to make it alive and real.

Paley comes to our rescue more than he realized; for there are incidental suggestions in his *Natural Theology* which make all the difference to his picture of the universal watch and the universal watchmaker. One of these is Paley's insistence on the personality of Deity. He was thinking, it is true, mainly of personality in a restricted sense, *viz.*, that of mind. " Contrivance, if established, appears to me ", writes Paley, " to prove every thing which we wish to prove. Amongst other things, it proves the *personality* of Deity, as distinguished from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes called a principle, which terms,

[16] *Three Essays on Religion,* quoted in N. Kemp Smith, *Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,* London, 1935, p. 54 note.

in the mouths of those who use them philosophically, seem to be intended to admit and to express an efficacy, but to exclude and deny a personal agent. Now that which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought . . . They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; which is mind . . . We have no authority to limit the properties of mind to any particular corporeal form, or to any particular circumscription of space . . . Also every animated being has its *sensorium*; that is, a certain portion of space, within which perception and volition are exerted. This sphere may be enlarged to an indefinite extent; may comprehend the universe; and, being so imagined, may serve to furnish us with as good a notion, as we are capable of forming, of the *immensity* of the Divine Nature, i.e., of a Being, infinite, as well in essence as in power; yet nevertheless a person ".[17]

It seems as if Paley is here pretty close to the concept of a Cosmic Intelligence, or Logos. He could do no more than suggest it, since he was still really very much of a scholastic and was living in an age entranced by the discoveries of the relatively new natural sciences. Perhaps, were Paley living today, he might talk of the Great Planner. In that case, his contritribution to contemporary thought would be considerable; for instead of planning solely in a social context, with man as beginning and end, we might be planning in a larger setting. We should recognize, as he did, that there is not much sense in the world and still less sense in the Christian revelation without a cosmic plan; and that, further, without the recognition of a Cosmic Planner our little plans, be they ever so nobly conceived, are unlikely to conquer the world.

We close by quoting a passage from Paley's *Natural Theology*, which, strangely enough, elucidates his argument more clearly than the more obviously dialectical sections of the book. It occurs in his chapter discussing the relation of animated bodies to inanimate nature. " Day and night are things close to us; the

[17] *Natural Theology*, p. 284.

change applies immediately to our sensations; of all the phenomena of nature, it is the most obvious and the most familiar to our experience; but, in its cause, it belongs to the great motions which are passing in the heavens. Whilst the earth glides round her axle, she ministers to the alternate necessities of the animals dwelling upon her surface, at the same time that she obeys the influence of those attractions which regulate the order of many thousand worlds. The relation therefore of sleep to night, is the relation of the inhabitants of the earth to the rotation of the globe; probably it is more; it is a relation to the system of which the globe is a part; and, still farther, to the congregation of the systems, of which there is only one. If this account be true, it connects the meanest individual with the universe itself; a chicken roosting upon its perch, with the spheres revolving in the firmament".[18] Whatever the fashions in philosophy and theology at any given period, when confronted by such instances, be we ever so sceptical, we cannot but begin to wonder whether there may be design and purpose and an Artificer. And if we reach that far, we have at least got to where our relatively primitive forefathers started. Modern science has not really disproved Paley's general thesis of marvellous contrivance: it has only shewn that the contrivance is even more marvellous than Paley ever imagined.

[18] *op. cit.*, p. 207.

PRUDENTIUS AND THE BEGINNING OF CHRISTIAN LATIN POETRY

By L. J. MORISON

In the second half of the fourth century of the Christian era there emerged something of a renascence of Latin poetry. In a little more than a hundred years after the death of Virgil those who had carried on the Epic tradition had passed away. That century had seen the fierce rhetoric of Lucan, and after him those profuse writers of faultless but rather monotonous hexameters; then followed Statius, whose shorter poems are pleasant enough, but whose Thebaid and unfinished Achilleid repel the modern reader though for long he was a popular element in the Latin corpus, partly perhaps because of the tradition that he was a Christian, whereby he gained mention in the *Divina Commedia.* Next came Valerius Flaceus, with his prolix treatment of the ancient stories of Thebes and the Argonauts, and Silius Italicus who, forsaking the substance of mythology, preserved its form, and embellished his historical poem on the Punic War with a wealth of highly artificial interferences by the old divinities. But for about 150 years from the end of the first century there is a period of dearth in which the only considerable product of the poetic field is that charming trifle, the *Pervigilium Veneris.* In Africa, indeed, there emerged some activity in the writing of prose with the Latin Fathers Tertullian and Cyprian, among whose works are printed some sacred poems, accepted as genuine by early editors but now generally regarded as spurious and of uncertain date; and, as an example of what is a survival, but to the taste of those who respect classical Latin, a most degenerate survival of the hexameter, there are the curious accentual verses of the African Christian Commodianus.[1] They are in the form of

[1] He is commonly placed in the third century, but a modern French scholar, Courcelle, has recently propounded the view that he is as late as the fifth.

acrostics on religious subjects, a form which can hardly be attributed to a divine afflatus, and it would have puzzled an Augustan to have scanned such verses as:

Quam diu stultus homo Christum agnoscere non vis?
Vitas agrum pinguem, et sterili semina iactas.

But in the fourth century we find the survival of a more orthodox literary taste. The Spanish priest, Juvencus, did the gospel stories into verse, and shewed great ingenuity in preserving their language almost literally in quite classical hexameters; and a little later the poetic silence was broken, not so much on the native soil of the Latin tongue as in the distant provinces of east and west. Ausonius of Bordeaux and Claudian of Alexandria observed classical prosody, and, in the main, classical diction. Neither of these can be admitted to the circle of great poets. Ausonius, a teacher of rhetoric, who was tutor to the Emperor Gratian and attained the high positions of Prefect of Gaul and Consul, has left a body of verse little better than mnemonics for the help of pupils, but also two poems of considerable charm. His *Moselle* is remarkable as an early instance of an interest in landscape, though the enumeration of the various fishes to be found in the river suggests the practical Latin tendency to make use of nature as well as to admire her; and the more fanciful poem, the Crucifixion of Cupid, contains two lines among the most musical of all Latin versification:

Inter arundineasque comas gravidumque papaver
Et tacitos sine labe lacus, sine murmure rivos.

He was of the Christian faith, but must have known Virgil almost by heart, as his Nuptial Cento shews, even if his claim to have composed it in a single day is not to be taken quite literally; and its final section must offend not only Christian notions of decency but also any sense of reverence for Virgil. But here, as in some other poems on subjects eminently unsuitable for poetic treatment, such as the number three, or the nature of the as and its parts, the reader cannot fail to be impressed by Ausonius' immense ingenuity in the manipulation of language. The contemporary Claudian, a master equally of panegyric and invective, flourished under Honorius. Included in his works are

a few Christian poems, not generally accepted by the critics as genuine, and, if they are not the work of another hand, may be attributable rather to the requirements of the court of Milan than to his own faith.

Contemporaneously with these two exponents of the final phase of the secular classical tradition there arose two other poets, looking backward indeed for much of their culture but marking the transition to the literary history of the Middle Ages, Ambrose and Prudentius. Vastly dissimilar from each other in their technique, they were alike in being Christians, wholly dominated by the new faith of the Empire. The differences in their method are easily explained. Ambrose wrote his hymns, and even the most drastic critics allow a few of those called by his name to be genuine, to occupy the mixed and excited multitude which watched with him when he took refuge in his basilican church from the attacks of the hostile Arians. Naturally he adopted a simple metre, the iambic lines of eight syllables, of which there are a few contemporary examples, and such as could be easily picked up and sung by an untrained congregation. But he observed the classical quantities and the classical system of elision of vowels. Scansion by quantity was soon to be superseded by scansion by accent. Ambrose seems to have been careful to avoid a clash between the two systems; his free use of spondees in the first and third feet rather obscure the true iambic lilt, and the effect is rather heavy. But the embellishment of rime, so easy and indeed almost unavoidable in an inflected language, is not present. It was much later that regular rime, especially the graceful dissyllabic rime which lends such charm to medieval verse, made its appearance. Thus the Ambrosian style, though lacking the rich variety of classical measures, has nothing positive in it to shock those who had been brought up in the strict classical tradition.[2]

[2] So many Latin hymns are anonymous and cannot be dated that it is almost impossible to trace the development of rime. "*O lux beata Trinitas Et principalis unitas*", sometimes attributed to Ambrose, is rejected by competent critics. Sedulius (*c.* 450) and Venantius Fortunatus (about 50 years later) have traces of rather irregular rime, often on weak vowels, and not consistently arranged throughout the poem.

The purpose and the technique of Prudentius were wholly different. Like Ambrose he had a distinguished career as a layman, but he was not, like Ambrose, swept suddenly from civil life into Holy Orders and a bishopric. He was born in 348 at Saragossa and thus adds to that succession of Latin writers, from the Senecas and Lucan, who were of Spanish origin. He received the usual literary and rhetorical education of his time, first with tears under the swishings of the schoolmaster's rod, and later in the rhetorician's Academy where he was apparently instructed in the art of making the worse appear the better reason—*mox docuit toga Infectum vitiis falsa loqui, non sine crimine.* These youthful years he does not claim to have been blameless; but he gives no details in the Augustinian manner of his early delinquencies, and as there is no hint of a conversion it seems safe to assume that he came of Christian parentage. There followed a civic career of some distinction: "the piety of the Emperor elevated me to a place close to himself, bidding me occupy the nearest station". What exactly this high position was he does not specify, neither are we told the place or the date of his death. All that we have is his own statement that he retired from his civil occupation at the age of 57, and apparently devoted the leisure of his declining years to literary pursuits.

Prudentius is probably best known to the general reader by his *Liber Cathemarinon,* a series of twelve poems covering the course of the pious Christian's life. They are styled hymns, but are very different from the hymns of Ambrose and his school. Some of them are over two hundred lines in length, and like the three Winchester hymns of Bishop Ken are clearly intended for private reading and meditation, rather than for congregational use. But portions of them became regular office hymns, especially in the Mozarabic liturgy, and some fragments are preserved in modern English hymnals. Perhaps the best known is "Earth has many a noble city", a very free version of selected stanzas from the Epiphany hymn. The symbolism of the Magi's gifts is neatly indicated:

"Regem Deumque adnunciant
Thesaurus et fragrans odor
Turis Sabaei et myrrheus
Pulvis sepulcrum praedicant."[3]

A longer and more literal version from another hymn (VII) is to be found in "Of the Father's love begotten" (A. & M. 56) of which the opening lines represent:

"Corde natus ex parentis ante mundi exordium
Alpha et Ω cognominatus, ipse fons et clausula
Omnium quae sunt, fuerunt, quaeque post futura sunt".

The nine stanzas in *Ancient & Modern* are but a selection from the 38 of the original, and the refrain "evermore and evermore" is an addition by compilers. Prudentius, though his individual sentences are so compact with meaning as sometimes to be a little difficult, is in his general treatment immensely diffuse. This poem includes allusions to many passages of the Gospel story, the Virgin birth, the changing of water into wine—*cantheris infusa lympha fit Falernum nobile*—the healing of the blind and deaf, the stilling of the sea, the woman with the issue, the Gaderene swine, the descent into Hades (expanded by later accretions) and the ascension, *imclytam coelo reportans passionis gloriam.* This is one of the most pleasing of the twelve poems, partly because of the long trochaic metre which has endured from the time of Aeschylus to the present day. The closing stanza, with its string of substantive and its sonorous polysyllables, is worth quoting as an example of Prudentius' style:

"Fluminum lapsus et undae litorum crepidines,
Imber, aestus, nix, pruina, silva et aura, nox, dies
Omnibus te concelebrent saeculorum saeculis".

Another of the poems in which Prudentius shews his mastery of form is that "After Fasting". Our Lord's command to his disciples is thus paraphrased:

"Terge ieiunans" ait "omne corpus,
Neve sabducto faciem rubore
Luteus tingat color aut notetur
Pallor in ore",

[3] This is more quaintly expressed in the suspected epigram printed among Claudian's works, "*Myrrham homo, rex aurum, suscipe tura Deus*".

a stanza which would have been intelligible to, and acceptable by, the audience of Horace; and the description of the recovery of the lost sheep has nothing in it to offend the ear of an Augustan.

Impiger pastor revocat lupisque
Gestat exclusis umeros gravatus,
Inde purgatam revehens aprico
Reddit ovili.

Prudentius shews equal skill in other Horatian metres. He uses two varieties of Asclepiads, sometimes with the interesting development of a three-lined stanza. The Hymn after Meat is in hendecasyllables, and however strange it may seem to have the mystery of the Double Procession, *Regnat Spiritus ille sempiternus A Christi simul et Parente missus,* announced in the metre which we associate with Lesbia's sparrow, for the story of the feeding of Daniel in the lion's den by Habakkuk which occupies the greater part of the poem it seems suitable enough.

Other well-known extracts are *"Cultor Dei memento"* (part of the *Hymnus ante somnum*) which is in the Sarum and Mozarabic liturgies and appears in the *English Hymnal,* 104, as " Servant of God, remember ". The omitted portion of this poem contains a parallel to that just mentioned which is worth quotation alike as evidence of the poet's orthodoxy and as a specimen of the metre:

O Trinitatis huius
Vis una, lumen unum,
Deus ex Deo perennis,
Deus ex utroque missus.

For the hymn before a meal Prudentius has chosen a tripping metre of three dactyls and a long syllable, rather frivolous in its nature and suggestive of a nursery rime, but dignified in English by Hood's serious and pathetic lines " One more unfortunate, weary of breath ". The poem is a good instance of the writer's tendency to digression. A few lines are rather prosaically germane to the subject, a prayer for moderation lest *" piger immodicis dapibus viscera tenta grævet stomachus "*: but the greater part of the poem is an elaborate account of the temptation and the Fall in Eden, and the bruising of the serpent's

head beneath the woman's feet by the advent of Christ and the peaceful world of redemption when

Impovidas lupus inter oves
Tristis obambulat et rabidum
Sanguinis immemor os cohibet,

and ends with an assurance of the Resurrection, " as I remember that God with easy steps made his way back from Phlegethon to Heaven in bodily form, the same hope awaits my members which Christ risen from the same earth summons to the fiery stars ".

Other extracts from this series of poems which are preserved as English hymns are " Now that the daylight ", " Sweet flow'rets ", " He who once in righteous vengeance ", " Father most high be with us ", "All ye who seek ", " The winged herald ", " Ye clouds and darkness ", " Lo golden morn " and " Father of Spirits ".

The didactic poems are by their nature less attractive, but they are rich in theological and literary interest. That on the Incarnation, curiously entitled Apotheosis, a word which might easily imply an heretical view of which the poem is innocent, is an argumentative attack on various heresies, especially Sabellianism, Ebionism and Docetism. The Almighty is invisible—no man hath seen him at any time—omnipresent, impassible, supreme. Even the pagans came to admit this, and Prudentius invokes them to his support, but in language which to modern ears is regrettably intolerant: " Consult ", he says, " the *deliramenta barbati Platonis,* the dreams of the maladorous cynic, the dizzy twistings of Aristotle ", *turbidulos sensus et litigiosa fragosis Argumenta modis concludere numen in unum.* We have here the spirit of Tertullian rather than that of Clement of Alexandria; and it is to be noticed that Prudentius, in his attack on pagans and heretics, not unnaturally clothes his Lucretian intolerance in Lucretian rhythms. Such lines as *" Cum sit difficilis via noscere principiorum Semina "* and *" sed tamen et Patris est specimen quod cernere fas est "* shew that he did not take the Virgilians as his sole model in the construction of his hexameters; and the same influence is to be noted in the

Hamartigenia, his poem on the still more recalcitrant subject of the Origin of Sin. The poem is a terrific attack on the dualism of Marcion, marked at once by the strength and the weakness of rhetoric. There cannot be two creators; one creator made all things good. God is not the inventor of evil (*inventor vitii*): we know that there is a father of crimes, but we know that he is not a god but the bond-slave of Hell; but the personality of this evil power is so much emphasized that with little change of phrase he would be as real as Marcion's Demiurgus. Jealous of newly created man, this fallen spirit turned the whole creation awry and brought in every kind of physical and moral evil: *laxa licentia rerum turbavit placidas rupto moderamine leges.* Luxury, greed, vice of every kind from the use of jewelry and cosmetics to the barbarities of the amphitheatre flourish: the prolix description rises to real eloquence. But man has freewill and is responsible for his own sins. Satan can trouble and deceive us only so far as we consent. An objector asks, "Can any man sin *invito Tonante?*"—a curious survival of pagan phraseology, but not without precedent in Tertullian and Juvencus. "Fool, knoweth thou not the strength of thine own freedom, given by the Creator himself," answers the poet. From the more searching question, "If God does not will evil why does he not prohibit it?" Prudentius recoils in horror. His answer is in effect that man, set as lord over created things, must be *rex ipse sui.* The poem ends with a prayer of great humility and beauty: "I ask not a home in the region of the blest: that is for the pure who have despised earthly wealth, for spotless virginity: enough for me if my soul be devoured by the flame of Gehenna, plunged in its lowest depths".

> "*Lux immensa alios et tempora vincta coronis*
> *Glorificent: me poena levis clementer adurat*".

The proem to *Psychomachia,* dealing with the promise of a son to Abraham, is noticeable for its reference to the symbolism of the number 318.[4] The poem itself, of nearly a thousand lines, is a description in the Epic manner of a contest between the

[4] TIH: the cross and the first two letters of the name of Jesus: cf. among other passages, Ep: Barnabas, cap. IX.

virtues and vices. These warriors, female by the constraint of the Latin language, challenge each other with defiant speeches in the old convention of classical war-poetry and engage in personal combat with a diversity of weapons, and described with a truly Virgilian variety of sanguinary detail. The Virtues prevail: but Discordia, whose other name is Heresy, has treacherously mingled them. She is smitten in the mouth by the javeline of Faith, and torn in pieces. Concordia, who has been wounded, delivers an address of triumph, and she and Faith proceed to construct a temple, adorned with the Apocalyptic jewels, so vast that they are hoisted into place by a crane; and therein is enthroned Sapientia, who *omne consilium regni disponit;* and the poem ends with the praise of Christ who enables light to prevail over darkness and virtue over sin.

The *Peristephanon* is a series of poems on the passions of various martyrs, many of them, as one might expect, Spanish. They range in length from the 1,140 lines of St. Romanus to the little poem of 18 lines on the baptistery erected in the place where two unnamed martyrs suffered. Prudentius avoids the monotony of a unified theme by a rich diversity of metres; in addition to those used in the *Cathemerinon* he employs the elegaic couplet, the Archilochian measure used by Horace in the fourth ode of the first book, and the longer line of that measure alone, a modified Alcaic stanza consisting of the first line repeated, thereby losing the beauty of the sonorous third line in contrast with the tripping dactyls of the fourth, and the Hipponactean of Horace II 18. The treatment is highly rhetorical and the incidents are strongly adapted to edification. St. Laurence, for example, in reply to a demand from the praefect of the city for the treasures of the church, the gold and silver vessels which were reported to exist, "*hoc poscit usus publicus, Hoc fiscus, hoc aerarium*", begs for delay so that he may make a list of them. He collects the cripples and pensioners of the Church and presents them to the praefect after three days, explaining that they are the true treasures of the Church for

Quum membra morbus disiicit
Animus viget robustior;
Membris vicissim fortibus
Vis sauciatur sensuum,

and to these he adds the sacred virgins. The praefect in fury threatens him with a lingering death, and gives order for the fire to be prepared. The face of Laurence shines with radiance as the faces of Moses and Stephen. Half roasted he bids that he be turned. The jest is a little revolting; but Laurence in the midst of his torments breaks out into a hymn to Christ of some 50 lines, of real beauty, praying that as Rome has been ordained to be the head of the Empire, so may she be head of a Christian world. Let the gods of paganism retire, for here are reigning the two princes of the apostles,

Alter vocator gentium
Alter cathedram possidens Primam.

His prayer and his life end together. His body is borne away by *patres*; can this mean by senators? The interpretation has been suggested but is disputed. But from that day the cult of the heathen gods froze up: even the lights of the Senate, priests and flamens worship at the shrine of Laurentius, and through his intercession their prayers are granted. The poem ends with a prayer by Prudentius for himself, a rustic poet, unworthy to be heard for his own merits, but able to obtain healing through the patronage of the martyrs.

This may be taken as shewing the general pattern of the poems, but each has its own individuality. St. Eulalia, the child of twelve years old, vowed to virginity, despising youthful play and feminine adornments, is bidden to offer incense and perform a burnt-offering. She is set on resistance, *femina provocat arma virum,* and escapes from the safe retreat which her father has provided for her in the country. She appears before the tribunal and defies it. The praetor is enraged, but attempts to persuade her to recant and save her life. She spits in his face: the executioners tear her body and burn it with torches. A dove, white as clean snow, is seen to emerge from the martyr's mouth and ascend to the stars. The lictor flees in terror, and a snow-storm covers her corpse. Strangers and native inhabitants resort to her splendid shrine. "Bring your offerings", concludes the poet: "I will bring garlands woven in my dactylic measure".

In the other poems of the series are commemorated St.

Vincent, the eighteen martyrs of Caesaraugusta, St. Quirinus, St. Romanus, St. Hippolytus, St. Cyprian, St. Agnes and others. In some of them the torments are described with repulsive detail; but miracles are frequent, and the constancy of the martyrs in some cases leads to the conversion of the official persecutors.

Of the *Dittochaeum,* a collection of quatrains of hexameters on scriptural subjects, there is little to be said: it is omitted in some of the MSS. Possibly it was intended merely as a mnemonic for the use of learners: if, as has been suggested, it was a series of titles of 49 pictures, it is interesting as shewing the condition of the pictorial art. Some critics have rejected it on the ground that it excels the standard of Prudentius, others that it falls below it.

There remain the two pieces in reply to the oration of Symmachus, the champion of the pagan party in the senate in their struggle for the replacement of the altar of victory which had been removed by Gratian. However complacently Prudentius may have viewed the progress of Christianity, the fact remains that at the end of the fourth century the old religion was strong enough to make a great demonstration in self-defence. Symmachus had received the consulship from Theodosius himself: he was regarded as a prodigy of eloquence, and Prudentius has sufficient sympathy with him to treat him with respect, though he repels his advocacy of paganism with the utmost vehemence. His counter-attack is on the lines usual with the Christian apologists: scathing criticism and even ridicule of the ancient gods, or at any rate of the unedifying stories of their adventures on earth which Rome had borrowed from the more imaginative Greeks when they conquered their conqueror. Saturn, the refugee, with his *equina libido,* Jupiter with his amours, Mercury, the inventor of thieving and of Thessalian magic, Hercules disconsolate (*caclebs*) at the loss of Hylas, Bacchus and his orgies, Mars whose adultery was responsible for the birth of Romulus and Remus, are all the subject of virulent attack. Venus, as mother of Aeneas, is rationalized as a lady

of august station who is married below it. Nor is the marriage of Livia spared, nor the deification of Antinous. But Prudentius is more philosophical in his declaration that the sun cannot be a god, for its course is unchanging while man is free: and he makes some amends for his contemptuous reference to Plato by describing him as *quidam doctissimus* who has finely said that the commonwealth would be *fortunata satis si Vel regis saperent vel regnarent sapientes,* a recantation which is incidentally to be noticed as an instance of the poet's Lucretian style. A speech of nearly 100 lines is put into the mouth of Theodosius, exhorting Rome to conversion from their childish festivals and absurd rites; but, more temperate than some champions of the new faith, he would have the master-pieces of pagan sculpture remain, as the fairest ornaments of the father-land.

So Rome, the poem continues, forsook her old error and turned to faith in Christ. "Less profitable to the city was the laurelled victory of Marius when he led captive the Numidian Jugurtha, nor did Cicero bring such healing to Rome when Cethegus in just imprisonment was put to death": (perhaps it is the exigence of metre which put Cethegus where we should expect Catiline, but the instance is interesting): but the fervid and eloquent description of Rome's conversion must be treated as poetry rather than strict history. "The fathers leapt for joy and assumed the whiter robes of piety: hundreds of noble families turned to Christ. The populace dwelling in their attics and fed by the public dole crowd to the tomb by the Vatican to defend their own worshippers: why should she not make yet another change; for amid all the political changes there has emerged the blessing of monarchy, and the unity of the Empire should be the foundation of the universal triumph of Christianity".

The reputation of Prudentius has suffered curious fluctuations. His popularity in the middle ages is shewn by the existence of over three hundred manuscripts of the whole or part of his works, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries about

forty editions appeared. But modern texts are few, and not very easily procured.[5]

His fellow-countryman, Isidore, extravagantly (but with a regrettable false quantity) recommends the reading of him;

> *Si Maro, si Flaccus, si Naso et Persius horret,*
> *Lucanus si te Papiniusque tedet.*

Bede styles him *nobilissimus Hispaniae scholasticus*; Rabanus, *disertissimus atque Christianissimus*. Erasmus regards him as the one truly eloquent among Christian poets. One may pass over the laudations of his editors: but Bentley goes so far as to call him the Virgil and Horace of Christianity; and Colet, in prescribing the curriculum of St. Paul's school, would have his boys read Prudentius and Lactantius instead of Virgil and Cicero. "Those books alone", he says, "ought to be read in which there is a salutary flavour of Christ. Those books in which Christ is not found are but as tables of devils". But Colet had a scholarly contempt for debased Latin, and his words are a strong testimony to the relative purity of Prudentius' language. It is true that occasional licences and irregularities may be found in his versification, and there are naturally forms which have a rather strange appearance. But Latin was still a conservative language, and many of these are archaisms such as became fashionable even in the Silver Age, and such of them as are new inventions are the coinage of a scholar loyal to tradition and genius of his language, not colloquialisms or corruptions of a half-educated public. It was left to later writers, lawyers and chroniclers, even more than theologians, to produce a language that is really debased. There is little in Prudentius which would be unintelligible or even offensive to an Augustan critic; whether his writings would be intelligible to the populace which could pick up and sing Ambrose's hymns is another question. He was essentially a man of letters, writing for his own society, absorbed in his desire to promulgate the Christian faith, but standing upon the ancient ways, and consecrating to the new religion the beauties of pagan

[5] Dr. H. J. Thompson's recent publication of the first volume of a text and translation in the Loeb Library is greatly to be welcomed.

Latin, just as the Pantheon was to become in due time a Christian Church. He was not a great poet, but had a complete mastery of metrical form, and his lack of reticence in thought and diction, leading him sometimes into superfluous detail, must be attributed to the taste of his age.[6] He was not a profound theologian, but he had a knowledge, more than competent, of the main historical heresies; rather curiously he shews no great familiarity with the controversies which in his life-time were agitating the Eastern Church, and he mentions Arius[7] but once. He was insensitive to any merits which the old myths may have possessed, for he lived before the days of a philosophical study of religion, but the fervour of his faith is unmistakable. He is unsparing in his denunciation of the vices of Rome, but yields to none in his devotion to the Imperial City. He is memorable as standing at the transition-point of the old civilization to the new, and as an example of the outlook and tendencies of the best culture of his time.

[6] In the seclusion of a footnote it is legitimate to quote a regretable line in *Apotheosis* describing the miraculous feeding, "*crudus conviva resudat congeriem ventris*". The half of the evangelist is preferable to the whole of the poet.

[7] Spelt "Arrius"; the two false quantities presumably represent popular Latin pronunciation.

CHRIST AND THE LAND

By W. S. BOYCOTT

PREFACE

"TUESDAY next is the eve of St. ———'s day, there will be Evensong at 6.30 *if wet, if dry* there will be no Evensong for we must continue with the harvest" said a country rector, at least by repute. The worship of God or work upon the land, which? In rural places the harvest is of prime importance, particularly in wet seasons; but so is the worship of God in all seasons. Was it justified to make that service dependent on the weather and the harvest? Isn't the in-gathering of the fruits of his bounty as important—perhaps more important—than the observing of St. ———'s eve?

Let us suppose that this announcement caused division among the village and that both sides wrote letters of complaint to the bishop. The one complained of the service being interfered with, the other that the harvest was threatened if all the choir had to be at Evensong. The bishop (praising God that as things turned out it was only fit to start carting at 7.15 just after they came out) had to mediate. He had promised at his consecration to "banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine contrary to God's word". Could he therefore give his approval to such an announcement being made again? Suppose *you* were that bishop, how would you proceed?

The renewed interest which the Church is taking in agriculture at the present time raises a number of interesting questions and implications. The concern of the Church with

practical and sociological matters of rural welfare, as with industry generally, and the revival of the agricultural services in our churches are to be welcomed. Behind these, however, are theological principles and implications which may be found to have important relevance to our faith as a whole. In going back to the land, for example, we may find that some theological truths that are long forgotten are brought again to light; and we may be able to see that life, and all that life implies, is given a wider and deeper significance. For, in Christ there is not merely hope and salvation but a wholeness, a completeness, of life which, it is fair to say, has almost completely been obscured in theological ideas of the present time. Perhaps the most important question referred to above, is whether by going back to the land, theology, and the Church at large, can regain a sense of the wholeness of life which is found in the bible, and in particular in the life and teaching of our Lord himself. In the bible there are a good many frankly agrarian passages which have either been neglected, or sometimes have been interpreted allegorically, so that their importance has been seriously overlooked.

While not denying that Christ, as our redeemer, may be perhaps the core of the Christian faith, Creation rather than Redemption is the *foundation* upon which the whole justification of Christianity, in all its aspects, rests, and it is only by taking into consideration man's relationship to the land (as part of creation as a whole) that we can really begin to appreciate either the wholeness of Christian living, or the true meaning of redemption. That redemption is dependent on creation in this way is doubtless a controversial idea, yet when it is given careful consideration, it seems to work out that way. Far too little thought perhaps has been given to the connexion between creation and redemption. William Temple, however, uttered some words which may help us to focus our attention upon it:

"The thought of God as Creator of the universe has always suggested such a conception of him as makes very difficult any full acceptance of the Passion. The thought of the evil in the world and of God as Redeemer suggests a conception of him which easily leads men to deny his Omnipotence altogether. But here, as so often, the whole Christian belief consists in a balance of two conceptions *apparently*

incompatible, not by the paring away of each until the incompatibility vanishes through the disappearance of all that is significant in both conceptions, but by the setting of each in its own place in a scheme which has room for both.

". . . . The world as a vale of soul-making is full of darkness and tragedy, into which God himself must enter."[1]

"Soul-making" is creation, yet something more than physical creation,[2] but in so saying, we must not delude ourselves that (in man at any rate) they are different and unrelated processes. The whole act of divine creation, implied from the beginning had its completion in Christ. The Incarnation was a cosmic, creative event, and within this is Christ's meaning of atonement. Apart from the Incarnation, the Atonement loses practically all its meaning. The Atonement is re-creation, and as such belongs to the original work of the first creation. "As in Adam all *die,* even so in Christ shall all be made *alive*" (I Cor. xv, 21).[3] Being made alive in Christ is a consequence, a logical outcome we might say, of living and dying in creation. Thus to appreciate fully what Life everlasting in Christ is, we cannot wholly disregard either the process of our first creation, nor the means whereby our lives are sustained (i.e. by our food and the land) between the first and second stages of being born into God's own self. Admittedly the thought is difficult, if not indeed confusing but, on the evidence of the Incarnation itself, we must attempt to face the problem rather than run away from it.

Because it is this wholeness seen in Christ which we are trying to find, the vastness of the subject will at once be apparent, yet we must make the attempt to see it as a whole. All we can do in a short space is to outline the general pattern of the theology of creation in the light of Christ, and try to see

[1] In the University sermon, Cambridge, Septuagesima 1925. Quoted in Canon Baker's *William Temple and His Message,* p. 127f.

[2] The separation (the dichotomy) of body and soul is ecclesiastical rather than biblical. In the bible "Soul" means really the entire being of an individual.

[3] Cp. also vv, 22 and 45-48; Rom. v, 12-21. And see Ottley, *Doctrine of the Incarnation,* p. 115.

the way in which this is closely related to the land. The Lambeth Report of 1948 states it clearly:[4]

"Our need for bread, our need for one another, and our need for God, are all interdependent." (Part II, p. 5.)

This, in a few words, gives us a clue to the shape of God's changeless pattern for man, in an ever-changing world. It is really the impact of this changeless pattern upon everyday life which the Church, seeking to be "up-to-date", overlooks or neglects. It is this changeless pattern, the basis of the faith of the Old Testament, completed and fulfilled in the Incarnation and then passed on to the Church down through the ages, that we are here concerned with. A great deal of the truth of the Old Testament is still relevant to-day with the one difference that it has been sealed and made perfect in and through Christ, whose gospel is founded upon, and cannot be understood apart from, the faith of Israel.

God, as seen in the pages of the Old Testament, is the Active, Living God (I Sam. xvii, 26; Hos. i, 10 etc.), the God of fact, rather than of philosophical idealism. It is he, not the false god Baal, who is the God and Father of the corn and wine as much as of his people (Hos. ii, 8. Cp. Deut. vii, 13; xi, 14 etc.). The good and fertile land was given by God to Israel (or as we might say to his Church) as an Inheritance (Deut. vi, 21, Ps. cv, 11 etc.). The significance is all the greater when we recall that in the Old Testament world good fertile land was scarce, and might be just as precious as the word of the Lord. As we shall see later, such good and fertile land is once more becoming scarce in the world. Our modern idea that all creation is fallen, and because of this of little relevance to our faith, is completely absent from the Old Testament where *man*

[4] It is interesting to notice that the bishops in 1948, in concerning themselves with the land, were following in the steps of the great Robert Grosseteste (Bp. of Lincoln, 1235-1253). Of medieval scholars he was one of the greatest. It would not be doing him justice to suppose that his *Rules* (of husbandry and estate management) can be isolated from his other theological and philosophical writings. How proper for such rules to come from an episcopal hand!

is fallen and creation is "very good". We also find in the Old Testament that knowing about God, that is theology in the usual sense, and knowing God, loving him in and through worship are different things, which sometimes can be contrasted with each other. For this reason the rural approach to Christianity must include the devotional side. Christian devotion is not always based, as it should be, upon facts of reality, but upon some escapist moonshine that seems to disregard the full reality of the living, active God we find in the bible.

Everyone, perhaps, would admit that our relationship with creation *can* affect our worship of God, not everyone, however, might agree that it *should* do so; yet I think we cannot stop short of saying that it *must* do so. If our worship is to be true worship it should be shaped by facts rather than by our own feelings. One of the facts which go to make up the content of our worship is God's presence in nature and the land. This is *not* the worship of nature, pantheism. The attitude we take to creation helps, or may help, to make a solid foundation for true worship, that is worship grounded upon reality. Reality which, as Temple reminded us in the sermon already quoted, is fact and value in one. The fact of creation added to the value that we put upon it, which is religious, the divine presence in creation, and the land, points to his presence beyond it. But we must not forget that his presence beyond creation is revealed to us *in* it. Creation is indeed the framework and ground of all revelation, even if what is sometimes called "special" revelation (as *e.g.* the Incarnation itself), appears to be independent of creation. In the case of the Incarnation, a moment's thought will show us that if it is outside creation, the word "Incarnation" is a bad misnomer.

Further, Creation (particularly as seen in the Old Testament) is sacramental. There is rather more to a sacrament than "the outward and visible sign *and* the inward spiritual grace". (The idea of an outward sign *of* an inward grace is, in any case, a misunderstanding of the Prayer-book.) While sacramentalism is a twoness, it is much more a *togetherness*. Our faith is in the Creator himself, yet the reasons for this are found not in

him or in us, but in his creation (of which we are but part). "The essence of religion is bound up with the duality of the Creator and the creature".[5] This duality can be thought of as one thing which we carefully take apart, or as two things which, while recognizing their apparent independence, we bring together. And this bringing together is the core of sacramental thought. It is from this sacramental attitude to creation in the Old Testament that our Lord derives the force of much of his teaching, and the Church (as we shall see presently) derives the basis of her idea of sacramental worship, particularly of the Eucharist itself.

In the Old Testament we find this connexion between faith and agriculture, worship and life, in what seems to be precisely this sacramental relationship. One of the prime conditions of creation is that man shall have dominion of the soil and subdue it (Gen. i, 26; ii, 15); side by side with this is the great commandment to worship and serve God. The 78th Psalm is a good example of the faith of the Old Testament being inseparable from the land history, and creation. Here man's utter dependence on the land for his food and God as his only true Guide are completely interwoven. This is clearly summed up in the last verse (72):

> "He fed them according to the integrity of his heart; and guided them by the skilfulness of his hands."

We are continually meeting this same interdependence of the land and Hebrew faith, as for example,

> "The Lord will be jealous for the land and bless (or pity) his people." (Joel ii, 18).

The land comes first, as a necessary condition to blessing the people. Famine has detrimental effects upon the worship of the temple (Joel i, 9). Caleb—one of the few saints of the Old Testament, for of no one else is it said that "he wholly followed the Lord" (Deut. i, 36)—is given as a reward, not a mystical

[5] Thornton, *The Incarnate Lord*, p. 112.

heavenly crown, but the good, the real land. Part of Uzziah's great godly character is that he *loved* husbandry (II Chron. xxvi, 10). Creation and man's use of divine resources for his natural requirements of food are the real foundation of Israel's faith. This is the tough foundation of the religion of reality which may seem to have little or no connexion with religion as we sometimes think of it. As Professor Dodd has put it:[6]

> "The strength of the people lay in this simple farming stock tenacious of the land and its traditions progressing through unremitting industry, yet never far from the poverty which the death of the bread-winner or two or three bad harvests might bring. To put one's best into the soil . . . . are its root values—and no bad foundation for religion, though of religion in the technical sense there is almost nothing said".

Why farming people are so often regarded as "simple" one does not know, they are simple only in the sense of not being complex academically, but behind a thin simpleness on the outside, country people have a depth of character and feeling for which anyone who has lived with them much can only have a profound regard. What the author means by *religion in a technical sense* is perhaps not perfectly clear. Probably he means "doctrine" as we commonly think of it, assent given to formulas, as articles of religion or creeds. Yet it would be untrue to suppose that these people had no religious convictions. They had, but like religious convictions in other ages, these sometimes became smothered up by the rough and tumble of hard living. It must be borne in mind too that often it is religious technicalities that rob religion of much of its meaning and purpose. As, for example, when church ceremonial becomes the mistress rather than our aid and servant of worship; or when *saying* we believe in God is regarded as more important than living the kind of life that shows we must believe in him.

Elsewhere[7] Professor Dodd makes it clear that the tenacity which is necessary to a farmer's life makes demands upon his

[6] *The Authority of the Bible*, p. 147.
[7] *The Authority of the Bible*, p. 265.

spiritual resources. This is important, and as valid to-day as in the times of the Old Testament. Agricultural prosperity is an integral part of the wholeness of life, contingent upon the faithfulness of the Israelites towards God (Deut. xxviii, 1-14). They are to become the "Head" of creation, only as his blessing rests upon all creation (vv. 13-14). The art of prayer (which is something very different from *saying* prayers) and the art of husbandry are linked, we may add sacramentally linked together (Ecclus. vii, 14-15). This thought also provides the basis—a clue to the meaning of—the great liturgical chapter (Deut. xxvi) which again foreshadows the Christian Eucharist, where the reality of the fruitful land is the prerequisite of all it implies by offering, communion with God and sanctification. Even though the later prophets may seem to occupy themselves with, supposedly, "higher" matters, they assume the relevance of creation and the land. Malachi (iv, 6), for example, realizes that the worst form of judgement is for the Lord to smite the earth. The reality of the land and its welfare are quite explicit in the Book of Joel; and most modern scholars refuse to consider any form of allegorical interpretation of Joel.[8] Job offers some interesting observations; sarcastically he suggested (xii, 7) that the beasts of the fields and the fowls of the air might help him to solve his problem. Yet in the end the Almighty answered him by a lengthy appeal to creation (Chps. xxxviii-xl) and finally blessed Job with great agricultural blessings (xlii, 12) which are exactly double what he had in the beginning (cp. i, 3) and these appear to take preference, too, over his seven sons and three daughters which are the same as he had at the beginning (cp. 1, 2).

The Old Testament and the apocrypha, since they were written by many hands over a very long period of time, do not provide us with any systematic picture of Israel's religious thought. Nevertheless underneath the whole of it runs a particular attitude to creation and to the land which cannot lightly be dismissed. This attitude is different to the ideas about creation found in other ancient philosophies, and has a very

[8] See Wade's *Commentary* (Westminster), p. liv.

definite *religious* significance; if we are to know the loving kindness of the Lord in reality we are bidden to observe and ponder upon his created works (Ps. cvii, 43; cp. lxiv, 9). Their importance is brought home to us also through the wisdom and word (*logos*) doctrines to which the New Testament quite often appeals back. All things consist by divine Wisdom (Prov. viii, 22 ff; Wisd. vii, 22 ff; Jer. x, 12 etc.). Again it is his Word which is the reason and cause of Creation (Ps. xxxiii, 6; Ecclus. xliii, 26).[9] The word has in fact a double aspect of divine utterance and divine activity (Cp. Deut. viii, 3 RV). "It combines God's creative work and man's understanding, (yet) God is an abstract being distinct from the world and men".[10]

It is important to keep in mind that the New Testament, all the way through, presupposes the old, though this is far too often forgotten. Paul (a true Hebrew, but by no means a countryman!) sees that the one permanent, and final vindication of God is that he provides our food (Acts xiv, 17). The New Testament is a progressive revelation, fulfilling, but never denying, the Old. Christ is the great Fulfiller rather than the great Reformer; and so we find man's double relationship, to creation on the one hand, to God on the other, completed in Christ. This can be seen conveniently in three ways which though they may appear to be independent of each other, nevertheless are three distinct aspects of his gospel. Yet they are but parts of a whole for it is always important to see the life, person and work of Christ as one important unity.

First, as is so obvious and yet so misunderstood, much of his teaching is rooted in nature and creation. The Sower and the seed, the good and the corrupt tree, consider the lilies, these all are not merely "illustrations" in words, for behind them is an understanding of all created things which few, if indeed any other man of nature has ever apprehended, let alone understood.

[9] And cp. "God *said* . . . ." Gen. i, 3.

[10] Cook, *An Introduction to the Bible*, p. 129. Cp. also Heb. xi, 3. The use of *rhema* rather than *logos* as in Heb. i, 3, tends to strengthen rather than weaken the argument.

When he said "Consider the lilies . . ." he meant *consider* them. That is contemplate the relationship of the lily, and all other created things, to God himself. It is just his deep understanding of nature which gives so much of his teaching its real point. As Professor Dodd has put it,[11] "human life, including the religious life, is a part of nature as distinctly stated in the well-known passage 'Consider the fowls of the air . . .' (Lk. xii, 24-28). This sense of the divineness of the natural order is the major premise of all the parables". Some of the teaching concerning his own person, e.g. the corn of wheat which must die to live again (Jn. xii, 24), is again based upon this supreme understanding of nature and leads us to the second aspect—his person. The Revelation of the Incarnation is itself a cosmological event. (Col. i, 15 ff; Jn. i, 1 ff; Heb. i, 1-3). In Christ all things (i.e. all created things) are gathered together in one (Eph. i, 10). It is often overlooked that not one isolated verse, but three separate New Testament writers all agree than any comprehension of the person of Christ must involve a reference back to Creation. He is the fulfilment of the Wisdom and Word creation doctrine of the Old Testament, and thereby hangs his justification. That by him all things consist (Col. i, 17) leads directly on to his Headship of the Church. There is no break in the thought, Christ's relationship to creation is the ground of his Headship of the Church. Both Colossians (i, 17-18) and Ephesians (i, 22-23) (the only epistles which really deal with this relationship) bear witness to the same cosmological significance of his Headship of the Church.

The feeding of the five thousand (Mk. vi, 34 f and parallels) appears to illustrate concisely the three aspects of our Lord in one. His concern for the material, physical needs of the people is clear—"He had compassion upon them". He realized, too, that man never lives just by the bare (natural) fruits of the earth, but these have to be processed, the wheat has to be *made* into bread; and he taking the small amount, begins to prepare their meal, then looking up to heaven, giving thanks for them,

[11] *Parables of the Kingdom*, p. 21-22.

he invokes divine creative action. Here, possibly, is a Christological hint about himself, he creates, thus he is God, or at any rate shows forth the power of God in providing food.[12] His Lordship over all creation becomes apparent. Concerned as he is with the material needs of the people, this is never enough. Through the supplying of their needs, he reveals divine power and glory. St. John leads his account of the feeding of the five thousand straight in to our third aspect of Christ, the Eucharist. Here all our Lord's teaching about men and their needs, about himself and about God are gathered together. Under the conception of the Bread of Life, the fruits of the earth (processed by man, bread and wine, not wheat and grapes) are combined with his own person and given by him to the Church in perpetuity. Though in one sense he has completed and fulfilled and is the final revelation of God to man, in another sense, by his own institution and command, this fulfilment of life and revelation of himself and God are pushed outward and onward into his Church for all ages. We cannot embark, here, on anything but the briefest reference to the Eucharist. It must be sufficient to say that underlying everything else that can, and should, be said about it, there is a fundamental connecting relativity between Christ himself and the fruits of the earth. In whatever way we attempt to answer the question "What does the Eucharist mean?", our answer will be incomplete if it neglects creation and man's use of the land. In the consecration we refer to the bread and wine as *"these thy creatures"*,[13] and this should help us to remember that however we conceive them after consecration, what they are before is of importance to the meaning of our offering and oblation.

[12] The people may well have had portions of the Old Testament brought back to them. Cp. Ex. xvii, 1-7; Num. xi, 22; Ps. lxxviii, 19-20; cxlv. 16.

[13] In the 1549 Prayer-book, as in the American canon of to-day—"Thy holy gifts". There does not seem any real ground for suggesting consecration has the effect of making what is unholy holy. Compare also David's offering—"all things come of thee and of thine own have we given thee" (I Chron. xxix, 14).

In Christ, then, we get a direct and permanent link, a tie which must not be broken, between man-in-nature and man-in-God; a creative and redemptive wholeness which, admittedly, is not always simple to do full justice to. Dualism cannot do justice to this fullness and wholeness, which is an essential character of him, his revelation of God, and the meaning of Life. The real implications of this fullness which is in Christ (Col. i, 19; ii, 9 etc.) may easily be overlooked. The Greek is *pleroma* which may be both passive, the thing filled, or active, the thing which fills; in Christ both senses are indicated, however even more important is the form of this fullness. It is not so much the fullness as in a pail of water (which is not so very different if it is only half full, for it is still a pail plus water), rather it is the fullness we find in a garment, an ampleness, an abundant copiousness or plenitude, something which would be quite different if it was not for its fullness. It is the ampleness of divine life manifested to us in Christ which we are always circumscribing and limiting and thereby distorting the *Big* picture of him of the New Testament.[14] It is his fullness, too, which must prevent us (and this caution is perhaps necessary) from saying that he is only King of creation or Lord of agriculture. He is those things, and he is more. Nor are these offices which can be tacked on to our other conceptions of him, for that would be merely putting new cloth into old garments. Every aspect of Christ is such that it bears influence on the whole of his person. For example, if we hold that he is the Lord of Agriculture, this must of necessity to some extent shape our conception of him as Master or Redeemer, as our Passover or Bread of Life. With Christ mathematical laws break down, the whole is always greater than the sum total of the parts. Because one argues that agriculture is particularly relevant to religion and especially to Christianity, one must not suppose that Christ is *only* (or merely) Lord of the Land, or the Master

[14] The Church should be the reflection of this fullness of Christ. In that it fails to reflect this fullness, the Church fails. It seems clear that this fullness is an *essential* of the doctrine of the Church and the clue to the Church's catholicism.

Husbandman. The Gospel of wholeness does however *begin* there. And if we are to appreciate fully many of his deeper sayings, such as "I am the Way, the Truth, the Life" or even more, "This is my body", we must see these words as part of a whole gospel, which begins in creation and is continued as man deals with the renewing of creation in his own dealings with the land from whence he derives the very substance of all life—food.

This "renewing of Creation" does, however, go on far beyond the gaining of our food; on to redemption and Life everlasting. The cross is not merely a cosmic event, yet it has quite definite cosmic significance, because first *in* death, and then *through* death, all creation comes to its destiny.[15] It is *through the blood of the cross* that our Lord accomplishes his reconciliation with all things (Col. i, 20). Death is our *enemy* (I Cor. xv, 26), not a friend who releases and liberates us from life to something better beyond. If Creation was thoroughly bad and heaven, in contrast, good, would we not say death was our *friend?* Even so, our true glory is in the cross (Gal. vi, 14), for in the cross we find the real clue to the mystery of created being. Yet the cross itself is a mystery (I Cor. xv, 51), a divine secret, which like court secrets are made open to those who live close to the king. Those who live out their lives close to Christ are able to say "O death where is thy sting?", and to live here believing all the time in the reality of the life of the world to come; for that Eternal Life (*zoe*) is to be realized even in this world (Jn. iii, 36; xvii, 3; I Tim. iv, 8 etc. also cp. Jn. xi, 25). Our Lord taught that the Son of Man must suffer; that this was imperative and compulsory; his statement did, however, include with it the promise of raising again (Mk. viii, 31). This is a fact of creation, in rhythm with the order of all created life. He likens it, as we mentioned before, to a grain of wheat dying,

[15] Incidentally it is legitimate to ask if it is possible at all even to attempt any explanation of the Atonement apart from creation. It is worth noticing at any rate that Article II, of the XXXIX, connects the facts of the cross to the facts of the Incarnation without even a full stop !

to bring forth fruit again (Jn. xii, 24). His death on the cross is in keeping and a completion of what creation is all the way through. It is only by facing the actual facts of creation as we see them, and going down deeply into them with our thoughts, that we can overcome the "apparent incompatibility" to which Temple referred in his sermon which we have already quoted. At times even the most faithful of us want to abolish the cross; and with Peter rebuke our Lord for preaching such a bloody doctrine (Mk. viii, 32). With the disciples we would turn away from him for the idea (Jn. vi, 66). Yet for the sake of popularity or to make things simple to our minds we must not shirk this fullness in our Lord's teaching. And we must remember, too, that Good Friday, a death, presupposes creation, and that Easter Day hinges on what happened on Good Friday. Both of these, then, arise from what creation *is,* and so present us with the shape of redemption in Christ. This is an added reason why we said at the start that creation and not redemption is the core of the Christian faith.

We can very easily misinterpret the Cross and all it stands for, not so much by misunderstanding Christ himself or the gospel, but by misconceiving creation in relation to the Creator and He-in-Christ. We see that he is revealing himself, perhaps, but fail to see just how he is revealing himself to us by reconciling all things, i.e. the whole of the created order, to God and to himself. For this order is such that it demands—or seems to demand—some manifestation of its meaning and purpose (Rom. viii, 19 ff). Trying to find a meaning in the cross and its relation to our redemption is not simple; it is only too easy to miss the significance of creation; as Mary supposed he was just the gardener (Jn. xx, 15),[16] the kind of mistake which both reveals and obscures a part, perhaps an important part, of the whole truth which is in Christ. At this point we must remind ourselves, too, that scripture sees the Resurrection and the Ascension in the closest connexion (Cp. Acts ii, 32-33; Eph. i, 20

[16] He is, of course, truly the Master Gardener and Master Husbandman, but how seldom do we think of him as such.

etc.). He rose and ascended, furthermore, as man, as taking up into glory all things; not (as occasionally it seems to be implied) as emancipating himself from a naughty world.

The Church, if it is truly to confront the world with Christ, must confront it with this wholeness, or fullness, of Life as this is seen in him. That it seldom in fact does so, and holds before the world a limited, and thus distorted, picture of he who Is, is a tragedy we need not dwell upon now. Rather let us see how the Church can, and must, proclaim this fuller gospel in which life in the sense of physical being (*psyche*) is the foundation and way into Life Eternal (*zoe*). The sacramental relationship of these, their oneness, is perhaps the innermost secret of Christian faith (cp. Jn. vi, 40). No one lives only for bodily reasons, even though they may seem to, but for those things which are extra to the body, and are realized through the body. Christianity proclaims that all extra bodily functions, such as joy, hope, faith, above all love, are only fully found in Christ. For two reasons, because of the Incarnation itself, on one hand, and because men cannot be men, let alone saints, apart from their bodies, Christianity is the widest and the most materialistic of all religions, embracing as it does not only the whole of man, but all he depends on both in heaven *and* earth. Nor should we ever overlook the fact that this wideness of our religion is narrowed down and seen, pin-pointed as it were, in the Incarnation, in "him in whom all things consist". To be practical the Church must proclaim what appears to be two things, and yet are in reality but one, these two are the right use of our natural resources, what is commonly known at Good Husbandry, *and* the fullness of a dogmatic faith, which is something more than a mere spiritual morality, a true reflection of the Incarnation itself.

Precisely what we mean by good husbandry is not as easy to define as those who do not understand the land appear to assume it is. It is, of course, the practice of a certain mode of agriculture, and the observance of simple rules. Yet it is more than this—it is a relationship with the land into which the farmer enters. It is a fidelity in the strictest sense which includes con-

formity to truth and fact. It is to honour, cherish, and obey the land.[17] "Obey" is perhaps the important and operative word. It is an understanding, the kind of understanding between a man and wife which words will not serve, and to which words may sometimes in fact be a disservice. A farmer who sees his land as a dumb, yet living and active partner in his job, comprehends the mystery of Good Husbandry. Agriculture today is, and rightly so, scientific, but not wholly so, as any good farmer readily acknowledges. Science has definite limitations which on the land are fairly well understood by the good farmer, and totally neglected by the bad one. Here we ought to mention a certain school of thought in agriculture who make claims for organic, as against inorganic, methods of husbandry and say that the use of what are called "artificial" manures are detrimental under all circumstances, whereas organic manures, dung, are good. No one would deny that rather more dung on the land than the English farmer can produce under present conditions would be a good thing. Yet good husbandry is not determined by what manure is used, but the way in which all manures are used and related to the whole process of cultivating the land. In agriculture, as in theological fields, there are some who, by putting the limelight on a fraction of the truth, try to make out that it is the whole truth. A great deal of the art of the farmer is a technical skill about which the Church, as the Church, can have little or nothing to say. But we must not suppose, nor, which may be worse, let any farmer suppose that his whole craft is technical. (As a matter of fact no really good farmer does fall into this error.) Many farmers are ready to acknowledge that "the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof", and that it is by the command of God that we labour upon the land (Gen. i, 28 cp. Ecclus. vii, 15). Because the land

[17] It is worthy of notice that the same kind of (mystic) relationship exists between God and man, Christ and the Church, man and the land, and between man and wife. It is not merely an accident of words, for it points to a common principle behind, what we might call the theology of relationships; and it is one clue to what sacramentalism really is.

has social, economic and political implications for everyone, the Church has a duty to maintain the importance of the land to *all* her members, quite apart from the strictly religious implications of the earth.

This is of very special relevance to the world situation of to-day. The world is a great deal shorter of food than most people realize, even if they do realize a probable cause of this shortage—war. "Swords or ploughshares" is as much a question of the moment as it is of the Old Testament. The situation is bad enough, but the fact that those who control the destinies of mankind, parliaments, politicians, as much as the leaders of organized religion, are doing almost nothing about it. Soil is neglected, it is permitted to become a dust bowl; and land is allowed to become unproductive. While the situation is becoming daily worse through an increase in the world's population, the amount of land fit to produce food is fast decreasing. For all our benefits of an alleged intelligent and rational age, supported by science and technology, we are running straight ahead into the age of want, sheer want of food. If the series of upheavals which have marked the first half of the twentieth century for world history are not to lead to utter disaster in the second half and succeeding centuries, mankind has got to look to the land. And so looking to husband it, to nurse the land, to encourage, first, land fertility, and, second, food production. Merely to seek, first and last, food production will only be to rob the land still further. Soil fertility is the basis of human society just as much as the Love of God is its crowning point.

Here I believe the Christian Church has an opportunity of winning the respect and the allegiance of the world as it has never done before. The Church *could* (but will it?) take this opportunity and proclaim to the world, not only that the earth is the Lord's, but that he has given man a charge to subdue it, and use it for both man's own benefit and God's own glory. Man's despair is God's opportunity in facing a situation to which governments appear reluctant to give a primary place. Surely the guide to all this is the parable of the talents, keeping in mind, too, that of the wicked husbandman. God has given to man

the land, but what use are we putting it to? Are we not a wicked and slothful generation, allowing his gifts to be wasted rather than trading (i.e. using) them to produce his wealth? So far as the welfare of the land is concerned the Church is anything but a good and faithful servant. What can we then expect from the Lord of the vineyard and the Heir, but judgement, harsh judgement? There may be some who would question whether the land is the concern of Christ's Church, however most of those asking this question would claim that the problems of marriage (and divorce) are. Where is the difference? Both concern relationships. Both forms of relationship are holy in the sense that they concern vital matters apprehended by faith rather than knowledge; to argue that the Holy Ghost can be a reality in marriage but not in agriculture is to expose one's ignorance of nature, human and otherwise. The hand of God is an active partner in agriculture, as many very practical farmers are the first to acknowledge. He is present with the husbandman in his work in a manner in which no one else can encounter the hand of God. Those who are conscious of his presence in this way see, perhaps, the sacramental relationship of God and man with the land acting in a double sense; a double sense which we can call the "to" and "from". First the Church must bring to bear on agricultural problems the gospel of good husbandry and fair treatment of the land. Just as in marriage it is difficult to say one sort of conduct is right and the other wrong (even though theoretical morality delights in trying to make it appear so), so in farming there are not just right and wrong methods, but a right and a wrong attitude to the whole of a husbandman's calling. The Church is not concerned with details of method, but with emphasizing to all that husbandry—upon which the life of the world depends—is an art, a calling which is Holy in a sacramental sense, and to which there must be a specifically *Christian* attitude. This is bringing the gospel *to* the land, a task which is something more than seeing that dairy maids go to their communions, though it may ultimately involve this too. What might be called the ethics of good husbandry need far more study than anyone has given them in recent years. It is all too

easy to condemn this or that way of farming, because we are not completely sure of how far it is legitimate for man to interfere with the natural order. It is true a lot of people fancy they know, but it is a serious question whether enough thought has been given to this in the light of modern, scientific methods of agriculture. To condemn modern methods because they are modern is an absurdity.

Side by side with the proclamation by the Church of the gospel *to* the land is the enrichment of the Church by the gospel *from* the land. We have already discussed this, and seen that there is an important factor in Christian faith which arises from the land, yet which is in no sense pantheism, because it is vindicated by reference to Christ. This double relevance of the land (if such it may be called) finds its place in the Lambeth Report for 1948 in the committee's report on the Christian doctrine of man (p. 6):

> "Those who live by raising crops—the most obvious instance of man's co-operation with the Creator—can still understand better than anyone else the religious conception of man's work in the world, in dependence on God, and for the service of his will. Thus the new concern of the Church with agriculture may be found to have far-reaching social consequences."

The religious conception referred to here can have even more consequences than those we might usually call "social". It can and should have a definite religious effect in deepening the faith of the whole Church. It must indeed be so conceived and acted upon that it does have this result. If the Church approaches this new concern it has with agriculture in the spirit of unwillingness to learn, then it will be missing an opportunity to regain the fullness of the gospel which (we must be honest) the Church has completely lost. The Lambeth Report also says that one of the most urgent needs of our time is the marriage between true science and true religion. We must emphasize the word *true*. As agriculture has its scientific and religious aspects, we may well find that it may provide the wanting clue to the real Christian connexion between science and religion. Indeed, in the light of what we find happens in man's tilling of the ground,

we may well have to reconsider the meaning which we attach to both the words, *science* and *religion*. Science, so far as it can demonstrate the "how" of life, sets before us a working principle, a principle which is obscured to some extent by its great diversity. Nature is far from the simple thing some would have it to be. But science cannot say anything of the cause of this principle, or the power behind it. That is the "why" of life which is the concern of religion. It may be true in a mathematical sense that one cannot add a how and a why. But one can see the fallacy of attempting to subtract the one from the other, for neither the "how" nor "why" of life gives us a satisfactory explanation of life as we see it, or as we experience it in its wholeness. They must impinge on each other and this they do in our relationship with the land as in no other experience of man. Science and religion may be two intersecting circles. It is in the intersecting portion, where man truly lives, that the meaning of both is truly found, and it is also here where agriculture surely must be truly placed.

The revival at the present time of the agricultural services of Plough Sunday, Rogation and Lammas is to be welcomed and further extended. One word of warning is, however, necessary. The rightful background and setting must be understood; these services can so easily be used by the Church as occasions for a stunt or to make a splash, and their real meaning entirely overlooked. It was because their theological significance had been forgotten that they fell out of fashion, let us not bring them back now and forget that they rest upon good doctrine and sound theology. Just as Christmas, Easter and the other major festivals of the Church are essential to our understanding of the life of our Lord, so these agricultural observances are part of the whole gospel. In some fashion they must be woven into the life of the Church, and not regarded as an optional extra of little importance in comparison, say, to Easter. The origin of Whitsun, when we think of the life of the Church, is truly agricultural, since Pentecost was a Jewish agricultural festival, and, coming as it does close on the heels of Rogationtide, should be seen as related to our prayers for the life of the

earth itself. So much of the Church's teaching is not false, but wholly out of focus in the minds of even faithful churchgoers. The gospel is put in abstraction rather than in the setting of the realities of human life. It was just these realities which, so often, our Lord had to drive home in his teaching. Being born again (Jn. iii, 3 and 7) is not a kind of mystical obstetric abracadabra, at which we might truly marvel, but a fact of this life which narrow minds, ignorant of the ways of nature, know nothing about. We are all, in one sense, " born not of blood nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God " (Jn. i, 13). Our task is to realize this in our own lives. While life is transmitted by the manifold processes of reproduction it is not *created* by them. God, as Creator, is the *one* true Father of all life (Mat. xxiii, 9). Our Lord, then, was not essentially different because *he* was " born of God ". By misunderstanding of what life really is we may easily overlook the point in John's prologue, that Christ is a revelation of what life primarily *is*. For this reason it seems essential to the whole of his teaching to be able to understand earthly things, and their divine significance, if we are to appreciate heavenly ones at all (Jn. iii, 12).

It is through man's concern with the land that he encounters in a most obvious way this secret of life. He feels God as well as thinks about him. Perhaps *feeling* God as well as thinking about him is the height of true prayer and worship. (But how seldom does anyone point this out!) It is from the land, and perhaps nowhere else, that the Church can, and indeed must, if she is to survive, regain this conception of life; a conception which makes it at once real and at once Holy. It is also interesting to notice that the Evangelism Report[18] says that if there is to be a national revival in religion the seeds of this may germinate in the countryside and spread to the towns and cities. No reason is given for this suggestion, one can only surmise that a vague sense of the reality of the countryman's religion was in mind, such as we have attempted to outline here. To many people to-day the countryman's religion seems to be a form—sometimes even a crude form of paganism which seems nearly synonymous

[18] *Towards the Conversion of England,* par. 177.

with heathenism. That is not, however, the case; few people who use the word *pagan* so glibly to-day, use it in its correct sense. In origin, at least, paganism stands for the kind of religious faith which is rustic or which pertains to village or what may be called "native" life. It was Tertullian and St. Augustine who contrasted such rustic religion of their day with the Christian teaching, and thus made it almost the same as heathenism. In their day there was probably good reason for this contrast, but to-day there is none. The countryman does not worship a false nature god; he worships God in his own rustic natural way. This may often appear incompatible with the Church's dogmatic faith—if it is dogmatic—concerning Christ. Notwithstanding this contrast, this deep-rooted, apparent paganism can and must be brought together in truth, unity and concord with the Church's faith. The Church's faith is not wrong, but it is often presented in the wrong way: in abstraction, rather than a series of truths which arise from the fullness of our Lord's work, life and teaching. A creed is essential to a Church, but it is never enough. A credal formula of words is often regarded as "safe", but when the attempt is made to work out the implications of such a creed in life and being, it is often regarded as dangerous, if not heretical. Our creeds are in fact one statement made up of a series of statements within it and depending upon the preceding one. Thus that God is "Maker of heaven and earth" has to be believed in *as religion*, and thus made to affect our lives, otherwise it is not religion at all but hypothetical metaphysics. God as Creator, then, seems to be the basis of the whole creed and of Christian dogma. St. Paul is explicit about two things concerning Christian faith. It is *one* whole gospel (Eph. vi, 15; I Tim. i, 11 etc.) also that it makes no difference to whom it is preached, it must be preached in the same way. It cannot be twisted and craftily manipulated to suit a particular sort of congregation (II Cor. iv, 1-6).[19] It is just the gospel of God, not to be watered down, twisted or sugar-coated. There is no special gospel for the agricultural community, there

[19] See Goudge's *II Corinthians*, p. 38, for a long and interesting note on this section, which begins "Attention to these six verses might save Christian preachers from many mistakes . . . ."

is, however, a special agricultural element in the gospel which should find its place in all preaching. And these are two very different things. The land and man's use of it has a significance for it which no other work or occupation can have, just because in this man has to be an active partner with the power of the unseen, declared to us to be the power and wisdom of God in Christ.

To sum up, then, let us take an allegory from the cow shed —Christian faith is as a milking stool set upon three legs; a simple looking object until one tries to make one, and one discovers the secret of each leg set at an angle and in tension to others. Each leg, while independent of the others, upholds what the others do. Our faith is supported by three legs, (a) the authority of the bible, (b) the authority and living voice of the Church, and (c) the authority of the indefinable but very real, inner light, or individual conviction. Many try to make do with a one-legged, a shooting-stick, faith. Up to a point this may be permissible, yet it can never hold the whole weight of true faith. One of the biggest problems of the true Christian is to learn the importance of each of these, both separately and in concord with the other two. Yet even when this is achieved (and it must be admitted that probably it is not often achieved perfectly), it is never enough. A milking stool depends on the law of gravity; the legs must stand on the ground; our faith, through the bible, the Church and our inner light, stands on the world, nature and creation, which upholds our real faith through the three legs. A stool with either one or two, or four or more legs can never stand firm as a three-legged one can. Christian thought can never afford to forget that men do not live by bread alone, yet they must first live by bread, the staff of life, and discover through this that our fuller life here on earth extends right into heaven through true worship; that kind of worship which in its fullness reiterates the fullness of Christ so that the whole earth becomes full of God's Glory (Is. vi, 3 RVm). By bringing together Christ and the land we can truly hope for a more understanding and faithful world which can be brought to know, in its truest and deepest sense, both the Fear of the Lord, and the Love of God.

REVIEWS

PROBLEMS OF REUNION. By A. E. J. RAWLINSON, Bishop of Derby. (Eyre and Spottiswoode). 9s.

ANY work on the problem of reunion written by the Bishop of Derby is worthy of close attention, not only because of the charm and ability with which he always writes on theological subjects, but also because of his practical leadership in the cause of Christian reunion. Few single figures from the Anglican side can have contributed so much in recent years towards the goal for which so many plan and pray.

Those who are familiar with the early phases of the bishop's thought will find little to surprise them here. The wide liberalism and essential orthodoxy of the "New Testament Doctrine of the Christ" is reflected alike in his sense of the importance of continuity with historic Christendom and his refusal to take for granted the theological rough-working by which orthodox conclusions are normally attained. Those who have used the volume of essays entitled *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation,* edited by him nearly thirty years ago, will recognize the skill and ability with which he has selected topics for treatment here which bear upon the living issues of the day.

A man of action, and particularly a bishop with diocesan and wider responsibilities, is, however, not best placed for making a decisive impact upon contemporary theology. It is the old problem of the man of action who has not sufficient leisure of mind to work out as fully as either he or his contemporaries might wish the principles upon which his action is based, while the theologian with his academic equipment more recent than that of the bishop's can succeed in being, is frequently too detached and of insufficient stature to step successfully into the breach. The Bishop of Derby's book has the weakness of its veritable strength. It is written as a series of studies, some of them delivered as charges to his diocese, others as individual papers and lectures. These last are not all as relevant to the main subject of the work as they might be, but are of value as further illustrations of the mind and temper of the author

in other fields. Much the most valuable part of the book consists in a review of the work entitled *The Apostolic Ministry,* full of sound and penetrating criticism.

There is, in the nature of the case, no suggestion that he is offering a new theology of the Church, and ministry, yet it is precisely this from a point of view similar to that of the Bishop of Derby that is urgently needed at the moment. When it is produced, it will find in the present work an admirable quarry of material, but the work still needs to be done. *The Apostolic Ministry* made one such attempt, but has met with much criticism, not all of it ill-founded. Bishop Newbiggin has produced a similar effort for the Church in South India. Liberal Catholic Anglicanism still awaits its full-scale intellectual justification.

It may seem almost impertinent to say that this work shows that the bishop has grasped the essentials of the problem without having gone all the way to fill the need. In the preface he points out the new approach to schism made within recent years—to regard it as division within rather than from the Church. A frank recognition of this fact must inevitably lead to the abandonment of classical rigid Cyprianism. The question, however, remains, " Where do we go to from here?" The old Tractarian doctrine of the Church stood for the theory of the Branch Church. Those Churches which kept the historic faith and which possessed valid ministries and sacraments were, despite their mutual divisions, parts of the Catholic Church. But it was always rather difficult to maintain with anything like strictness for not only did it leave out of account or settle in a negative sense the Churchmanship of the Free Churches but also might be criticized for attempting to have it both ways. Either schism exists between the branches of the Catholic Church or it does not. If it does, the safe assurance of Catholicity remains illusory, if not, the whole concept of Church unity has received a severe, if not a fatal, blow. It is in any case founded on Augustinian premises, which Newman, as long ago as 1887, in the interests of the older Cyprianism, placed in jeopardy. Catholic Churchmanship does not draw its validity from the possession of valid ministries and sacraments; it gives to them their essential validation. As the bishop clearly sees, it is the existence of *episcopi vagantes* that constitutes the fundamental weakness of the Augustinian doctrine. On Cyprianic principles they have forfeited their status by being sundered from the Church; on Augustinian principles, due in part to an ill-advised attempt to heal the Donatist schism more speedily, a bishop sundered from the communion of the Great Church is capable of creating and perpetuating schism. The fundamental principle of the work, *The Apostolic Ministry,* really rests

upon a somewhat extreme form of the Augustinian premise—that the essential ministry depends directly upon Christ whereas the dependent ministry issues directly from the Church and is therefore modifiable at need. The existence of rural deans need cause no heartaches in the field of reunion discussions !

What seems to be the direction in which the bishop's studies are pointing is a new Cyprianism which holds Church and ministry firmly together and which yet recognizes the fact of schism as trouble within the Church. By far the most important part of this particular problem is the status of those ministries which have lost their historic pattern, or never secured it, and which are yet part of a regularly constituted Church life. Dr. Rawlinson is right to remind those who take up the attitude of *The Apostolic Ministry* of the need to define positively as well as negatively what the status of Free Church ministries may be considered to be. To call them " spiritually efficacious " and leave it at that does not really begin to touch the problem. The recognition of such ministries as real, which dates back to 1923, certainly needs clarification. It is at worst an ambiguity, at best an evasion of the essential problem. To deem that they possess solely a " prophetic ministry ", while recognizing an essential element within the Free Church tradition does less than justice to the prophetic elements in the ministry of the historic Church and to the fact that the Free Church ministries really make the claim to be doers of the sacraments. To deny that they actually perform sacraments considered as Churchly acts, even by implication, would be in effect to reduce their ministrations to the status of those possible for the Christian laity. It may be possible to recognize all ministries as valid within the limits of their Church conception and their ecclesiastical limitations and this is perhaps the best approach for a new Cyprianism to take, but it meets the serious difficulty that the Anglican Church is not the only one to commission its ministerial priesthood for the " office and work . . . in the Church of God ". It may well be that we are all wrong to claim as much as this, but the plain fact is that most Churches in fact do so. A really theological treatment of the consequences in the doctrine of the ministry of this new approach to the problem of schism is an urgent necessity. Dr. Rawlinson clearly sees as much, but his treatment unfortunately just falls below the kind of treatment which it would require.

Dr. Rawlinson, on page 140 and following, raises a somewhat related point—the celebration of the Holy Communion by a layman. That this is no mere academic exercise is proved by the fact that one of the constituent denominations of the Church of South India had actually authorized this practice in cases of urgent need.

The right of a layman to baptize in case of need is, for an Anglican, not in doubt. Wherein lies the fatal difference between lay administration of Holy Baptism and lay celebration of the Holy Communion? He quotes the two relevant opposite authorities, Tertullian and St. Thomas Aquinas. The former, on the grounds of the principle of the priesthood of the laity, finds no special difficulty here, the latter, while not denying Tertullian's theological principle, does not regard it as having any bearing on the case. Here, surely, unless, as is sometimes maintained in Free Church circles, the principle of the priesthood of the laity does away with the possibility of a ministerial priesthood, St. Thomas is right and Tertullian is wrong. The doctrine of the priesthood of the laity is exhausted by the fact that the laity are potentially capable of ordination. The tendency on the part of some writers to speak of Confirmation as the ordination to the priesthood of the laity, while a helpful image, has grave theological dangers. The layman has a status, not an office, and the use of the term ordination in this connexion really darkens counsel. St. Thomas gives as his reason for the refusal of permission to the laity to celebrate the Holy Eucharist, the great dignity of the sacrament. He further maintains the solid ground that whereas the reception of the Holy Communion is the necessary and prime aspect of the spiritual life where it may be had, sacramentally speaking, Holy Baptism must be had for the initiation of the Christian into the spiritual life at all. Apart from a baptism of desire on the part of catechumens who are martyred, no relaxation of this principle has ever been envisaged. There is thus no substitute for Holy Baptism, although where the Holy Communion may not be had, there still remain unexpended, the "iron rations" of a Christian. A really isolated company of Christian men might be tempted to celebrate the Holy Communion without a priest. That such an action might be spiritually efficacious is not open to doubt. God giveth not his Spirit by measure. That it might be a *sacramentale* again need not be doubted. They would be performing an action which they might reasonably regard as supported by the regular framework of the Church's normal ordered existence and their own past regular sacramental experience. That it could not be in the proper sense a *sacramentum* again is perfectly clear, since one of the normal constituents of the sacramental act would be missing and neither their own status within the principle of the priesthood of the laity, nor the protective framework of regular Church order and worship could avail to transfer a *sacramentale* into the category of a *sacramentum*.

There is a curious half-truth on page 24. To indicate the difference which the fact of schism makes in the interpretation of New

Testament texts concerning the Church, the bishop quotes the Pauline statement "Christ loved the Church and gave himself for it" in a number of forms designed to reveal them as half truths of the *pars pro toto* variety. This is a perfectly defensible technique although the more logical and intransigeant members of some of the communions concerned find apparently no difficulty in making this equation. But the substitution would be patent of another and truer interpretation that despite the fragmentation of the Church in schism God gives himself no less for the fragmented portions than for the whole. The point would be more convincing if it were not so ambiguous.

Two errors in detail have slipped in, both concerned with initials. Dr. T. W. Manson appears as T. M., while on page 130 the first initials of the late Dr. Buchanan Gray should be G. and not W.

Dr. Rawlinson's book is far from being without its merits, but it does not materially alter the state of the question. It presents in a series of essays a theological view, itself widely held, which has made a considerable contribution to ecclesiastical policy over the last twenty years. What, however, is really needed if this point of view is to be successfully marshalled against its various critics is something more than what Dr. Rawlinson has already given us, the full-scale working out of a systematic theology, which will deal not merely with certain problems piecemeal, but with the whole range of topics which should be covered in a doctrine of the Church. If Dr. Rawlinson can either produce this himself, or stimulate others with equal vision and charity to produce one, he will have struck the real blow in favour of his approach for which his supporters are looking. He will be able to offer those who hesitate for fear of theological and practical implications which they cannot at present foresee the real material for making a careful and considered judgement. Those who believe that the teaching of the book *The Apostolic Ministry* will not do, have at least the confidence that its advocates have offered a full-scale exposition of their position upon which a judgement can reasonably be given. Those who hesitate to commit themselves entirely to the policy and programme which the Bishop of Derby advocates have the uneasy feeling that there may be much more to be said in its support than has so far appeared. This work does something to meet this need, but it is not by itself of sufficient weight and extent to resolve doubts and terminate uncertainties.

H. E. W. Turner.

THE PROBLEM OF CHRIST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By W. R. MATTHEWS, K.C.V.O., D.D. (Oxford University Press). 7s. 6d.

IT would be heavy-handed criticism if this latest book by the Dean of St. Paul's, containing the substance of his Maurice lectures, were discussed as a finished theological treatise or as though it offered a new Christology. That the author expressly disavows. He calls it "an essay on the Incarnation"; and it is essayists privilege to "suggest thoughts rather than to work them out with rigid consistency". The suggestions he makes are admittedly tentative; they are intended only to open up some new lines of thought about the Incarnation which may, he believes, be found to provide material for a twentieth century statement of the doctrine.

For the twentieth century has, in any case, posed the question Who is this? in a new form. It is vain, says Dr. Matthews, to plead that though much in the Gospels may be dismissed as legendary, yet the Church was not and is not mistaken in the affirmation of its central doctrine. This is, as he rightly says, to bring together two contradictory propositions. For the doctrine "is not that God has revealed himself with complete adequacy in some person but that he is manifested in *this* person and that if we would find God we must seek him in the historic Jesus of Nazareth". Moreover, though it is understandable that our Lord should have remained incognito to all except the innermost circle, it is almost impossible to imagine that he remained incognito to himself. "The plain man is, I believe, perfectly right; the ultimate ground of the doctrine of the Incarnation must be in the self-consciousness of Jesus" (p. 12).

That sentence may provoke disagreement, but it gives the text for the essay. The dean has little difficulty in showing how the classical statements of the doctrine in terms of substance-theology break down. He is kind enough to quote with approval something that I myself wrote elsewhere, that we require a Christian metaphysic which will do justice, as Platonism cannot, to the nature and status of personality. We cannot ride off on judgements of value. Confronted with a materialist philosophy, the Church is compelled to set up its own world view; "we cannot shirk the question how the Person of Christ not only fits into that world view but is its centre". (p. 39).

Now it is in the realm of personality that so much new material is available, which must at least be taken into account, and may, thinks Dr. Matthews, prove important in an eventual statement of the doctrine. The unconscious has forced itself into psychology, and much has happened since Sanday first attempted—unhappily, as we must now admit—to interpret the doctrine of Incarnation

in terms of the subliminal consciousness. He draws attention to three new hypotheses. The Freudian concept of Libido must have its bearing on " original sin " and the whole idea of Christ's sinlessness —though, as he frankly admits, it seems at present to land us in more problems than solutions. More hopefully, in my view, he turns to Jung's idea of the racial unconscious as perhaps throwing light on the traditional claim that our Lord was " not a man but Man "—which as thus stated was self-contradictory. Such a phrase as " in Adam all die " may in truth be more than metaphorical. Thirdly, extra-sensory perception and the recent approaches towards inspiration in terms of suprarational perception (as opposed to the Sanday-Myers subliminal) may be found to have bearings on Incarnation " through the operation of the Spirit ".

In his final chapter the dean turns to philosophy. For the old static concept of substance and of mind, in terms of it, as *res cogitans,* modern philosophers tend to substitute the more dynamic concept of patterns, as the constants persistent through change. The universal is a behaviour pattern. Is it possible to conceive a personal mind of which it could be said that its pattern is the same as the temporal will of God ? If so " it would be God manifest in the flesh ".

Dr. Matthews, all through this essay, is professedly tentative and experimental. He advocates no premature conclusions and commits himself to no dogmatic answers. He offers the Church some new ideas to think about, hoping that some of them may be included some day in a restatement of its central doctrine. This volume will certainly be welcomed and it deserves to be critically examined. It is written, one need scarcely add, with that freshness, candour and humility which are characteristic of the author.

RUSSELL SOUTHWELL.

FROM JOSEPH TO JOSHUA. BIBLICAL TRADITIONS IN THE LIGHT OF ARCHAEOLOGY. By H. H. ROWLEY. Schweich Lectures for 1948. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, for the British Academy). 12s. 6d.

THE opening words of this book refer to the earlier series of Schweich Lectures delivered by C. F. Burney in 1917, and published under the title of *Israel's Settlement in Canaan.* Essentially, Professor Rowley's work is a re-statement of Burney's position. In spite of a considerable number of differences, the three great props of Burney's reconstruction remain—a late thirteenth-century date for the events recorded in the Book of Exodus; the view that these

events, and those that follow them in the dominant Biblical tradition down to the close of the Book of Joshua, reflect the historical experience of only a few of the Hebrew tribes; and the importance of the Kenite clans in Israel's early development, both religious and secular. What is new since Burney's day is the evidence to be gleaned from archaeological investigations at a number of Palestinian sites, and to this Professor Rowley devotes a good deal of attention. It is no disparagement of his labours to say that the result, as far as any elucidation of the problem of the dates of the Exodus and Settlement are concerned, is quite inconclusive. Not only is the key-problem of the date of the fall of Jericho a matter of rather unhappy dispute between rival archaeologists, with no agreed solution apparent, but neither here nor at any other site, has any evidence been found to link the signs of destruction directly with the Hebrews. Until such evidence comes to light, the most important part of the extra-Biblical material is likely to remain the epigraphical—the Amarna Letters, Merneptah's stele, etc.—and the final criterion of a critic's work must be his treatment of the very diverse Old Testament material.

In these matters, Professor Rowley displays immense thoroughness and remarkable ability to grasp the import of a vast mass of facts: his final synthesis is a most impressive piece of work. It is characteristic of Professor Rowley's approach that he prefers to rely rather on scattered indications preserved by Israelite "tradition" than on historical reconstructions, within the Bible itself, made by a later and more literary age. His case against such schemes is a strong one, and it may be hoped that as a result of his work the existing chronology of the Book of Judges, which has had so much attention devoted to it, will henceforth be recognized as quite artificial. In this connexion, Professor Rowley might have referred to Noth's view in his *Uberlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien I* —elaborated later in his essay for the Bertholet *Festschrift*—that the list of the "Minor" Judges in Judges x, 1-5, and xii, 7-15, represents an independent if fragmentary chronological scheme, much more ancient and authentic than the main one of the book. Perhaps Professor Rowley sometimes gives the details of early Hebrew tradition an importance which they do not really merit. For example, he writes that "it is of the essence of the Biblical tradition" that at the time of the Exodus the Israelites were living near the Egyptian court, because Pharaoh's daughter came across the infant Moses when she went out for a walk. This suggests a date for the Oppression during a period when the Egyptian capital was established in the Delta region. But is this a valid deduction from a tale so obviously legendary as the birth-story of Moses? In general,

one of the great problems in the discussion of Israelite origins consists precisely in the vagueness of the Biblical tradition concerning events and places which figure in it before the occupation of the Promised Land, as compared with its much greater reliability for what happened on the soil of Palestine itself—the differing indications of the name and site of the holy mountain are a case in point.

While holding that the invasion under Joshua cannot be placed in the fourteenth century, Professor Rowley believes that the evidence of the Amarna Letters points to two simultaneous, but independent, invasions of Hebrew groups in that period. One was in the extreme north of Palestine and included especially Asher, Zebulun and Dan: the other was from the south, comprising Judah, Simeon, Levi and related clans such as the Kenites, one episode of which was that now related in Gen. xxxiv. The evidence connecting this latter invasion with the Habiru of the Amarna Letters is strong, and Professor Rowley's sober presentation of it will command wide assent. He would probably agree himself that the evidence for a northern invasion in the Amarna age is nothing like so cogent: indeed, it is perhaps not too much to say that there is as little clear reason for identifying the SA-GAZ with the northern Israelite tribes as there is for equating them with the Joshua group. Most of the cities mentioned in connexion with the SA-GAZ, such as Byblus and Beirut, are on the coast far to the north, and there is no evidence that the Israelites had any power there, even in the hinterland, before the reign of David. From Judges i we have the impression that such tribes as Asher and Zebulun were unable to capture the cities of the territory they occupied: yet the letter of Zimrida of Sidon [Knudtzon no. 144] and other evidence shows that the Amarna SA-GAZ took possession of a considerable number of towns. There is, in fact, no real necessity for assigning the settlement of the more northerly tribes to the century before Joshua. Professor Rowley several times writes as though the Joshua complex narrated the occupation of the whole of central Palestine by a *group* of tribes. But once it has been agreed that we may disregard the Biblical tradition that Joshua led all twelve tribes, the way is open for a recognition of the fact that the stories of Joshua ii-ix represent a specifically *Benjamite* tradition, since all the cities mentioned seem to have been reckoned in that tribe's territory. If this is so, the argument that the conquests of other tribes are not mentioned in the history of Joshua becomes an *e silentio* one of the most precarious kind. Further, we have to ask when and how the northern tribes became Yahweh-worshippers, as they certainly were by the time of the Song of Deborah; it is curious that Professor Rowley here cuts the ground from under his feet by trans-

ferring the Schechem covenant of Joshua xxiv to the Amarna age. There is after all some evidence for a southern tradition of non-Mosaic Yahwism but surely none at all for a northern.

Space forbids any extended discussion of Professor Rowley's provocative revival of the Kenite hypothesis of Israel's Yahwism. The tide is perhaps setting against this theory: it has recently been rejected by such different scholars as Heinisch, Proksch, Elmslie and Fleming James. Its great weakness is the need to postulate that the Kenites were a Midianite clan. There is no real evidence for this and a certain amount against it, so that Proksch can say roundly "*die Qainiter haben sonst nirgends etwas mit den Midianitern zu tun*" [*Theologie des Alten Testaments,* 1949, p. 76]. It is noteworthy, however, that Professor Rowley attributes perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of Israel's religion, its ethical quality, not to the Kenites, but to Moses himself.

No student of the Old Testament could fail to be instructed and stimulated in all kinds of ways by reading this book, for it does not only present Professor Rowley's own point of view, but also sets out very fairly the conclusions of an astonishing range of other scholars. In its own line, it is hard to imagine any work more authoritative and complete appearing for a very long time.

There appears to be one slip of some importance. On p. 135, l. 4, should not "Joseph" be read instead of "Moses"?

J. R. Porter.

Christianity and Physical Science. By G. D. Yarnold. (Mowbrays). 8s. 6d.

In this short and clearly written book, Dr. Yarnold sets out to answer the question, "Can a scientist be a Christian?", and he fulfils his purpose of showing that the answer to the question is an unequivocal "Yes". The book deserves to be widely read, and will help many people at a point where their conscience is rightly tender. It is the substance of open lectures given in the University of Nottingham, where Dr. Yarnold was Lecturer in Physics. He has recently become Chaplain and Lecturer in Divinity at Lincoln Training College.

For Dr. Yarnold science means physical science, and he is convinced that all the sciences are destined to be reduced to physics in so far as they succeed in becoming fully scientific. His argument may be summarized thus: The rationality of the physical universe is not something that we impart to it; it is a direct inference from the fact of the reproductibility of experiments. We can directly

see the sequence of cause and effect in macroscopic mechanical processes—where we can see that things *must* happen as they do, once the well-known characteristics of materials are established. At a deeper level we have to call in entities such as atoms, which are not directly observed, but which, if they are described as behaving in certain ways, explain the observable phenomena. Behind these are the fundamental laws and events expressed in mathematical form. These last are descriptive rather than explanatory "since the essence of explanation consists in accounting for facts in terms of other facts."

At the level of ultimate particles a radical indeterminacy appears at two points: in the "spontaneous" disintegration of radio-active atoms, and in the necessary indetectibility of the precise *speed and position* of an electron. In both cases the statistical uniformities remain, and the sub-atomic indeterminacy is not inconsistent with the rationality of the system as a whole.

So much for physics. It cannot "explain", but only "describe". It cannot answer the question "Why?", but only the question "How ?".

The metaphysical arguments for theism are treated with extreme brevity. But these are only preliminary to the main point; for the Christian has an experience of God which is as real as his experience of the material world; and in the light of God's revelation of himself we can see why the physical universe is as it is; it is the only sort of world in which rational responsible beings can grow. "The goal of creation is human life lived in union with Christ."

Hence, miracles are no scandal, for occasional departures from uniformity are to be expected when the purpose of God justifies them. The uniformities are due to God's constant will operating impersonally (it is suggested this may be at the sub-atomic level where our system of causality breaks down); and the departures from uniformity in miracles are due to the same will operating personally upon due occasion. Science cannot prove that miracles are impossible; but before accepting any alleged miracle we must be satisfied (i) that it is a real breach of established physical law (radio is not miraculous, though it might appear so to a savage); (ii) that the testimony is good; (iii) that it sets forward the revealed purpose of God. The gospel miracles and some (but not all) of those in Acts are submitted to these tests, and are shown, for the most part, to pass them.

In the course of these chapters Dr. Yarnold gives a brief but clear account of the origin of the gospels, and also makes much more explicit the properly religious grounds for faith in God, as

Christ reveals him. Our reaction to the gospel miracles will depend in the last resort on our reaction to the total fact of Christ and his Church. And this surely is the right conclusion.

In the last chapter there is a useful discussion of prayer and the sacraments in a sacramental universe, and an interesting parallel is drawn between "substance" and "value", both being distinct from physical properties. But we are not persuaded that they mean the same, or that the substitution of transvaluation for transsubstantiation will end controversies about the Holy Sacrament.

Dr. Yarnold writes "from faith to faith", and he should be extremely helpful to Christians in difficulty. But one who does not share his faith might also quarrel with his arguments. The argument from religious experience, he might say, begs the whole question of what is and what is not evidence for the existence of non-material entities; to say that "a Christian's prayers are as real as his (not His !) breakfast" is to take refuge in the ambiguity of "real". He might well point out a certain looseness in the use of terms, such as "explanation". Again, the statement that the thing as thought about is always a mental symbol (p. 62) is hard to reconcile with the distinction made between "real objects" and concepts such as mass and energy. Nor, in fact, is mechanical causality working in observable events self-evident. Historically it is a late and difficult growth. He might also ask whether the physicist's confidence that physics will eventually swallow all the other sciences is not going to get us into trouble at the point where mind meets brain. Is not the involuntary duck of the head which makes the bullet miss me in answer to a prayer, as much of a *physical* miracle (on this view) as turning the bullet backwards ? Dr. Yarnold does not discuss the problem of free choice and free thought exercised through a brain which is in all its parts physically determined. Where a little learning is dangerous, he, whose learning is not little, wisely does not tread.

We may also feel that questions of the evidence to matters of fact in the gospels are rather summarily dealt with. Simply to call the evangelist a "liar" is not the only ground on which one may question the reliability of a tradition, as indeed Dr. Yarnold shows himself in many contexts aware. And there is the same tendency to isolate the New Testament miracles both from miracles in the Old Testament and in the subsequent history of the Church, which we find in Dr. C. S. Lewis, but not in the New Testament itself; not to mention the many well-attested super-normal events outside the Christian area altogether.

It must, indeed, give confidence to other Christians to see that a physicist as competent as Dr. Yarnold can hold the whole Chris-

tian faith without any reservations, and to be shown once more that the scientific picture is completed and not contradicted by the Christian account of things. And this, perhaps, is the justification for Dr. Yarnold's statement that "there is no substitute for the exact discipline of the exact sciences. In the work of the Church to-day a knowledge of a modern science is even more valuable than a knowledge of an ancient language, desirable though that may be."

T. R. MILFORD.

A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. By S. J. CURTIS. (Macdonald). 18s.

IN the foreword which Miss Dorothy Sayers has contributed to this book she speaks of the "lucid guidance" afforded her by the brief account of medieval thought which it contains. Lucidity, however, does not appear to me to be a quality for which it can be specially commended. As an introduction to a subject which one is glad to find attracting the general interest to which the existence of a demand for such a book testifies, Mr. Curtis's outline should prove very useful. The writer has gone to good authorities for his facts, and has wisely concentrated attention upon the principal points, avoiding the accumulation of details of secondary importance which might have tempted a conscientious scholar to satisfy his desire for completeness at the risk of distracting and wearying his reader. But the clearness of thought and felicity of language which the epithet "lucid" would suggest are not the most conspicuous merit of the work.

Mr. Curtis quite rightly begins his sketch with St. Augustine as "an essential link between Greek and medieval thought". But no one not already more familiar with the history of the former than one can expect those to be for whom this introduction seems to be intended, could make much of the confused and confusing references to "Platonists" and "Neo-Platonists" in the second paragraph of Ch. I. The distinction between the two groups indicated is nowhere explained, and it is odd to find no mention of Plotinus in this connexion. The remark on p. 16 that "the body participates in the Divine Ideas only through the medium of the soul, for without such a participation it could not have existence", is surely, as it stands, nonsense. Do no "material and extended" bodies exist which are not associated with any soul? If there be any sense in which a body of this kind may be said to exist only through participation in the Divine Ideas. in that sense such par-

ticipation would not be necessarily mediated through a soul, as any knowledge or apprehension of the ideal must, of course, be mediated.

Another instance of confusion of thought—or, perhaps, rather of expression—is to be found on pp. 49, 50. If "Moderate Realism" "represents", as Mr. Curtis tells us, "the view held by Aristotle", it is puzzling to find it also stated that it "was fairly late in development".

Nor is it at all easy to see what the possible adventures of the writings called Aristotelian in the period immediately following Aristotle's death (see p. 105) have to do with the limited knowledge of them possessed by the scholars of the early Middle Ages.

Who could guess, on reading (p. 190), that "Aristotle had described 'man' as a social animal", but that "St. Thomas takes a further step and adds, 'political animal'", that what, in fact, Aristotle said was that man was φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον and that St. Thomas (quite rightly) translated this as *naturaliter animal sociale*? Nor does St. Thomas anywhere, so far as I know, distinguish *politicus* from *socialis*, the two words being regularly treated by him as synonyms of one another and of *civilis*.

What, again, is meant when it is said (p. 219) that the existence of matter without form, though possible, would be "a mere travesty", I cannot conjecture. Perhaps, had a reference been given to some passage in Scotus which Mr. Curtis (who is here epitomizing the teaching of the Subtle Doctor) had in mind, it might have given us a clue. But translation is not his strong point. Difficult though it is (as all those who have tried well know) to render satisfactorily the Latin of medieval philosophers into intelligible English, one cannot but feel that such attempts as that made on p. 64 are so unsuccessful that the boast on the "blurb" that "no reader need fear that lack of knowledge of medieval Latin will prove a barrier to his understanding the thought of the principal philosophers of the Middle Ages, since all extracts from their works are given in translation" was perhaps premature.

The defects in Mr. Curtis's work to which attention has so far been called are, however, not such as to render it valueless as a guide to readers who, without previous acquaintance with medieval Latin or familiarity with the classical background of medieval thought or with philosophical literature in general, may wish to learn the outstanding facts of the history to which it is intended to serve as an introduction. My remaining criticisms will deal with some lapses from accuracy which, occurring in contexts with which the reviewer's own studies happen to have made him familiar, have struck him in his reading of Mr. Curtis's book. On p. 74, in the account of St. Anselm's argument for the existence of God com-

monly called "ontological", he is made (more than once) to speak of *Ens quo maius cogitari nequit*. As a matter of fact, his phrase is *id quo maius cogitari nequit*. I doubt if the word *ens* occurs in his writings, and, although it is used by Boethius, it only, I think, became a term of frequent use in philosophy when the recovery of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* had made it important to have a regular equivalent for Aristotle's τὸ ὄν.

In Ch. V Mr. Curtis speaks, as was formerly usual, of John of Salisbury's two principal works as *Polycraticus* and *Metalogicus* respectively. There is, however, no doubt but that the second of these should be called *Metalogicon*, for John himself expressly tells us so. As to *Polycraticus*, were there any reason for supposing the first four letters of this title to represent πολύς, the occurrence of *i* for *y* in the earliest manuscripts would not trouble one; but if, as Mr. Curtis himself says (and, I think, rightly) on p. 83, the book so called "is intended as a statesman's handbook", then plainly *Policraticus* is correct.

There are a few bibliographical omissions which may be noted. It is said, on p. 80, that there is no English translation of St. Anselm's philosophical writings. Mr. Curtis may be excused for not having discovered one of the *Proslogion* in a book called *The Devotions of St. Anselm*, published by Methuen in 1903. In the account of Catherine of Genoa (pp. 267-8) no reference is made to Baron von Hügel's well-known book, in which her life is studied as an illustration of "the mystical element in Religion". Nor is this important work mentioned on p. 278 among the suggestions for further reading on mysticism. It should have been pointed out on p. 263 that the expression "the candle of the Lord", beloved of the Cambridge Platonists and used by Butler, is derived from Prov. xx, 27.

A few misprints may be mentioned: p. 33, last line: "general" for "genera"; p. 62, "Nichomachean" for "Nicomachean"; p. 89, "Normands" for "Normans"; p. 111, "univerally" for "universally". On p. 218, l. 10 from bottom, should not "not" be omitted?

C. C. J. Webb.

The Salvation of the Nations. By Jean Danielou. Translated by Angeline Bouchard. (Sheed and Ward). 6s.

This is a splendid book by a French Jesuit priest on the urgent need for sound strategy and clear theology in the task of world-wide evangelization. Here a truly catholic outlook finds expression and one feels that some new possibilities in Roman Catholic theo-

logy are showing themselves in this consideration of "the current importance of the missionary question". The basic contention is that "No man is a stranger to the presence of the Word" (p. 16) and "No man is a stranger to the grace coming from Christ", for though sanctifying grace is obtained only through Baptism, there also exists "predisposing actual grace through which God acts in every human soul" (p. 20). Then "the proofs for the existence of God by purely intellectual methods are not the whole story: What is involved is the revelation of a presence" (p. 22). Such a remark is a proof that within the Roman Catholic Church there are signs that the dualism of the Aristotelian and the Platonic traditions in Natural Theology is being overcome. Again, "while God made a special covenant with Israel he is still the God of the whole human race" (p. 25). This affects profoundly missionary strategy, and the author asks about the great world religions: "What must live and what must die?" The true use of tradition involves an element of selection and neither mere acceptance nor complete rejection of what comes from the past. It means that the Church cannot be fulfilled until it contains fully developed within itself the great contributions which other nations will bring, e.g., the Moslem sense of the greatness of God, the imaginative qualities of the African negro, the mystical and monastic instincts of India. So far Christianity "has been refracted only through the Greek and Roman worlds, but it will have to be refracted through the Chinese facet and the Hindu facet in order to attain its total fulfilment"! So the missionary task is described as follows: "It is accidental that Christianity should have been Westernized: we must learn to extricate from its cultural background the essential message of the Gospel and place this message in contact with other civilizations to see in what measure it is to become incarnate in them" (p. 37). "A full-fledged missionary spirituality must not see only the evil in other civilizations nor be so unduly optimistic as to see only the good: it must be at once a spirituality of incarnation and a spirituality of redemption" (p. 47).

Père Danielou gives two chapters to certain aspects of Biblical Theology: he seeks to place the missionary problem within the framework of a Christian view of history and he writes of the mission of the Holy Ghost. These chapters show that there is a real interweaving of constructive theology in both Catholic and Protestant circles going on in our present age.

On the whole, this book is to be warmly commended—but one regret must be expressed. Why is it not possible to find a similar approach to the problem of reunion expressed from the Roman Catholic Church: it is not enough to say that "the pro-

blem of the unity of the Churches is equally mysterious". Sooner or later the theological principles applied to missionary strategy must find some expression in the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to the problem of reunion.

H. K. ARCHDALL.

JOHN CASSIAN. By OWEN CHADWICK. (Cambridge University Press). 15s.

A MONOGRAPH in English of John Cassian has been a long felt need, but the many different aspects of the subjects on which the author would be expected to touch are sufficiently daunting. Cassian straddles both West and East, so there is no question of "sitting out" alternate dances. He forms the link between Eastern and Western monasticism and therefore the writer must have an eye alike for St. Anthony and St. Benedict. He was engaged upon doctrinal controversies alike in connexion with Nestorianism and with Augustinianism, and therefore whoever would offer an assessment of his achievement and personality must be both a Church historian and an historian of dogma.

All this (or nearly all) is given us in Mr. Chadwick's study. He is certainly not blind to the weaknesses of his subject. There is no tendency in Mr. Chadwick to approximate Cassian too closely to St. Benedict. The latter was a born organizer, the former was more satisfied to set out the underlying theological principles, though not without a considerable tincture of common sense. He makes no claim that his subject is a first class theologian, though he measured sword not unsuccessfully against the rising power of Augustinianism. His sources are well noted. Origenist spirituality and above all the important, though little known, figure of Evagrius. His significance is, above all, traced in the monastic life to which he gave a theory and a form in Gaul and in a balanced, though hardly a theological emphasis, upon the outlook upon the Christian life and faith which might be expected in a holy and reasonable monastic.

Such a judgement, fair and reasonable though it is, is not all that Mr. Chadwick gives us. His work opens with a masterly summary of trends and policies in Egyptian monasticism by way of setting the stage for John Cassian, and his achievement. There is no extravagant laudation of the more sordid side of Egyptian monasticism, although Mr. Chadwick is not prepared to go to the extent of ascribing a philosophical dualism to monasticism, whole or in part. He deals briefly, though sensibly, with the vexed question of the historical authority of the Collationes, in which he shows him-

self well abreast of the more recent work on the subject. The scene then shifts to Gaul, where the intervention of Cassian is shown to have directed Gallic monasticism away from early rigorism in the direction of a milder coenobite organization. It appears, like its more famous successor, the Benedictine Rule, as a rule for beginners. Mr. Chadwick then proceeds to analyse the rule which does not, as he notes, bear the marks of a specially capable draughtsman, and points out the obscurity of the provisions about obedience, the treatment of work (not as an end in itself, but merely as a remedy against idleness) and the obscurity of the liturgical provisions which have served rather to darken counsel than to throw plain light on liturgical problems.

Mr. Chadwick, having established his competence in the realm of early monastic history, now proceeds to treat of ascetical theology. Here he is not so busy expounding what was, after all, the real strength of John Cassian, as to fail to notice the conflict between Origenist and anthropomorphic spirituality, with an interesting discussion on the reactions of these two forces on the monastic history of the period, or to underline the significance of that enigmatic figure, Evagrius of Pontus. Cassianic ascetic theology is really only Evagrian ascetic theology turned in a manner which would adapt it for Gallic conditions. Your reviewer is inclined to disagree with the contrast drawn between the New Testament spirituality and that of ascetic theology. St. Paul, for example, can speak of the "upward calling of God in Christ Jesus" and St. Ignatius, in his famous Triadic image in Ephesians ix shows that the thought is not strange to him either. Mr. Chadwick presses the New Testament evidence too hard when he insists that its total message is that the goal had already, through God's acts, been reached. This view, like that of Professor Dodd upon which it is presumably based, is an over-simplification of the facts. The influence of Origenism on ascetical theology is, however, well laid down and we are prepared for the doctrinal *pièce de resistance* of the book, the part played by Cassian in the Augustinian controversy.

Here, there are many wise *obiter dicta,* and the whole tangled skein of events is briefly set out before the reader. The significance of the tension between grace and effort in the monastic life is certainly an important point, though it ought not to be forgotten that Pelagius also was a monk and that St. Augustine hedged the episcopal office with a certain aura of monasticism. Monastic witness on this point did not wholly point one way. Mr. Chadwick is right that behind John Cassian's abhorrence of some Augustinian developments lay the milder and less clear-cut Eastern doctrines of man and the fall, though the protests of St. Vincent of

Lerins showed that it did not take an Easterner to find this uncongenial.

Finally, there is the short and rather painful episode of intervention of Cassian in the Nestorian affair. Here he does not come out of it very well. Christology just was not his subject. The connexion between Nestorianism and Pelagianism may, however, well be closer than Mr. Chadwick makes it out to be. It is clear that some of the assumptions which have been made about the doctrinal affinities of John Cassian with the School of Antioch will need to be thought again in the light of the evidence put forward by Mr. Chadwick. The question of his birthplace is so vexed that it can hardly help us. If he has points of contact with St. Chrysostom, he was also deeply influenced by Origenist spirituality. If his "light" doctrine of the effects of the fall indicates the East, it does not necessarily imply Antioch, while his opposition to Nestorius is somehow tempered by passages which have a certain Nestorian ring about them. But the same can, after all, be said of the Tome of Leo.

Many of us have a sneaking sympathy with semi-Augustinianism in the doctrine of grace. If Mr. Chadwick is not altogether of our company, he at least shows us a doctrinal controversy fought, on the whole, between gentlemen, and a defeated standpoint which, if only as a "Yes but", succeeded in saving the Church from the worst rigours of Augustinian logic, and which gave much-needed time to prevent the Church from being swept in reaction from Pelagianism into a doctrinal position from which alike retreat and development would have been equally difficult.

H. E. W. Turner.

Medieval Studies Presented to Rose Graham. Edited by Veronica Ruffer and A. J. Taylor. (O.U.P.). No price.

These studies in clerical and monastic life in the Middle Ages have been presented to Dr. Rose Graham, on her seventy-fifth birthday, by a circle of distinguished medievalists, her friends and admirers. Their names are enough to make any other medievalist desire to possess the book, and the subjects of the essays, from the community of the medieval village to an unfortunate homicide by William Beverley, Archdeacon of Northumberland, and its sequel in the Church courts, are enough to interest those who, not being historians, like to look through any open window on to past centuries.

As to Dr. Rose Graham herself, the home ties which originally prevented a promising young Oxford historian from taking up academic work proved themselves, in the end, a great boon to English

historical scholarship, to learned societies, and, in particular, to the Canterbury and York Society. The bibliography of Rose Graham's published writings occupies eight pages, all the books and articles the result of work on original sources illuminated by an informed judgement. Beyond this, Miss Graham has been always ready with advice and assistance to those working in the medieval field: her seventy-five years have advanced the study of monasticism in England, particularly of the Cluniac order, of English episcopal registers (she edited the Register of Archbishop Winchelsey herself) and of medieval ecclesiastical institutions.

The contributors include Helen M. Cam, who writes about the English village as a legal community, able to sue and be sued; John Compton Dickinson, who discusses some early suppressions of English houses of Austin canons; Ernest Fraser Jacob, on a disputed election at Fountains Abbey; Claude Jenkins, on the correspondence between an Augsburg physician and his undergraduate nephew, beginning in 1456 and extending through the latter's career till 1472; M. David Knowles, Alexander Hamilton Thompson, and seven other accomplished medievalists. The short paper on "Monks and Friars", by D. H. S. Cranage, is apparently a tribute of affection, and of altogether slighter calibre than the rest. Of particular interest, as showing what medieval monks thought themselves of the origin and history of the monastic institute, is William Abel Pantin's discussion of some medieval English treatises on the origin of monasticism. The writers of these treatises, still in manuscript, deal with community life in the Old Testament, with the Essenes, in the New Testament and Acts, with the Egyptian monks, with the rule of St. Benedict, and with the later religious orders: in one case, with a Benedictine of Bury St. Edmunds, who collected passages dealing with monasticism from the writings of St. Jerome and Cassian onwards, antedating the labours of Professor David Knowles. Those who like the Middle Ages will like this book.

M. Deanesly.

Medieval Papalism: The Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists. By Walter Ullmann. (Methuen). 18s.

This book contains the Maitland Lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1948, and consists of six chapters. After an introductory lecture on the canonists and canonistic scholarship Dr. Ullmann discusses the canonists' doctrine of the Natural Law and of the relation of the Pope to it. This provides the setting of the second half of the book in which the idea of the papal plenitude of power, and the

claim to world dominion with the consequent results in political conflicts with the secular rulers are set out. Dr. Ullmann writes: "The supremacy of the pope in spiritual matters was a point that aroused no more than a transitory interest among medieval writers: all the more interest was evoked by, and all the more energy was spent on, the proof that the pope was superior to the emperor in all temporal aspects of life. *Omnes subsunt ei jure divino*—everybody is subject to his jurisdiction—*parem non habet super terram*—nor has he any equal on earth. Both these statements, recurring over and over again in canonistic writings, have to be taken literally: the idea of hyperbole was foreign to the canonists." The whole tragic story of the conflict of Empire and Papacy which began in attempts to reform and ended in ruining the medieval Church has often been told. In this book Dr. Ullmann sketches in part of the background which has sometimes been unnoticed because of its inaccessibility. Very little of canonistic literature of the Middle Ages is available in print and that which is makes slow and difficult reading. Dr. Ullmann has a very considerable familiarity with both the manuscript and the printed sources and it is this immense knowledge which gives its real value to the book. It is doubtful whether the picture given by the Carlyles in their great work on *Medieval Political Theory in the West* is substantially altered by this new book, and most readers who are familiar with the older work will demur at Dr. Ullmann's criticism of it, but it is good to have one section of the subject so very amply documented, and these lectures will be of the greatest help to future students.

ERIC KEMP.

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